357.AK/3–1651: Telegram
The United States Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State
priority
1293. Re peaceful settlement Korean affair. Following are reports conversations concerning peaceful settlement Korean affair which Ross and I had with Grafstrom, Padilla Nervo and Trygve Lie yesterday on their initiative.
We met jointly with Grafstrom and Padilla Nervo. At their request and pursuant to questions raised by them in conversation on March 6 (Usun 1236) I outlined what I described as “general” reactions of Dept as set forth in Deptel 776, Mar 12. Padilla and Grafstrom expressed general agreement; latter in particular expressed view no other attitude could be taken pending development such factors as military situation in Korea and FonMin deputies talks in Paris.
Padilla then raised question Trygve Lie idea of approach to North Koreans as reported my letter Mar 10 to Hickerson. At some length Padilla indicated idea intrigued him. Said much same idea had grown out of consultations he had had with number LA’s dating back to period before passage Feb 1 resolution. He said there had been considerable feeling that dealing directly with North Koreans would sidestep necessity political concessions to Chinese Communists.
I indicated tentative views expressed by Hickerson in his letter to me of March 13 without referring to Hickerson by name, and emphasizing that these views were not necessarily definitive views of Dept. I elaborated following points:
- (a)
- We did not think approach to Gromyko at Paris was likely to be fruitful.
- (b)
- We did not think idea of driving wedge between Chinese Communists and Russians seemed very realistic.
- (c)
- Approach to North Koreans might get UN drawn into series of commitments while Chinese Communists would be left free of commitment. Result of this process might be very seriously disadvantageous from both political and military viewpoints.
- (d)
- In response to query by Padilla concerning possible Chinese Communist necessity save face I commented that this was a question of negotiating tactics and should not be allowed to put UN at a political and military disadvantage; on other hand, if Chinese Communists chose to put North Koreans forward as authorized intermediaries, or to use any other agents, that was up to Chinese Communists.
- (e)
- I said we did not want to appear wholly negative to action which GOC in its judgment might find it desirable to take, and I expressed view GOC had competence to approach North Koreans.
Foregoing analysis appeared to convince Padilla and Grafstrom that approach to North Koreans by GOC was not likely to be fruitful or safe.
[Page 240]In response to request for estimate present situation I said was difficult to judge at such distance. However, in personal way I mentioned following alternatives: First, Chinese Communist withdrawal might be prelude to new major offensive by them; we must assume this a likely development. Second, Russians might move in. Third, Chinese Communist withdrawal might be part of policy to cut losses and withdraw from Korean engagement. In this case we would be confronted with necessity decisions, both political and military in character, involving problems of control and supervision of northern area in order to prevent new military build-up and otherwise assure security UN forces, while providing basis for peaceful achievement UN objectives in Korea.
Padilla said GOC was not required to report. If GOC reported “progress” this would have effect stalling work of AMC, pending clarification peace-making efforts. This GOC did not think appropriate now. He saw no need for GOC to make any negative report unless developing circumstances should indicate desirability for good political reasons. Parenthetically he said with regard to AMC that UC already had authority to ask for any additional assistance it might want in Korea, but for AMC, First Committee, and Assembly to go through process of recommending anything less would seem destined to have bad public reaction.
After leaving Padilla, Grafstrom told us GOC had met earlier and was meeting later Thursday afternoon1 to consider desirability of “consciously naive” approach to Malik2 to inquire whether any information had been received from Soviet Ambassador, Peiping, concerning reasons why no reply yet received from Chinese Communists to Entezam’s communication. In response to Grafstrom’s request for opinion I did not venture any but asked if they had considered alternative possibility of Swedish Ambassador Peiping more casually sounding Soviet Ambassador.
In conversation with Lie late in the day I outlined to him, in same manner as I had to Grafstrom and Padilla, views concerning his idea of approach to North Koreans.
Lie said he thought with UN forces doing well at moment we had good opportunity to take strong initiative and press for peace. If we did not do so alternative he saw was deterioration to stalemate situation involving continued losses UN and particularly US troops. He queried how long US public opinion would stand for such situation.
He said he felt Dept’s attention was concentrated too much on China as factor in situation. He said he felt we should turn our [Page 241] concentration to Russia. He interpreted Stalin’s recent statement3 as indication that Russians were prepared to write off Korean venture, adding that if Chinese and Russian interests were not parallel Russians would not hesitate to use North Koreans as means achieving peaceful settlement.
He said he thought there were four alternative approaches, looking towards cease-fire and peaceful settlement. First, a military approach in the field (through MacArthur, he said). He did not know anything about this. Second, an approach to Chinese Communists which had been made and he expected no result whatever from this course. Third and fourth, an approach through Malik or alternatively Gromyko. An approach through Malik he thought would be useless. He had taken soundings with Zinchenko4 who told Lie that best approach would be through Gromyko for two reasons: (a) Gromyko was now very close to highest Soviet authorities; (b) Gromyko was no longer closely associated with UN and UN affairs.
Lie queried possibility of a de facto cease-fire leading now or later on to negotiated settlement. He said we should not be too proud to accept something less than 100% of UN objectives in Korea and expressed view return to status quo before June 25 would be best way out of situation.
I pointed out to Lie dangers we saw in any provisional cease-fire, whatever it might be called, and in any status quo situation which would leave Communists free hand in North Korea, without any UN control or supervision, to prepare new aggression. In general I took same line with Lie as we had with Padilla and Grafstrom earlier in day.