Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

357.AK/2–2851: Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State

secret   priority

New York, February 28, 1951—7:05 p. m.

1211. Re GOC and CAM—From Ross. I lunched with Padilla Nervo today on his invitation. He discussed relations GOC with CAM along following lines:

1. He said at first meeting of two groups last week he had taken line with Sarper¹ that CAM should not meet again until GOC had given either positive or negative report to CAM Bureau. He said at meeting with Sarper yesterday discussion on this point had continued. Arguments presented by him, and he said agreed to by Entezam and Grafstrom, are outlined below. He said at yesterday’s meeting Sarper had insisted on necessity CAM meeting without reasonable delay, but that at present he would be willing postpone calling of meeting if he could explain to press that he was doing so at express request for delay by GOC. Padilla said he had expressed view this was quite agreeable to him but he objected to statements to press which would merely agitate press and in turn possibly develop Congressional opinion adverse to orderly conduct of business. He said he expressed view that press agitation and Congressional opinion might in effect unduly influence US decisions. In any event Padilla said he had indicated that he felt two groups might follow US lead since USG in best position to judge what should be done and when. Arguments Padilla said he had advanced in discussion with Sarper along following lines:

2. With regard to further military sanctions Padilla said he felt there was no occasion for consideration by CAM since under existing authority unified command quite free to solicit additional forces, et cetera.

3. With regard to diplomatic and political sanctions Padilla cited, for example, possibility of recommendation that governments which had not yet recognized Chinese Communist regime should continue to refrain from doing so. He expressed two objections to such consideration as follows:

(a) With regard to general run of Latinos in particular he said Latino governments would become involved in difficulties flowing from principle that recognition was matter involving national sovereignty; they would inevitably, he felt, link question of recognition Chinese Communists in principle with problems presented by UN action during past three or four years re Franco.

(b) Such recommendation by GA would have adverse effect on Chinese Communist desire for peaceful settlement since in light of fact UN dealing with Franco question had taken three or four years Chinese Communists would estimate their own problem would take as long and there would be no incentive in this field for them to seek peaceful settlement.

4. With regard to economic sanctions Padilla felt we would have considerable difficulty again on grounds of national prestige and sovereignty. In this connection, he referred to statement he said had been made by USG few days ago against export of raw materials, et cetera, to countries engaged in military action against UN forces. In reaction to this statement he said President Videla of Chile had issued statement February 26 indicating that this was matter for individual governments to decide for themselves and that so far as copper, for example, is concerned, Chile would export copper to highest bidder. Padilla attached great significance to this statement since he said Chile in matters concerning Communist aggression was, of course, more Papist than the Pope. In same connection Padilla referred to an item on agenda for March 26 meeting of American Republics’ FonMins concerning production and consumption of primary materials which he said would cause US considerable difficulty.

5. Interspersed with foregoing were number comments concerning necessity proceeding in any further measures against Chinese Communists with maximum degree of unity and harmony in UN. He alluded in this connection and in context of remarks concerning military measures to necessity of UN approval for further measures such as bombing against China mainland. He referred also to great disadvantage confronting us if in voting on further measures in GA there were large number of abstentions. In this connection he said that we might, of course, get number of Dels vote with us but we should consider importance of getting support from the hearts of the peoples of the countries voting with us. In same general context he indicated that if GOC failed in its efforts, way would be cleared for work of CAM.

I told Padilla that I thought I detected in his comments certain amount of defeatism re work of GOC and effort to achieve peaceful settlement of Korean affairs. At same time, I said I thought I detected certain amount of misconception concerning our own objectives and motives. I said that we were eager to achieve peaceful settlement of Korean affair and wanted to assist GOC in its efforts in every reasonable way. At same time, UN could not be sure that Chinese Communists wanted peaceful settlement. Therefore, it seemed essential as a minimum to maintain momentum of CAM. I said in our conception the two committees were not antithetical, but that their work should proceed along parallel, if not converging, lines. I said I thought the problem was delicate one of maintaining political balance between the two committees. I said that we did not want to force unduly the pace of CAM either as to substance or as to timing. On other hand there was considerable body of public opinion in US which wanted to see quite extreme measures taken against Chinese Communists. In face of this opinion, I expressed view that CAM would not remain idle for indefinite period. In any event I made clear my view that decision as to timing was not for us to make but to be arrived at on basis consultation with principally interested Dels.

So far as question of diplomatic sanctions was concerned, I said I thought analogy he drew between Chinese Communists and Franco was not a valid one, since Franco had not been engaged in aggression against UN while Chinese Communists clearly were as GA had found.

With regard to economic sanctions, I said at present we did not contemplate that CAM should necessarily get involved in specifications and details, particularly with regard to specific commodities.

On other hand, I said I saw no reason why if CAM should meet on Monday or Tuesday of next week² to consider plan of work presented by Bureau this would cut across bows of GOC.

Padilla said that he thought it was significant that no reply had yet been received from Chinese Communists to Entezam’s overture of more than week ago. Assuming that Chinese Communists were concerting their policy with Russians Padilla said he thought there were only three alternative explanations for this delay as follows:

(a) Mao had been consulting with the Soviets but they had been unable to reach agreement on reply that should be made.

(b) Russians were following line with Chinese Communists that GOC was a blind for the work of the CAM which was aggressive in its intentions against Chinese Communists; on this theory Chinese Communists were waiting to see what CAM would do.

(c) Russians had persuaded Chinese Communists to hold off pending further estimate of prospects of alleviating tensions by means of CFM meeting.

I said we wanted to hold door wide open to possibility of peaceful settlement. I said if Chinese Communists wanted to walk through this door that was one thing and we could proceed from that point. On other hand, I expressed view Chinese Communists must realize that if they did not choose path of peaceful settlement additional measures to combat their aggression were inevitable. I repeated view that while keeping work of two committees in balance and without attempting to force pace of either committee I saw no reason why CAM should not meet by Monday or Tuesday next week for initial consideration of plan of work drawn up by Bureau.

Padilla expressed view that GOC must necessarily be hearing something from Chinese Communists by middle next week. He therefore felt that CAM should not meet before middle or end next week.

Padilla said that he and his colleagues (Entezam and Grafstrom) had met this morning and had considered whether it would be desirable to review with us points which we would consider important in event Chinese Communists should respond favorably to Entezam’s overture for discussion looking toward peaceful settlement. He said he and his colleagues agreed that such consultation with us would be desirable. If Chinese Communists’ response unfavorable, nothing would be lost. On other hand, conceivably Entezam might receive favorable response from Chinese Communists at any time. It would be better, therefore, to have had consultations with us previously rather than to attempt such consultations under time pressure. I told Padilla I did not want to make any personal comment on advisability of procedure he raised, but would have to seek advice from Department. I asked him what sort of points he and his colleagues had in mind. He said they had in mind such points as (a) conditions we would now consider essential re cease-fire arrangements; (b) steps following a cease-fire; and (c) meeting for discussion of outstanding issues.

I told Padilla I would, of course, endeavor to let him know our views on procedure he raised soon as possible.

Padilla raised question his own situation and that of his Del and government in view fact Mexico is member CAM. He felt that he personally should not participate in work CAM since he was member GOC but should send an alternate to represent him on CAM. His FonMin has been inclined to view that Padilla himself might appropriately represent Mexico on CAM. I questioned whether as matter of formality he might not be named as Mexico’s representative on CAM together with alternate and determine in light circumstances from one meeting of CAM to another whether he would represent Mexico or send someone (probably Noriega). Padilla felt this might be reasonable compromise; on other hand he seems to have some leaning towards absenting himself from participation in CAM work in view of his membership on GOC. He asked that we let him know any views we might have on this question. [Ross.]

Gross

1. Selim Sarper, Turkish Representative on the Additional Measures Committee.
2. March 5–6. For documentation on the work of the Committee on Additional Measures, see pp. 1874 ff.