Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

795.00/3–2951

Memorandum of Conversation, by Ward P. Allen of the Bureau of European Affairs

secret

[Washington,] March 29, 1951.

Subject: Proposed Statement on Korea

Participants:	M. Edmund P. Callebaut, Belgian Embassy
	Ward P. Allen—EUR

Calling at his request, M. Callebaut expressed a desire to be brought up to date on the issuance of the draft statement on Korea and probable developments. Claiming to be speaking only privately, M. Callebaut expressed some doubts about the present utility and timing of the statement, particularly in its relationship to General MacArthur’s statement of March 24th. He felt that, while portions of the latter were very indiscreet, the subsequent “disclaimer and rebuke” by the US Government was very strong indeed. The proposed statement if immediately issued might be interpreted as further “backing away” from MacArthur’s views and a weakening of our position in the face of the Chinese Communists’ rejection.¹ He referred in this connection to the importance of not undercutting MacArthur’s basic position in the area as the Supreme Commander. M. Callebaut suggested that the statement might contain a reference to General MacArthur’s statement and explain that it was by way of clarification of the former.

As to the statement itself, I indicated that we have now received favorable comments from all countries consulted, except the UK, whose views would, I hope, be forthcoming shortly. The text was in process of revision to incorporate most of the drafting comments made by various countries but had not been changed in substance. No decision had been reached on the timing of possible issuance and the pertinent views he had put forward we, of course, were bearing in mind. As a personal view, I said that it seemed unlikely that a statement would be issued this week.

M. Callebaut expressed interest in our estimate of the possibilities of full scale Soviet intervention. He indicated some fear that the USSR was planning to soft pedal its activities in Europe, move against the US in Korea and Japan in the relatively near future, and seek to woo Europe into maintaining a neutral position. Without speculating on Soviet intentions, I expressed confidence that any such maneuver if it were attempted would not succeed, provided his government and others were determined not to be fooled by it. Since the USSR usually likes to use its satellites and stooges and prefers not to commit itself directly until it feels fairly confident of victory, this should make them pause before deciding on any full scale warfare in Korea.

When I suggested as perhaps a more imminent possibility a holding action in Korea and a strong Chinese Communist offensive in Indochina, M. Callebaut agreed that this would be tempting to Peiping. However, according to the views of the Counselor of the Belgian Embassy, who had just come from China, the Communist hold in South China is relatively weak. Since the Southern warlords are not convinced Communists, their allegiance to Peiping is not firm. He felt, therefore, that the warlords and chiefs would be very reluctant either to send the troops under their control into Indochina and thus deprive themselves of their local strength, or to acquiesce in the influx of northern Chinese armies in order for them to start an offensive in Vietnam.

1. On March 29, Peking radio had broadcast a statement issued on the previous day by the spokesman of the Chinese People’s Committee for World Peace and Against U.S. Aggression which termed MacArthur’s statement an insult and an attempt to intimidate the Chinese people and called for a redoubled effort to liberate all of Korea by driving out the aggressors whose primary intention was to invade China from Korea (795.00/3–3051).