Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

795.00/3–1651

Memorandum of Conversation, by Robert E. Barbour of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs

secret

[Washington,] March 16, 1951.

Subject: Briefing of Ambassadors on Korea

Participants:	Australia	—Ambassador Makin and Mr. McNichol, Second Secretary
	Belgium	—Ambassador Silvercruys and Mr. Callebaut, Attaché
	Canada	—Ambassador Wrong
	France	—Mr. Millet, Counselor
	Great Britain	—Mr. Tomlinson, Counselor
	Greece	—Mr. Kalergis, Minister Counselor
	Luxembourg	—Minister Le Gallais
	Netherlands	—Mr. de Beus, Minister P.
	New Zealand	—Mr. Laking, Counselor
	Philippines	—Ambassador Elizalde
	Thailand	—Mr. Kridakon, Counselor
	Turkey	—Mr. Benler, First Secretary
	Union of South Africa	—Ambassador Jooste
	United States	—FE—Mr. Rusk
		UNA—Mr. Hickerson
		R—Mr. Armstrong1
		BNA—Mr. Raynor
		EUR—Mr. Allen
		UNP—Mr. Henkin
		FE—Mr. Hackler
		FE—Mr. Barbour
		Major Converse—Army
		Captain Maertens—Army

Major Converse stated that the recent northward movement of enemy units may have been due to the casualties inflicted by the UN offensive or might indicate that the Communists are withdrawing to a main line of resistance farther north. He said that there had been no contact with the enemy from the west coast to the center of the peninsula but that the resistance being met by advancing UN forces farther east was either a delaying action or an operation to screen the outposts of a main line of defense.

Captain Maertens read a summary of an Eighth Army directive outlining the mission of this latest campaign as follows:

1. In the First Corps area, to attack north of the Han River and at the same time to retain sufficient forces south of the Han to provide security for First and Ninth Corps flanks;

2. In the Ninth Corps area to seize Hongchon and Chunchon and to trap as many of the enemy as possible south of Hongchon;

3. In the Tenth Corps and ROK sectors to attack and destroy the enemy.

Units were instructed primarily to destroy the enemy and to maintain lateral coordination at all times.

Captain Maertens said that the highlights of activities during the past three days had been the entering of Seoul and the securing of a lateral road line north of the Han River. UN troops had continued their steady advances of from three to five miles with increasing enemy opposition in the center sectors and virtually no resistance on the east and west coasts. He reported that the Greek battalion, while under heavy fire, had forced a crossing of the Hongchon River.

In reply to two questions from Ambassador Wrong it was stated that, first, the enemy’s intentions now seemed to be to defend a line running from the Han estuary laterally north and east to the old North Korean fortifications near the 38th parallel and, second, the enemy’s retreat from Hongchon, formerly considered as a line of resistance, did not indicate that he was not capable of mounting an offensive. As the enemy suffered defeats and casualties his immediate capability for mounting such an offensive decreased but was by no means destroyed.

Mr. Rusk, referring to press speculations on the subject of the 38th parallel, stated that the problem was constantly under study here and that we would be glad to have the views of the representatives present in addition to those already received from their governments. He said that basically the situation had not changed in spite of the Communist withdrawal from Hongchon. Powerful enemy forces still confronted us, and there had been no indication that the enemy had altered his political and military objectives. In this connection Mr. Rusk referred to an article by Mr. Stewart Alsop in the Washington Post of March 11. In this article Mr. Alsop, quoting a reliable Iron Curtain source, reached the following conclusions:

1. The Chinese Communists lack heavy equipment and technical training for using such equipment, but the Soviet Union is now providing technical assistance and within one year the Chinese Communists will be able to drive UN forces out of Korea;

2. There is no chance that the Soviet Union or the Chinese Communists would agree to any settlement in Korea which would leave UN forces near the 38th parallel or anywhere else in Korea;

3. If UN forces should again reach the Manchurian border or should there be an American attack against the mainland of China, the Soviet Union would openly and militarily intervene.

Mr. Rusk referred to this article as “interesting” since the information came from a Second Secretary of the Soviet Embassy and might give an indication of enemy intentions to fight on and drive UN forces out of Korea.

Mr. Rusk said that we would like to have the informal views of the governments represented on the question of whether the Unified Command, after consultation with the governments with armed forces in Korea, should in the near future make a public statement outlining UN policies with respect to Korea. There would be nothing new or different in this statement; it would clarify the objectives in understandable terms and make distinctions between military and political objectives of the United Nations as they relate to the present situation.

In response to Ambassador Wrong’s question about General Ridgway’s statement on the 38th parallel,² Mr. Rusk said that there had been no political instruction or directive behind the statement and assessed it as a statement of troop leadership to assure the troops that they had done a magnificent job and had won victory even if, for example, a stalemate should develop.

Mr. Rusk replied to Mr. Millet’s question on General MacArthur’s most recent interview³ by pointing out that General MacArthur had repeatedly said that there were decisions to be taken with respect to Korea which were quite beyond his competence as a field commander which was usually the case in wartime. The General had pointed out certain restrictions as bearing on the nature of the UN operation in Korea, but he had not publicly asked for their removal. Mr. Rusk said that there were two aspects of the problem of the 38th parallel—the first was the achievement of the parallel as a military objective but the second, a political objective, concerned the northern frontier.

Ambassador Wrong said that General MacArthur’s statement implied that some very important decisions were being expected. Mr. Rusk replied that the President had repeatedly said that General MacArthur had adequate directives for the conduct of the campaign. So far as Mr. Rusk was aware, there had been no request for clarification or modification of these directives.

In answer to Mr. de Beus’ question, Mr. Rusk stated that it was correct to say that there had been no change in the attitudes expressed previously to the group (on February 16).⁴ We did not see any quick or immediate change in the problem unless there should be a spectacular UN breakthrough which was highly unlikely, but we were thinking very hard about the question and if other countries had any views, we would like to have them. He said that although the enemy had been severely punished, he had by no means been defeated.

In response to a question by Mr. Tomlinson, Mr. Rusk said that he thought the Unified Command would be the appropriate issuing authority for the previously discussed statement on Korea. Before such a statement would be issued, it would be circulated to each of the governments concerned for its comments and concurrence. We would be happy to have the views of the members of the group on this subject. Possible criticism from the UN as a whole would have to be considered by the group as would the effect of such a statement on the work of the Good Offices Committee.

It was agreed that the meetings on Tuesday and Friday would be continued during the forthcoming week.

1. W. Park Armstrong, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Intelligence.
2. See footnote 1, p. 229.
3. See editorial note, supra.
4. See telegram 719, February 17, to New York, p. 178.