795.00/3–2751

Memorandum of Conversation, by Robert E. Barbour of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs1

secret

Subject: Briefing of Ambassadors on Korea

Participants: Australia —Mr. McNichol, Second Secretary
Belgium —Ambassador Silvercruys and Mr. Taymans, Counselor
Canada —Ambassador Wrong
France —Mr. Millet, Counselor
Great Britain —Mr. Tomlinson, Counselor
Greece —Ambassador Politis
Luxembourg —Minister Le Gallais
Netherlands —Mr. de Bens, Minister P.
New Zealand —Ambassador Berendsen and Mr. Laking, Counselor
Philippines —Ambassador Elizalde
Thailand —Ambassador Wan and Mr. Kridakon, Counselor
Turkey —Mr. Esenbel, Counselor
Union of South Africa —Mr. Jarvie, Counselor
United States FE—Mr. Rusk
UNA—Mr. Hickerson
EUR—Mr. Allen
UNP—Mr. Popper
FE—Mr. Ogburn
FE—Mr. Heidemann
BNA—Mr. Raynor
FE—Mr. Hackler
FE—Mr. Barbour
Colonel Thompson—Army
Lt. Colonel Hutton—Army
Lt. Colonel Wright—Army
Major Converse—Army

New estimates on Communist strength were listed as follows:

North Korean troops in action 28,000
Chinese Communist troops in action 122,000
North Korean troops in the rear 159,000
Chinese Communist troops in the rear 152,000
Guerrillas 14,000
Total 475,000

Major Converse stated that interrogation of enemy prisoners of war had revealed that the reconstituted North Korean Sixth Corps was in fact, equipped with Soviet weapons but not to the same extent [Page 272] as formerly. It had also been ascertained that the unit was a much less efficient fighting force than it had been on June 25, 1950. Major Converse summarized a report on enemy logistic capabilities, concluding that the Communists could maintain from forty to sixty combat divisions along the 38th parallel and that while his logistic facilities might enable him to stockpile sufficient supplies to launch a large offensive, it was doubtful that such an offensive could be maintained indefinitely without air and artillery superiority.

Lt. Colonel Wright reported on UN ground activities of the past three days, during which time there had been continued general, slow advances with limited patrol actions. On March 23, the 187th airborne regimental combat team had been dropped very successfully in the vicinity of Munsan. Casualties had been very light, and good results had been obtained with drops of artillery and vehicles. From the center of the peninsula to the east coast advances of two to three miles had been registered against generally light opposition.

In reply to a question by Mr. Rusk, Lt. Colonel Wright stated that with the exception of South Korean units in the Tenth Corps area, all forces had reached the phase line objective, “Line Cairo”. Major Converse added that on the extreme east coast elements of the South Korean Capital Division had reached a point two miles north of the 38th parallel.

Mr. Rusk stated that although we did not have a great deal of information on the subject, there were indications of major troop movements in enemy rear areas and that the Chinese Communist First Field Army may become involved in Korea. He pointed out that such movements would indicate that the enemy intended to continue the conflict in Korea.

At this point Mr. Rusk requested that everyone except Mr. Hickerson and the chief foreign representatives leave the room. Mr. Rusk then informed the Ambassadors that General MacArthur’s recent statement was unauthorized and unexpected and that steps had been taken to prevent further uncoordinated statements; further, that if the opposing Commander should by any chance seek discussions with MacArthur, the latter would refer to Washington for instructions.

  1. The source text indicated that Mr. Rusk was a codrafter of the memorandum, presumably for authoring the last paragraph.