Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

795.00/3–2651: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

secret

New York, March 26, 1951—10:10 p. m.

1330. Re Korea—38th parallel. Rau called at his request to discuss tactical crossing of 38th parallel. The suggestion has been made to him by an unnamed Asian del that now was appropriate time for an Asian appeal to UN that its forces should not cross the 38th parallel. Rau presented this idea to Gross, not as a suggestion of his govt, but to get a US reaction before communicating it to GOI. He thought that the concept of his unnamed Asian colleague was based partly on the fact that 38th parallel question is no longer academic and partly on Gen. MacArthur’s recent statement on crossing it.¹ He recalled that similar appeal had been made to PRC and while it had had no effect, one might naturally expect some result from appeal to UN on which cld base cease fire. He added that in view of Indian Ambassador in Peiping no representation to PRC would be of much use earlier than two weeks from Mar 17, date of last communication from Pannikar. Rau added that perhaps these developments made some such move important before that time.

In answer to question by Gross, Eau expressed personal view that appeal if observed by UN forces would remove one ground of PRC basis for intervention in that claim cld not again be made that UN has invaded NK. He had not considered whether appeal wld cover air and sea forces as well as land activities. He thought that probably it shld not cover air activities until there is cease Fire because otherwise build-up by PRC and NK wld be possible.

He felt that UN forces might halt some 10 miles behind 38th parallel allowing remaining area to parallel to be buffer zone for land patrol action and this might be stronger political position than zone previously suggested north of parallel.

Realizing serious nature of objections raised by Gross’ questions, he wondered whether appeal might not be both to UN and PRC. Here again he realized tactical problem of starting move in UN by its members to appeal to themselves or to put UN on basis of equality with PRC.

In substance he was tentatively thinking of whether this is a time when an appeal wld be useful as a device leading toward a cease fire. Gross stressed that as members contributing troops had been advised, any crossing of the parallel is a tactical military measure and that UN is not committed to unification of Korea by the invasion on a strategic scale of NK. He thought it likely that any decision for such a strategic crossing would be the basis of wide consultation, certainly among the group contributing armed forces. He stressed the fact that UN troops shld not be put into position of having additional inhibitions on their power to maneuver. More forces wld be necessary to hold any fixed line such as Rau suggested. Gross indicated we still consider possible PRC offensive against UN forces. Gross stated strongly that such an appeal is a sort of one way valve against the interest and security of UN forces and the PRC would probably pay no more attention to it than to the earlier appeal. It wld also be contrary to UN unity to have some members appeal to others. Personally he strongly indicated the undesirability of such an appeal.

Gross agreed to pass on to Dept Rau’s inquiry, to indicate clearly it was personal inquiry and not GOI view and to have US position for him soonest. Gross added that personally he felt big GOI contribution cld be made by close contacts with Peiping.²

Austin

1. On March 24, upon returning to Tokyo from his one day trip to Korea prior to which he had released the statement printed in circular telegram 568, p. 265, General MacArthur commented that the parallel had never had any real military significance and that for tactical purposes the U.N. forces were free to cross it. The text of his statement is in Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences (New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964), p. 388.

2. The Department made the following response in telegram 819, March 27, to New York:

   “Dept concurs in comments made by Gross to Rau re proposed Asian appeal to UN forces not to cross 38th Parallel (urtel 1330, March 26). In our opinion, such an appeal wld increase difficulties of UN forces and of UN Members who are supplying such forces; adversely affect UN unity in resisting aggression; complicate efforts to achieve peaceful settlement for Korea; and give encouragement to aggressors.” (795B.5/3–2751)