895A.2614/3–151

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

secret

Subject: Bombing of Power Plants at the Yalu River Reservoir

Participants: General Omar Bradley—Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Dean Rusk—Assistant Secretary of State

I called General Bradley with regard to General MacArthur’s request for permission to bomb the power plants at the Yalu River Reservoir.1 I told him that the political questions which formerly applied to this problem were no longer the same since we did not consider these plants of any importance as a bargaining factor. There remained the political problem applicable to such targets as Yalu River bridges with respect to crossing the Manchurian frontier. I said that we had no particular feelings with respect to the power plants but that we wished to preserve a common front with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

General Bradley said that they were unenthusiastic about any change in the directive and that they were contemplating telling [Page 202] General MacArthur that the earlier directives continue in effect. I said that we would concur with such a directive.2

  1. The text of telegram CX–56453, February 26, from General MacArthur to the Joint Chiefs of Staff read as follows:

    “Ref JCS msg 95949 DTG 070457Z Nov 50.

    • “1. CGFEAF has made an urgent rqst for permission to destroy the North Korean electrical power complex to include those plants on the Yalu River.
    • “2. CGFEAF considers that the destruction of these fac will hinder Communist support of the war effort, adversely affect gen morale, and reduce the surplus power aval to Manchuria.
    • “3. In view of the possibility that political considerations which influenced prev decisions may have changed, rqst instructions.” (JCS Files)
  2. The reply from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, contained in telegram JCS 84577, March 1, read as follows:

    “Reur CX 56453. In light of info contained in your C 52125 Dec 50 and continued validity of comments in JCS 95949 Nov 50, JCS do not approve request initiated by CGFEAF.” (JCS Files)

    Previous to this, on February 21, General MacArthur had been told that the restrictions on bombing Rashin, which had been in effect since September 1950, would not be lifted (see Hearings, p. 3193). The Department of State had opposed removal of these restrictions (Memorandum of the Secretary of State’s Daily Staff Meeting; 795.00/2–2051).