Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

795.00/3–1751

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

secret
No. 124

Pusan, March 17, 1951.

Subject: ROK Views Concerning 38th Parallel

Ref: Embtel 797, March 12, 1951¹

As indicated in the Embassy’s telegram under reference, the expected Korean reaction to General MacArthur’s statement concerning the likelihood of a “theoretical stalemate” was slow in materializing. Now, however, there are positive indications that General MacArthur’s statement did not go unheeded and that its possible implications have been cause for considerable alarm among the Koreans. Needless to say, General Ridgway’s press conference of March 12, in which he declared that it would be a “tremendous victory for the United Nations” even if the Korean war should end at the 38th Parallel, has done nothing to allay Korean fears concerning the intentions of the United States.

Enclosed herewith is a copy of a press release² issued in English on March 15, 1951, by the Korean Office of Public Information, quoting at length the views of the Defense Minister on the necessity of disregarding the 38th Parallel and pushing the enemy beyond the Yalu River. The statement is known to have been prepared in the President’s office as a result of General MacArthur’s “theoretical stalemate” comments. From the known sequence of events it appears likely that the prepared statement was being discussed in a meeting of the State Council at President Rhee’s residence on the morning of March 13 when news of General Ridgway’s press conference remarks reached the Koreans, and that the President became so perturbed that he immediately sent Clarence Ryee, Director of the Office of Public Information, to call on me.

Clarence Ryee arrived at my desk while the Council meeting was still in session, bringing with him both the draft of the prepared statement and the text of the UP Peter Kalischer release concerning General Ridgway’s press conference. I emphatically pointed out to him that it was time for all Koreans to stop getting agitated every time anyone mentioned the 38th Parallel and that this would be a good time for all of them to re-read the United Nations’ resolutions passed since June 25. In this connection I mentioned that the all-important issue and the United Nations’ commitment is to stop aggression. The United Nations policy is still aimed at a united, independent, democratic Korea, but there is no commitment anywhere that I know of requiring the United Nations or the United States to bring in any amount of force that may be needed to unify Korea. I went on to state that the Koreans simply must bear in mind that world developments will govern what can be done in Korea, and that the worst possible development, both for Korea and for the world, would be for hostilities to spread. I particularly stressed this latter point in connection with the draft of the prepared statement which he had brought with him.

Probably as a result of my remarks to Mr. Ryee, authorship of the statement was attributed in the press release to the Defense Minister, rather than to President Rhee as in the draft which was shown me. It is also noted that the English-language release was considerably toned down. The Korean-language release, however, appears to have been left substantially in the same form as that of the original draft. This release is summarized in the enclosed translation of a news item from the Tong-A of March 16.³ It will be noted that the wording of the release in Korean was considerable stronger than that in English.

On March 15 General Ridgway and I called on President Rhee during the course of which the President again brought up the matter of the 38th Parallel, speaking in a rambling fashion of vague plans to telegraph President Truman and General MacArthur concerning the necessity of bombing Manchuria. At this time I again took the occasion to repeat the remarks I had previously made to Clarence Ryee, particularly emphasizing the fact that the worst possible development for Korea would be a spread of hostilities. It is doubtful, however, that any words or logic could sway the President from his insistence that Korea must be unified at whatever risk or cost.⁴

Given these well-known views of President Rhee and the Korean Government, increasingly strong reactions can be expected from the slightest intimation that the United Nations action might stop anywhere short of the Yalu. The enclosures may well indicate the course which the Korean Government will follow in combatting any possible suggestions in favor of more limited objectives. The press release states categorically that to drive the Chinese Communists back into Manchuria is “the clear mission and duty of the United Nations forces.” Such a view could logically lead to violent charges of betrayal in the event of any compromise of the Korean conflict.

For the Ambassador:

Meredith Weatherby

Second Secretary

1. Not printed. It reported that Korean reaction up to that time had been unexpectedly light in response to General MacArthur’s statement of March 7 on the possibility of a stalemate in Korea. (795.00/3–1251)
2. Not printed here.
3. Not printed here.

4. Under cover of his despatch 125, March 20, from Pusan, Ambassador Muccio transmitted to the Department a copy of a memorandum for the record by General Ridgway concerning their meeting with President Rhee. General Ridgway’s memorandum read in part as follows:

   “1. I first had a half hour with Ambassador Muccio and General Coulter. I took up with the Ambassador the three principal points I had planned to take up with the President, subject to the Ambassador’s concurrence. These were:

   “a. To point out that Seoul had not been captured; that I was not ready to work on Seoul; that we were playing a dangerous game, with a numerically vastly superior enemy in a terrain which stretched our logistics capabilities to the limit; and that, therefore, the tide of battle might well go back and forth repeatedly.

   “b. For these reasons I hoped that only the minimum number of farmers essential to plant the coming crop be permitted to return to the northern area.

   “c. That this was war we were in, and not peace time maneuvers or training. Therefore, I expected that senior commanders whose troops disintegrated under attack, and above all those whose troops abandoned equipment, would be sternly and summarily dealt with. I said it was one thing for a senior officer who felt he could not hold his ground to withdraw his units intact, either on his own initiative or with proper superior authority, but it was quite another, and very serious matter, for him to give up the equipment which we had such difficulty in supplying, and which was so vital to the enemy in waging war against us.

   “The Ambassador having concurred, I took up these points substantially as outlined with the President, who seemed to receive them all well.” (795.00/3–2051)