Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

795.00/3–2651: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

secret   priority

New York, March 26, 1951—4:05 p. m.

1327. Re March 25 MacArthur statement.¹ Sunde (Norway) accompanied by Stabell called on me this morning to inquire concerning the significance of what Sunde referred to as “MacArthur’s pronunciamento”. I said I had received no special word about this but looking at it personally it seemed to me General MacArthur merely intended to indicate that as commander of UN forces he was prepared to discuss a cease-fire. His statement, I thought, strengthened the moral position of the UN. I expressed the view that MacArthur did not intend to go beyond his authority as military commander nor to assume a prerogative to deal on political issues. Sunde inquired concerning our policy regarding the crossing of the 38th parallel. Again expressing a personal opinion, I said it seemed to me the 38th parallel had lost political significance when it was violated by the Communist forces and that as a military matter it would be illogical to view the 38th parallel as a “taboo line” if the lives of UN troops were at stake.

Stabell asked whether MacArthur’s statement implied that we were now thinking of raising a question in the UN, either in the GA or in the AMC, regarding attacks upon the Chinese mainland. Gross replied in the negative.

Stabell also asked for information concerning a story by Reston in the New York Times of March 25 which indicated that the 14 countries with military forces in Korea were formulating a new statement of policy regarding Korea. Gross replied that some discussion was going on regarding a possible statement designed to reaffirm existing UN policy in the light of the present situation in Korea, but that so far as we were aware there is no thought of a statement involving new policy. Sunde and Stabell expressed strong hope that the Norwegian Government be kept closely advised and I assured them of our desire to maintain a strong feeling of mutual confidence between our two governments. Sunde expressed gratification, adding that the Norwegian Government was vitally interested in this matter and would appreciate being kept informed.²

Austin

1. Reference is to the statement of March 24, the text of which is printed in circular telegram 568, p. 265. The statement generally appeared in the American press on March 25, accounting for occasional references to it as the March 25 statement.

2. On the following day, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs George W. Perkins recorded the following memorandum of a conversation with the Norwegian Ambassador, Wilhelm Munthe de Morgenstierne:

   “The Norwegian Ambassador called today at his request to ask whether General MacArthur’s recent truce statement foreshadowed any change of our policy on aerial bombing or other form of attacks on Chinese territory. I told the Ambassador that our policy in this respect had not changed and assured him that no such change would be made unilaterally by us. We would certainly consult with the fourteen countries having armed forces under the Unified Command and I had no doubt that his government would also be informed in advance.” (795.00/3–2751)