Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

795.00/4–1051

Memorandum of Conversation, by Robert E. Barbour of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs

secret

[Washington,] April 10, 1951.

Subject: Briefing of Ambassadors on Korea

Participants:	Australia	—Mr. McNichol, Second Secretary
	Belgium	—Mr. Rothschild, Counselor and Mr. Callebaut, Attaché
	Canada	—Ambassador Wrong
	France	—Mr. Millet, Counselor
	Great Britain	—Mr. Tomlinson, Counselor
	Greece	—Ambassador Politis
	Netherlands	—Ambassador van Roijen
	New Zealand	—Ambassador Berendsen
	Philippines	—Ambassador Elizalde
	Thailand	—Ambassador Wan
	Turkey	—Mr. Esenbel, Counselor
	Union of South Africa.	—Ambassador Jooste and Mr. Jarvie, Counselor
	United States	—UNA—Mr. Hickerson
		EUR—Mr. Allen
		UNP—Mr. Henkin
		FE—Mr. Heidemann
		FE—Mr. Barbour
		Major McBride—Army
		Captain Maertens—Army

New figures on Communist strength were listed as follows:

North Korean troops in action	29,000
Chinese Communist troops in action	88,000
North Korean troops in rear areas	183,000
Chinese Communist troops in rear areas	382,000
Guerrillas	13,000
Total	695,000

Major McBride said that the increase in strength estimates reflected a belief that the Chinese Communist 18th Army Group of 100,000 men had moved into the forward areas in Korea. He reported that enemy rocket fire had been encountered for the first time in several months and that the enemy had, during the past four days, launched several small probing attacks accompanied by intense small arms and mortar fire. All of these attacks had been repulsed. He said that it was possible that the Communists were attempting to anchor their defense line on the Hwachon Reservoir, adding that the opening of the floodgates of this Reservoir had had no appreciable effect on the tactical situation in the area.

Captain Maertens reported the highlights of UN activities during the period as follows:

(1) UN forces continued to advance toward “Line Kansas”: In the west advancing units crossed this line but were still eight to ten miles away from it in the east.

(2) A task force was dispatched to secure the Hwachon Reservoir Dam and at last reports was approximately two miles from its objective.

(3) Continued moderate advances put UN forces across the 38th parallel in all corps areas.

(4) The 41st Royal Marine Commandos landed at Songjin, 75 miles from the Soviet-Korean border, destroyed considerable railroad trackage and withdrew without having suffered any casualties.

In reply to a question by Ambassador Politis, Major McBride said that indications that the enemy intended to launch a counteroffensive were based upon the continued southbound movement of vehicular traffic and the build-up of his ground forces, as evidenced by the arrival of the 18th Army Group and the movement of two North Korean corps toward the front. In answer to Ambassador Jooste’s question as to whether the build-up of enemy forces could not also be interpreted as a defensive measure, Major McBride replied that this might possibly be the case. He agreed with Ambassador Jooste that the Communist forces had taken no initiative recently and that they were not, at present, “heavily engaged”. Major McBride stated, in answer to another question by Ambassador Jooste, that insofar as he was aware there was no line objective beyond “Line Kansas”.

Mr. Hickerson said that we had nothing new to report on the statement of UN objectives in Korea as outlined by Mr. Rusk at the last briefing. We currently feel that the statement should be in the form of a report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for the information of individual members in accordance with the resolution of July 7, 1950, which requested periodic status reports. Mr. Hickerson said that thus far all such reports had been purely military but that a report such as the one Mr. Rusk had mentioned would be signed by the President of the United States in his capacity as Chief Executive of the State providing the Unified Command and would follow the text with which they were familiar. He emphasized that we had made no definite decision on this matter as yet. We would possibly want to see the members of the group individually or collectively some time before Friday’s briefing.¹

Mr. Hickerson added that President Entezam had called recently to say that there had been absolutely no response to his approaches to the Chinese Communist Government, and there was no indication that a reply could be expected. Entezam said that he had no new appeal in mind.

1. At the briefing on Friday, April 13, the following remarks were attributed to Mr. Hickerson concerning the proposed statement:

   “Mr. Hickerson told the group that although the events of the preceding 48 hours [see the editorial note, p. 298] had not changed our views on making some sort of a statement on the present situation in Korea, these events had affected the timing of such a statement. He explained that we had not yet taken any final decision on the matter but were still thinking of a report signed by the President to the Secretary General of the United Nations for the information of the member states. No statement would be made until next week at the earliest, he said, and we would wish to consult with the members of the group when our position had been clarified.” (795.00/4–1351)