795.00/4–951: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State
1385. Re: Korea—possible Asian-Arab appeal.
Palar (Indonesia) called at his request today. He identified himself as the unnamed Asian colleague on whose behalf Rau had approached us on March 26 for an Asian appeal to the PRC and UN that no forces should cross the 38th parallel (mytel 1330, March 26).
He was speaking as the rep of his govt and not on behalf of Asian-Arab group in raising this question. He thought it likely that members of that group would present their views to USUN within a day or two. His position is based upon fear of general war and its effect on the future of his govt. General war might be expected to destroy Indonesia as a democratic state and delay indefinitely its economic development for lack of capital from US. After a third world war the US would probably not be in a position to set up a new Marshall Plan and to make capital available to Indonesia. Therefore, while opinion in the Asian-Arab group has not crystallized, he was advocating a step which admittedly would sacrifice the prestige of the UN to some extent in order to preserve peace. He sees this as primarily a great power problem with the immediate solution the bringing together of the great powers even though hostilities continue.
A forthcoming PRC offensive might well mean general war and therefore some appeal should be issued to fore-stall the offensive. He recalled the criticism of the Asian-Arab states for dividing their proposal of 12 December into two draft res, which the PRC had interpreted as indicating their siding with the west and lacking in impartiality. Recalling that Indonesia had stood against dividing the two proposals for that very reason he thought that experience dictates that an appeal be made now to lay a foundation for effective negotiation [Page 323] after a Chinese offensive has started and when the UN forces might be in a far less advantageous position than now.
Speaking for himself, he is considering an appeal to the PRC not to go south of the 38th parallel. Although he realizes the difficulty of UN or any group in it appealing to the UN itself, he thinks there should be a correlative appeal to the UN forces not to go north of the 38th parallel. Such an appeal might be made by some undefined group other than the Asian-Arab states. This would preserve the bilateral character of the operation and involves an admitted sacrifice of prestige. This was essence of repetitive presentation in which he stressed particularly the importance of time as indicating some sort of appeal.
Gross pointed out the similar aims and responsibilities of US and Indonesia as UN members in dealing with the matter of aggression which is something distinct from fighting. The UN theory to which the US subscribes has been from the start that firm opposition to aggression is the way to avoid general war by indicating to PRC and USSR the determination of the UN to stand on principle and operate as a collective security organization. It should not quickly be forgotten that many appeals have been made and none has been answered. He picked three examples: (a) the appeal of the Asian powers of Dec. 5, (b) the very careful formulation by the UC of the terms of a cease fire along the general line of the 38th parallel as published by the GOC and (c) Entezam’s communication to the PRC in which he acted as GA Pres, quite distinct from his role as member of GOC. Gross reiterated that all these appeals are unanswered.
He suggested very strongly that the present focal point in the problem of communicating with the PRC is through Entezam. His efforts have properly been not to arrange a settlement but to bring the PRC into a position to negotiate with appropriate authorities. In answer to Gross’ questions Palar indicated no ideas on what further he or the group could do to aid in Entezam’s efforts. Gross pointed out that Entezam is singularly important to the group as being one of its members as well.
Given the UN purpose of firmness in meeting aggression, Gross warned that group appeals might well undermine the entire operation. He recalled press accounts of consideration that has been given to a statement by states contributing military units in Korea. In fact, he observed that thought is being given to a statement by the UC which would contain no new elements but drawing together a carefully formulated view of what the purpose of the UN in Korea is. Naturally this had been examined with states supplying troops and would also be considered with the GOC. The fact that there is not an intention for the group to issue a statement is indication of US view that statements [Page 324] by groups in UN are divisive rather than unifying. Palar expressed great satisfaction at fact that proposed statement would not contain any new elements.
Gross felt and we had communicated this to Rau after Palar’s idea was originally presented on the instructions of the Department that the sort of appeal or appeals Palar is considering would be premature, unwise and possibly dangerous to the security of UN forces in Korea. This would put an additional burden on UN troops and would be a one-way valve contrary to the security of UN forces because they would probably pay no attention at all to it. He stressed very strongly this general position and urged Palar to consider how he and the Asian-Arab group might strengthen and assist Entezam’s efforts. As to Palar’s point that now is the time for an appeal, Gross felt that it is far more important to be sound on the substance than to act precipitously. Furthermore, if there is an offensive from the north facts may very well indicate that after the offensive has been commenced or possibly halted it is a far more effective time to get on with the negotiation looking toward the settlement we both want.
Palar intends to discuss rather generally with UN dels his views along the above lines but does not intend to see the USSR del. Gross held himself at the disposal of Palar to discuss problem further at any time. He also would be available to Asian-Arab group whenever it might wish to pursue the subject.