795.00/4–651: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State
1370. For Hickerson from Gross. Conversation with Malik (USSR). At Protitch1 reception evening of Apr 5, conversation developed between Malik and myself along following lines.
Malik, as at several recent meetings, was in an amiable and conversational mood. After a bantering exchange of no significance, Malik struck a serious note re “American war preparations”. We had the usual interchange in which I stressed the defensive basis of the program [Page 310] to strengthen ourselves and those who supported the UN Charter, and in which Malik repeated the standard Cominform line.
Malik then brought Korea into the conversation as “evidence” of our “aggressiveness”, referring in the same way to our “seizure of Formosa”. When I reminded him that we had withdrawn our forces from Korea and had returned only under a UN mandate to repel aggression, Malik replied that the Soviet Union had also withdrawn its forces from Korea. He proceeded with some vehemence that nobody could believe the US really considered Korea essential to our security. Korea was thousands of miles from the US but only 65 miles from important Soviet area and with border on China. I commented that our objectives in Korea were perfectly clear, had been openly stated, and were identical with the objectives of the UN in Korea. I said that public opinion of the world generally understood that the North Korean Forces would not have committed aggression last June without the approval of the Soviet Govt. Open Soviet support in UN of North Korean actions confirmed this. I asked what are the Soviet objectives in Korea?
Malik replied the answer is very simple, that his govt “wants a peaceful solution”. On the other hand, the US Govt “perhaps because of the influence of General MacArthur” wants to conquer the Far East even if this means world war. I said this was nonsense and honestly believed Malik knew it was nonsense.
There followed somewhat lengthy and general discussion in which Malik repeated his usual line of “monopoly”, “warmongers”, etc.
I said I thought conduct is the best text of intention and reminded Malik of the frequent efforts of the UN to find a peaceful solution which did not involve surrender to aggression. I referred specifically to the current efforts of Entezam to establish contact with Peiping and asked Malik whether he could explain why Chinese Communist Govt had not given a reply to Entezam. Malik became noticeably guarded and evasive, leaving me with the impression he is not well-informed on the matter, rather than that he wished to conceal what he knew. I did not consider it appropriate to pursue the matter further and let the matter drop with the remark that it was all the more puzzling to understand why the CPG should refuse to acknowledge an approach from the President of the GA, since surely the CPG did not consider the GA or the President of the Assembly “illegal”. Malik replied in a half-joking manner that since the GA did not recognize the Chinese Communist Govt, perhaps the latter did not recognize the President. [Gross.]
- Dragoslav Protitch was Principal Director of the U.N. Department of Security Council Affairs.↩