795.00/3–2951: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State
1342. Re Proposed Statement on Korea. Pursuant to telecons with Hickerson, Gross and Ross called on Entezam and Grafstrom late [Page 273] Wednesday afternoon, Mar 28. Gross said that consistent with our desire to support GOC we wanted to keep them informed as fully as possible concerning our activities and thinking. He said consideration was being given to the issuance of a statement, probably President as Chief Executive of Govt designated by UN as UC. We were consulting govts with combat forces in Korea and indications received thus far from most of these govts were favorable. It was not yet certain but probable that statement would be issued. Idea of statement had been conceived before issuance MacArthur statement end of last week and there was no relation between two. Indicating that statement was not yet crystallized as document beyond working-level paper, Gross then summarized our thinking as to content of proposed statement.
Most significant aspect of ensuing discussion was that both Entezam and Graftstrom revealed substantial doubt concerning (a) desirability of issuing any statement; (b) if statement were to be issued whether issuance by President (UC) was most desirable form or method; and (c) if statement were to be issued whether now is appropriate time.
First question asked by both Entezam and Grafstrom was purpose or objective in issuing statement. Gross summarized purpose as follows: (a) To make clear beyond shadow of doubt that UC (and govts with combat forces) desired peaceful settlement Korean affair; (b) to reaffirm UN objectives in Korea; (c) to make clear there was no obligation (commitment) to take over (liberate) NK by force.
Analyzing pros and cons, Entezam then said on side of advantage he could see that it might be desirable (a) to clarify situation in a sense that might even be interpreted as directive to UC in field, and (b) to indicate that in victorious position UC (UN) was still desirous of peaceful settlement. On disadvantageous side Entezam wondered (a) about propriety of issuing statement in manner indicated and in this connection speculated about role of SC and GA in matter of this kind, and (b) while understanding that such statement might be desirable for our public opinion, whether Chi Communists would consider it as appeasement or as a threat.
Gross interposed that no threat was intended, referring in this connection to references to prevention spread of hostilities and specific reference to interests of neighboring states. Gross said Dept would, of course, be interested in knowing what Entezam and Grafstrom felt about possible effect of issuance of statement on work of GOC.
Entezam said that without any contact with Chi Communists it was difficult say what effect would be on GOC work. He said they were not in position at moment to tell Chinese Communists to hurry up with their reply. He assumed if statement were issued GOC would [Page 274] have duty of trying to interpret statement as an overture, that is, a new démarche or step in direction of peaceful settlement.
(Re contact with Chinese Communists, Grafstrom reported that Swedish Minister Peiping, inquiring of acting FonMin when Pres of GA might expect reply to communication, was promised by Acting FonMin he would take matter up his govt. This interview, which was apparently very recent, was not interpreted, however, as promise there would be reply).
Grafstrom, raising anew question of what is object of issuing statement, said there was nothing new in it, that it was not really a declaration of peace aims, that in one respect it was more rigid than five principles, and that with regard to Formosa and FE it seemed very vague. He concluded tentatively that statement would not improve chance of favorable reply from Chinese Communists re first steps toward peaceful settlement. Elaborating this thought Graftstrom at later point said that from what was known this would not be statement that would encourage Chinese Communists to “bite” if they have not already through other channels, e.g. Indians or GOC. He was frankly puzzled, therefore, as to why we felt it necessary to issue statement.
Entezam said he was quite sure that if any contact had been established with Chinese or were likely to be within short period, it would be better not to issue statement. Since there was no contact it was very difficult to know whether Communists would or would not respond favorably. As he understood it there was no intention of laying down any new policy or indicating any new direction of policy.
Gross expressed view that statement would in effect codify existing policy. He stressed psychological-political advantages to be gained by issuance of statement. Referring to Grafstrom’s remarks, Gross indicated that statement, if issued, would carry general implication that without renouncing UN political objectives, political and not military methods should be used to achieve those objectives. While making clear that military task did not end at 38th Parallel statement would imply in effect that NK future settlement would be sought by political rather than by military means.
Entezam, agreeing with concept that 38th Parallel is not a military line, queried what would be next line from military view point. He thought it would be better to wait until that line is reached before issuing statement. Statement issued at that time in nature of “peace offer” and carrying implication that if peace offer were not accepted at that time military operations would continue, even if Chinese territory were involved, would be clearer and more convincing and generally understood as generous offer in victorious situation.
[Page 275]Gross indicated that we were engaged in Korea essentially in war of maneuver, not of lines. There was no evidence that Chinese communists had given up idea of new offensive or of their determination to drive UN forces into sea. It was difficult to imagine practical line which would ensure against Chinese Communist break through.
Grafstrom, conceding that statement might reassure Chinese Communists on point of renunciation of force to achieve political objectives, questioned whether issuance by Pres (UC) was right “form”; in other words, was this right approach from UN “constitutional viewpoint”. He thought there might be better way of communicating idea to Chinese Communists. On balance he thought statement might make it more difficult to establish contact with them.
Gross observed that while we had to take Chinese Communist side of picture into account we should not, however, forget UN side and desirability of clarifying picture on that side.
Discussion concluded with suggestion by Entezam that if we really wanted statement to be known to Chinese Communists we might consider issuing it as major broadcast. Entezam was also interested in knowing whether anyone outside combat group had been consulted, to which we replied in negative. He was then quite insistent that our discussion be kept secret so that they would be in position of disclaiming any knowledge of statement before reading about it in the papers. He agreed, however, that it might be appropriate for us later to state publicly we had given to GOC members copies of statement shortly before issuance “for their information.”