795.00/3–1551
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs (Emmons)
Subject: United States Policy Toward a Crossing of the 38th Parallel in Korea.
| Participants: | Mr. Pyo Wook Han—First Secretary, Korean Embassy |
| Mr. Dean Rusk—Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs | |
| Mr. U. Alexis Johnson—Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs | |
| Mr. Arthur B. Emmons, 3rd—Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs, NA |
Mr. Han called on Mr. Rusk at his request at ten o’clock this morning. He explained the purpose of his visit was to inquire what United States policy now is toward a crossing of the 38th parallel, remarking that newspaper speculation as to the possibility that United Nations forces would be halted at the 38th parallel had greatly disturbed his Government. He explained that should the United Nations decide to halt at the parallel, a situation similar to that on June 25 would be recreated, that no future security would be possible for Korea under the circumstances, and that the Korean people would suffer a great loss in morale and might become disillusioned with the United Nations. He said that his Government held very strong views that the United Nations should continue its military operations toward the Yalu River until peace and security, in accordance with United Nations resolutions, had been established throughout Korea. Mr. Han mentioned that the ROK was also very worried over the attitude of the various members of the United Nations toward a crossing of the parallel which seemed to it to represent a change in the original interpretation placed upon the June 27 and October 7 resolutions.
Mr. Rusk replied that we did not know specifically upon what considerations such a change in attitude might be based. He pointed out that there were two basic questions which could not be determined in advance of our reaching the parallel. One of these involved the actual military situation as it would exist at that time and the other, the political conditions, specifically the Communist attitude, which might then obtain. Mr. Rusk explained that for this reason it is now not possible for the United States to reach a decision upon whether or not the parallel should be crossed. In connection with Mr. Han’s reference to the United Nations resolutions on Korea establishing the objectives of restoring peace and security and unifying the country, Mr. Rusk [Page 231] pointed out that the United States had never abandoned such objectives and was not now going to do so. However, while the June 27 and October 7 resolutions of the United Nations provided authority for the United Nations to cross the Parallel into North Korea, and were thus permissive in character, they would in no sense make it mandatory for us to do so.
Mr. Rusk stressed that the United States very clearly understood the natural attitude of the Korean Government and people in their desire that everything should be done in Korea to make it unified and free, and that this had been our consistent policy since 1943. He pointed out, however, that the single-minded pursuance of this course of action was for the Koreans a much simpler matter than it was for the United States, since the Koreans, in all frankness, were naturally concerned principally with the future of their own country, whereas the United States and the other UN nations had to take into consideration the much broader factors of their own national interest and the maintenance of general world security. Mr. Rusk wished to urge upon Mr. Han that Korea could never be entirely separated from a continued threat to its security as long as the Soviet Union and a Communist China were on its northern frontier and that in the last analysis the only way in which this danger could be finally eliminated would be by the destruction of those two governments. To attempt this obviously would involve us in a third World War during which the continued existence of Korea would be very doubtful. Therefore, he believed that the ROK should be very disturbed if at any time there were indications that the United States or the United Nations were taking a course of action which would lead to a World War. The survival of the Korean nation depended upon a solution to the present problem being found within the boundaries of Korea itself. The accomplishment of the ultimate political objectives in Korea was not necessarily dependent upon military operations throughout all of Korea.
Mr. Han then brought up the question of additional arms for the Koreans and stated that if Korea were to continue to be menaced by Communism, it was vital that it be in a position to defend itself adequately. Mr. Rusk said that we were fully aware of this problem, that undoubtedly the Korean armed forces would in the future have to be strengthened by additional equipment, training, and manpower, but that the building up and supplying of such additional forces would require time and that one of the principal problems involved was the effective strengthening of a corps of trained officers and NCO’s. Mr. Han wondered whether the non-United States members of the United Nations could not contribute more forces to Korea. Mr. Rusk replied that while the Communists continue to have tremendous resources in [Page 232] manpower, the United States, together with the other members of the United Nations, had sent to Korea virtually all of the manpower which they could provide. There then followed a brief discussion of the general military situation.1
Mr. Han, in concluding the conversation, asked whether, in the light of what had been said, it would be appropriate for him to inform his Government that the United States had reached no decision as to a crossing of the 38th parallel. Mr. Rusk replied that he might indeed do so, but he added that the Korean Government and people should realize that neither the United States nor the United Nations had, in any sense, abandoned their basic objectives for a unified and independent Korea.