795.00/4–1051
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)
Subject: Australian Suggestions with Respect to a Settlement in Korea
| Participants: | The Australian Ambassador, Mr. Makin |
| Mr. David McNichol, First Secretary, Australian Embassy | |
| FE—Mr. Rusk | |
| BNA—Mr. Shullaw |
The Australian Ambassador, Mr. Makin, called on me today and briefly reviewed the points which he had made in his conversation with Mr. Merchant on April 91 concerning the possibility of a renewed effort to negotiate a settlement of the Korean question. Briefly [Page 325] the Ambassador said that his Government believed this might be the last opportunity for negotiating a settlement because hostilities might spread with the launching of another Chinese offensive. He mentioned two points in particular: the desirability of establishing contact with Peiping and of reaching agreement among ourselves on minimum political objectives in Korea and on other Far Eastern questions.
In replying to the Ambassador’s remarks, I mentioned the fact that in attempting to arrive at an agreed position with our friends, there was a tendency to move to our minimum position. The other side might attempt to halve the difference and the pressure would be on us to accept the “compromise”, even though our basic position might be undermined thereby.
With respect to other Far Eastern problems, I said that it had always been our conviction that aggressors should not be permitted to charge a price for their aggression. The issue, I pointed out, remains aggression in Korea, and the Chinese Communists should not be permitted an opportunity to distort the issue so that it would appear the war was being waged for the purpose of preventing the seating of their representatives in the UN, or over Formosa.
I told the Ambassador that it was a difficult problem to define war aims in Korea without appearing to surrender our political objectives of unification of the country. Our minimum political objective must continue to be unification of Korea, but this is not necessarily a military objective.
In discussing Formosa I reminded the Ambassador of our special responsibilities in the North Asian area which gave us a special interest in this Question not shared in the same degree by our friends. Furthermore I said that it was reasonable to ask what kind of a China we would be turning Formosa over to—a power aggressively inclined toward its neighbors, a power which might turn the island over to the Soviet Union for use in operations against the free world? I also mentioned the fact that, quite apart from the question of Chiang Kaishek, we cannot be indifferent to the implications of turning over the large non-Communist population of Formosa to Communist rule. I told the Ambassador that while in an absolute sense we must continue to regard Europe as the priority area in the struggle with the Soviet Union, there is the possibility that the Soviet will not choose to make Europe the immediate field of contest. If instead, it were to choose the Far East as the area in which to push its aggressive schemes, then territory in the Pacific, such as Formosa, would take on added importance. I said that we had reached no conclusions on this question but we were studying its implications.
So far as establishing contact with Peiping is concerned, I pointed out to the Ambassador that there has been no lack of opportunity for [Page 326] the Chinese Communists to talk with us about a settlement had they been so inclined. They still have these opportunities, but it seems apparent from all the information which we have that there is no desire on their part to enter into negotiations at this time.
- Memorandum of conversation by Mr. Merchant, April 9, not printed (795.00/4–951).↩