795.00/4–651
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson)
| Participants: | Mr. Hume Wrong, Ambassador of Canada |
| Mr. J. H. van Roijen, Ambassador of the Netherlands | |
| Baron Silvercruys, Ambassador of Belgium | |
| Mr. Joaquin M. Elizalde, Ambassador of the Philippines | |
| Mr. Millet, Counselor of French Embassy | |
| Mr. John Hickerson, Assistant Secretary of State |
At the end of the regular briefing session today with the representatives of countries having military forces in Korea, the above mentioned gentlemen cornered me after the others had left and asked about the President’s statement at his press conference yesterday in response to a question as to whether General MacArthur had been given authority to bomb bases in Manchuria in the event of an air attack on UN troops.1
Mr. Millet led off with the questioning and said that the French Government had understood that the countries with military forces in Korea would be consulted before any such instructions were given. I replied that during the month of January we gave a number of governments, including the French Government and I believed, practically all of the countries with military forces in Korea, assurances that the proposed Chinese aggression resolution did not confer any [Page 307] additional authority for military action beyond that already covered in various other resolutions; I added that we carefully pointed out that in the event of a massive air attack against UN forces, the Unified Command must reserve the right to take counter-measures including bombing of the bases from which the attacking planes came. I added that at that time we gave assurances that we would, if possible, consult in advance with the interested governments but that we could not be absolutely sure that there would be time for this for military reasons. I added that those assurances still were valid and that the situation in that regard had not changed.
The Belgian Ambassador asked if this meant that General MacArthur would have to communicate with Washington before he could bomb the bases in the event of a massive air attack. I replied that it did.
Mr. Millet asked if it wouldn’t be a good idea in view of the importance of this question for us to consult with other governments now. I replied that we had thought that we were consulting in January when we gave these assurances.
Mr. van Roijen, Ambassador of the Netherlands, asked if it would not be a good idea to make sure that the enemy knew that if they made a massive air attack on the UN forces that there would be retaliation against their bases in Manchuria. Mr. Millet immediately expressed some opposition to this. I commented that my own feeling is that the enemy hasn’t much doubt that their bases would be bombed if they made a massive air attack on UN troops. I added that an effort to get such a warning to them would raise all sorts of additional and complicated problems.
- Mr. Truman had replied to the question by stating that it involved a military strategy matter on which he could not comment. (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1951, p. 217)↩