795.00/3–1551
Memorandum on the Substance of Discussions at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting1
[Here follows a list of persons present (16). In addition to the Joint Chiefs, 5 military officials attended; Messrs. Matthews, Nitze, and Perkins were accompanied by 3 other Department of State representatives; also present was Executive Secretary of the National Security Council Lay.]
Korea
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General Collins: I think that we should take another look at an early meeting at the problem of Korea. If the Chinese Communists have smartened up, they may be falling back of the 38th parallel. In that event, what do we do? They have been dumb enough to fight us with their best troops and to take a terrible beating. It will be very hard for them to replace their losses. They have filled up their hospitals.
General Bradley: That is a political decision not a military decision.
General Collins: The political decision might be to ask the military how far we can go in Korea.
Mr. Nitze: If our political decision was to seek the reestablishment of the status quo ante June 25 by an arrangement which would permit [Page 233] us to withdraw our forces—if that is the political objective relevant to the military course of action—we might still have a serious problem if we did not obtain the arrangement soon. In this event, a combined political-military decision concerning our attitude towards the 38th parallel during the time until the arrangement is obtained would be necessary.
General Collins: This is a field of inquiry into which we need to get.
Mr. Nitze: We have hoped that we could have some discussion of this prior to our next meeting. I believe that the Secretary wishes to discuss this problem with General Marshall and General Bradley. If the problem is not straightened out by next Wednesday,2 perhaps we could discuss it then.
General Collins: We may be faced with the necessity of a decision before Wednesday. There is no place for the Chinese to hold if we take Chunchon. We have our momentum up and we may be able to go a considerable distance without much fighting. We will have to decide what we are to tell General Ridgway.
Admiral Sherman: We should explore the strategic merits of various positions north of the 38th parallel. I have personally favored the taking of Pyongyang. I think that we could talk better if we held Pyongyang and that we would be ready to do business.
General Collins: If we are going that far, perhaps we should go on to the waist. That is a good defensive position. We would pick up the rest of the rice-producing area. A line anchored on Wonsan on the east and following the most desirable terrain to the west coast would be a good one. It would also include about 90% of the Korean population.
General Vandenberg: We would have twice as much difficulty because the Air Force could not operate effectively against the shortened Chinese lines of communication.
Mr. Nitze: It had been my understanding that a line south of the Han offered the best defensive potentialities largely because of the long Chinese lines of communication. Of course we cannot deny the Chinese the capability of breaking contact with our forces. They can withdraw beyond any line on which we choose to hold—unless of course we go all the way to Peiping.
General Collins: We never had an opportunity to organize our position on a line anchored on Wonsan as we were able to organize a position in the west south of the Han River. A properly organized position would be a very difficult one for the Chinese to break through [Page 234] even though the Air Force would be handicapped. With good fields of fire, we could raise hell with this particular bunch of people if they tried to storm our positions.
Admiral Sherman: I would urge that if we do consider a line north of the 38th parallel, we take into account other relevant considerations such as its relationship to Dairen.
[Here follows discussion dealing with Greece and Turkey.]