Editorial Note
On March 15, General MacArthur made a public statement on the 38th parallel issue in a telegraphic interview with Hugh Baillie, President of the United Press. In response to a question on how many troops would be needed to hold the 38th parallel inviolate, the General gave the following response:
“As I have on several occasions pointed out, the conditions under which we are conducting military operations in Korea do not favor engaging in positional warfare on any line across the peninsula. Specifically with reference to the 38th Parallel, there are no natural defense features anywhere near its immediate proximity. The terrain is such that to establish a conventional defense system in reasonable depth would require such a sizable force that if we had it, and could logistically maintain it, we would be able to drive the Chinese Communists back across the Yalu, hold that river as our future main line of defense, and proceed to the accomplishment of our mission in the unification of Korea. Under the realities existing, however, we can and will, unless the situation is radically altered, continue our campaign of maneuver as the best means to neutralize the military disadvantage under which we fight and keep the enemy engaged where it best serves our own military purposes. Such a point of engagement will of necessity be a fluctuating variable, dependent upon the shifting relative strengths of the forces committed and will constantly move up or down. The problem involved requires much more fundamental decisions than are within my authority or responsibility to make as the military commander—decisions which must not ignore the heavy cost in Allied blood which a protracted and decisive campaign would entail.” (The New York Times, March 16, 1951)
At his own news conference on the afternoon of March 15, President Truman declined to comment on General MacArthur’s statement since he had not yet seen it, but he reiterated his previous assertion that the decision to cross the parallel was a tactical one to be handled by the field commander. (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1951 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1965), pages 188, 190)
Also on March 15, President Rhee in a radio interview expressed [Page 235] his belief that United Nations forces should drive north of the 38th parallel and proceed all the way to the Yalu River where 500,000 well-armed forces could keep the Communists in check in the future. He added that, if necessary, U.N. bombing should be extended to China. (A summary of the interview, released by the Korean Office of Public Information, was transmitted to the Department under cover of despatch 121, March 15, from Pusan; 795.11/3–1151.)
For further comments on Korean statements concerning the 38th parallel at this time, see despatch 124, March 17, from Pusan, page 244.