795.00/4–651
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitze)
Subject: Korea
| Participants: | UK | US |
| Sir Oliver Franks | General Bradley | |
| Lord Tedder1 | Admiral Sherman | |
| Mr. B. A. B. Burrows2 | Col. Cams4 | |
| Capt. Coleridge, BJSM3 | Mr. Paul H. Nitze |
General Bradley opened the discussion by bringing forth a chart [Page 308] which showed the location of airfields and the estimated number of planes on them in North Korea, Manchuria, North China, and Siberia. The chart indicated approximately 800 planes in North Korea, Manchuria, and North China on some 90 airfields. Lord Tedder said that their intelligence roughly corresponded with ours, but might be somewhat lower as to the number of planes which would be actually operational. Sir Oliver indicated that it was important that there be agreement between London and Washington as to the facts. He gave the impression that his government was somewhat inclined to believe that our figures might be exaggerated.
General Bradley read the directive which he proposed to clear with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State and the President with the view to obtaining their authorization to issue it upon a determination by the JCS that the situation contemplated by the directive had in fact arisen.5
Sir Oliver said that he had certain preliminary comments. He felt there were far-reaching political implications to the decision involved, and that his government would feel that this was a decision which would have to be taken by the responsible Ministers. His government felt that if the state of facts occurred it would be desirable to give a preliminary warning, the warning to be endorsed by as many of the U.N. governments as possible. The state of facts might be reported to a special meeting of the U.N. He said his government attached considerable importance to the final decision being made in Washington. Admiral Sherman pointed out the importance of quick action in the event the state of facts took place and asked whether it would not be possible to give a warning before the event rather than after it. Sir Oliver said his government would give consideration to this question, but that he wanted to emphasize that his Ministers felt deeply their responsibility to Parliament and would not take lightly having a decision of this type taken by the U.S. JCS on behalf of all participants. It would be much easier for his government to go along with the consequences of such an action if they had participated in the decision.
There then followed some discussion as to the danger of an attack and as to the damage which it might cause in the event that it might be delivered. Lord Tedder felt that the important criterion was whether the attack was damaging. He said that the effects of such an attack often appeared much more serious right at the time then subsequently turned out to be the fact.
Admiral Sherman emphasized the important impact that such an attack would have upon public opinion in this country. Lord Tedder asked about the amount of anti-aircraft defense which was available [Page 309] in South Korea. General Bradley said that he would look into the question.
Mr. Nitze raised the question of an attack on Japan. Sir Oliver said he could not express the views of his government, but his personal feeling was “that would be it.”
- Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord Tedder was Chairman of the British Joint Services Mission in Washington.↩
- Counselor of the British Embassy.↩
- Col. Edwin H. J. Cams, Deputy Secretary to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff.↩
- Secretary to the British Joint Services Mission.↩
- See the annex to this memorandum.↩
- Information in the JCS Files indicates that on April 6 or 7 the authority requested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff: was approved by the President, the Department of Defense, and the Department of State. Notification of this approval was not, however, sent forward to General MacArthur prior to his removal from command.↩