Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

795.00/3–1751

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Eastern European Affairs (Reinhardt) to the Secretary of State ¹

top secret

[Washington,] March 17, 1951.

Subject: Cease Fire Agreement for Korea

The following are the thoughts George Kennan² asked be put before you:

1. The time has come when, if one wishes to obtain any cease fire in Korea or any improvement from our standpoint in the situation there, it is necessary to deal with the Russians. It would be dangerous to count on any understanding or arrangement regarding the North Korean area to which the Russians were not a party. They are the great land power in that part of the world and have an obvious and legitimate interest in what goes on in Northern Korea. By leaving them out and dealing only with their puppets, one would leave them without obligation and free to do whatever they pleased, which is in many ways just what they wish. To build on an arrangement which does not include them would be building on sand.

2. By “dealing” with the Russians is meant treating with them through informal channels and with the obligation of complete secrecy. Any leaks or intimations to the public would convince the Russians that this was only a propaganda venture designed to embarrass them publicly and they would play it accordingly. This means that it would be necessary either (a) to be prepared to ride it out and assert the propriety of secret diplomacy in the event of an inadvertent or malicious leak, or (b) the job would have to be done through some intermediary who could be denied in case of necessity.

3. Whoever talks with the Russians must begin by stating bluntly and in terms they will understand our reasons for intervening in South Korea and our objectives in that country. This should be expressed in terms of simple national interests as involved in our position in Japan and in the Philippines. They should be told that our long-term policy still looks to a unified and independent and democratic Korea, that we do not want a world war to be precipitated because of the Korean problem, but that on the other hand we have no intention of getting out and turning the whole country over to them. That they must understand that their violation of the strategic frontiers established at the end of the war could not go unanswered.

4. If we again push north of the 38th Parallel we will again invoke trouble. If the Chinese Communists are not able to obstruct our northward advance we invite the possibility of Soviet intervention.

5. There seem to be two primary choices of action at this time: (1) to choose the best line in the middle of Korea and sit on it by military means. This is perhaps not too bad a solution but the weakness of our intelligence with respect to Communist capabilities and intentions make it potentially dangerous; (2) some sort of an agreement with somebody. Since the UN does not seem to offer the possibility of producing such an agreement and since the Chinese Communists are not the real bosses of the area, that leaves the Soviet Government as the only possible party with whom to work out an agreement.

6. Two alternative agreements appear possible in the circumstances. (1) Return to the status quo ante the North Korean aggression. This would put the Russians back in North Korea which would have the advantage of precluding them from getting fancy with us in that area unless they were in fact ready for World War III. In such an event their presence would make little difference since, if and when they decide to kick off World War III, it will not be for local Korean reasons. (2) The alternative would be a proposal to the Soviet Union for UN forces from non-NATO countries to take over the bulk of Korea with Soviet and US forces restricted to small areas in the northern and southern extremities of the country respectively. The Russians would not like this and would probably not accept it. The North Koreans have been knocked out for some time and such an arrangement would be definitely to the disadvantage of the Communists. If it were possible to agree on the first alternative, we would of course have to make it clear that our reconstruction efforts in Korea would be limited to the ROK. These proposals, which would involve the complete withdrawal of the Chinese Communists from Korea, should put a real strain on Soviet-Chinese Communist relations.

7. The Russians will of course reply to any such proposal that they want the Chinese Communists to be in on the conversations. This will have to be resisted. We might well play the role of the offended party, insisting that the Chinese Communists were hysterical and childlike and that it was impossible to do business with them, whereas the Russians were responsible, businesslike and, after all, the real power to deal with.

8. We would have to insist that any arrangement arrived at must be worked out and presented through the UN and that we could not agree to any other manner of revealing it to the public.

9. Whereas there is not the slightest possibility of extracting a capitulation in Korea from the Chinese Communists or the Russians, the possibility of a deal as suggested above does exist since the present situation in Korea is unsatisfactory to both the Soviet Union and the United States. There would appear to be a mutuality of interest sufficient to make possible such an arrangement.

F. Reinhardt

1. A manuscript notation on the source text indicated that Mr. Acheson saw this document. In addition to the Secretary, it was addressed to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews), the Assistant Secretaries of State for European and Far Eastern Affairs (Perkins and Rusk), and the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitze).
2. Mr. Kennan, Counselor of the Department, had been on leave since the previous September. On March 12, 1951, Charles Bohlen received Senate confirmation as Mr. Kennan’s successor, but Mr. Bohlen did not return from Paris to assume his new position until July 1951.