795.00/3–151
The Secretary of Defense (Marshall) to the Secretary of State
top secret
Washington, March 1,
1951.
Dear Mr. Secretary: After careful
consideration of the State Department’s draft memorandum of 23 February
for the President on the 38th parallel, the Department of Defense
believes that, from the military point of view, it should not be
submitted to the President. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in their attached
memorandum of 27 February 1951, have presented several military grounds
for not favoring this approach at this time. I concur with them that
there is a risk in disclosure to the enemy of a United States military
decision, that freedom of action and freedom of maneuver must be
maintained for U.N. ground forces, and that it is now premature, from a
military point of view, to determine the action to be taken by U.N.
forces with respect to the 38th parallel.
The Department of Defense agrees with the Department of State that the
United States should abide by the United Nations decisions with respect
to Korea. Since the U.S. position constitutes one of the major elements
in U.N. decisions, the Department of Defense strongly believes that it
is now urgently necessary to formulate U.S. political objectives in
Korea and China, as the Joint Chiefs of Staff have suggested in
paragraph 11 of their memorandum. On the basis of these objectives, the
Department of Defense will recommend proper military courses of action.
Therefore, it appears to me that the political and the military factors
should be worked out in the forum of the National Security Council and
presented to the President. From the military standpoint, such a policy
should include consideration of the effective means for the
psychological handling of the problem of the 38th parallel.
I am advised that U.S. policy with respect to Korea and China is
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now receiving consideration in
the NSC Senior Staff.1 Recommendations on this policy
should be forthcoming as soon as possible. The State Department’s draft
memorandum for the President and the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
have both presented a number of the political and military aspects of
the Korean problem, which should be useful as a basis for developing
national policy for the President’s approval.
In the meantime, it might be advisable, if you agree, to inform the
President, before his departure to Key West, that the Departments of
State and Defense have carefully studied the problem of the 38th
parallel from both the political and military points of view; that the
National Security Council is urgently preparing recommendations for his
approval on an integrated political and military position with respect
to Korea and China; and that, from the military point of view, it
appears to be premature for even a preliminary determination to be made
at this time as to the action to be taken by the U.N. forces with
respect to the 38th parallel. In this connection, I would particularly
suggest informing the President that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have
reported that—“The Commander in Chief, Far East, has indicated his
intention to continue his advance to develop the enemy’s main line of
resistance; and, if no major enemy strength is disposed south of the
38th parallel, to make a report to this effect to the Joint Chiefs of
Staff requesting instructions before proceeding further.”
If it is your decision to forward the draft memorandum to the President,
I would appreciate it if you would accompany it with the views of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.2
Faithfully yours,
[Enclosure]
Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the
Secretary of Defense (Marshall)
top secret
Washington, February 27,
1951.
Subject: Action to be Taken by United Nations Forces
with Respect to the 38th Parallel.
- 1.
- In the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the draft
memorandum prepared by the Department of State for the President
on the subject of the 38th parallel is, from the military point
of view, an unsound
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approach to the problem of determining future military courses of action for United Nations forces
in Korea inasmuch as this approach:
-
a.
- Would, based solely upon interim political factors,
predetermine future military courses of action without
consideration or determination of concurrent political
courses of action in the premises;
-
b.
- Proposes future military courses of action without a
review having first been made of present political
objectives and of the political courses of action which
the United States should adopt as a result of that
review; and
-
c.
- Would, in all probability, result in disclosure to the
enemy of a United States military decision.
- 2.
- It should be obvious that the current situation in Korea is
such as to require an immediate review of United States
political objectives for that area. Such a review should result
in either reaffirmation or modification of these objectives.
Thereafter it should be practicable to develop the short-range
political courses of action to be adopted in furtherance of
these political objectives. Once these political courses of
action have been developed, the Joint Chiefs of Staff can
analyze military capabilities and can recommend military courses
of action to be taken in conjunction with and in furtherance of
those political courses of action.
- 3.
- Two possible military problems are discussed in the draft
memorandum prepared by the Department of State:
-
a.
- Unification of Korea by military means; and
-
b.
- Restoration of the status quo
ante 25 June 1950.
- In addition, the paper develops at least by implication, a
third possible military problem; namely, halting the advance of
the United Nations ground forces south of the general vicinity
of the 38th parallel. The paper fails to indicate a political
solution to any of the above military problems. In this
connection, it must be recognized that to attempt to solve the
political problem of Korea by military measures alone is
unsound.
- 4.
- With respect to unification of Korea by military means, the
statement appears in paragraph 2 of the draft memorandum for the
President that “It is the political objective of the United
Nations and of the United States to bring about the
establishment of a unified, independent, and democratic Korea.”
However, in paragraph 4 thereof it is stated that “Our principal
allies and the great majority of governments having troops in
Korea would not support the unification of Korea as a war aim, although they continue to
support it as a political objective.”
Thereafter in the subject paper it is indicated that the risks
involved in attaining our objective are grave. The Joint Chiefs
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of Staff agree
that there would be grave military risks in attempting the
attainment of this political objective by military means
alone.
- 5.
- As long as the present political objective of the United
Nations and of the United States for Korea is retained, the
military forces of the United Nations and of the United States
should not be forbidden, for political reasons, to advance north
of the 38th parallel since such a prohibition is wholly
inconsistent with that objective.
- 6.
- With respect to restoration of the status
quo ante 25 June 1950, paragraph 6 of the draft
memorandum indicates that such a restoration is unacceptable
politically because of the concessions which the Moscow-Peiping
axis would attempt to extort. The 38th parallel is of no
military significance whatsoever insofar as military operations
are concerned. Restoration of the above status
quo, however, would permit the Communists to build up
north of the 38th parallel, either overtly, or covertly, such a
concentration of military forces as to jeopardize the safety of
present or contemplated United States and United Nations forces
in South Korea, Accordingly, in addition to the fact that
restoration of the status quo ante 25
June 1950 may be considered unacceptable from the political
point of view, it is wholly unacceptable militarily in view of
the military risk involved.
- 7.
- A United Nations prohibition against a general advance north
of the general vicinity of the 38th parallel would not impose a
comparable restriction on the Communist forces. In this
connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would point out that,
based on their military experience, it would be impracticable to
undertake aggressive defensive operations which would keep a
numerically superior enemy off balance and to interrupt or
prevent enemy offensives against United Nations forces unless
the 38th parallel as such is disregarded as a military feature by the ground as well as the air and
naval elements of the United Nations command. In any event, such
a prohibition would definitely limit and restrict the freedom of
action and the freedom of maneuver which the United Nations
ground forces must have if for no other
reason than for their own security.
- 8.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff are fully in accord with the view of
the Department of State that the United States should strive for
a settlement of the Korean question by political action rather
than by placing dependence primarily on military action. If,
however, the Korean question cannot be settled by political
action, then the political measures adopted should advance
rather than jeopardize the security of the United Nations
military forces in Korea.
- 9.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it premature for even a
preliminary determination to be made at this time as to the
action to be
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taken by
the United Nations forces with respect to the 38th parallel. The
Commander in Chief, Far East, has indicated his intention to
continue his advance to develop the enemy’s main line of
resistance; and, if no major enemy strength is disposed south of
the 38th parallel, to make a report to this effect to the Joint
Chiefs of Staff requesting instructions before proceeding
further. Until this determination has been made, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that a decision to cross the
38th parallel or one to halt south of that line would be
unsound, from the military point of view.
- 10.
- Any decision not to cross the 38th parallel, which is taken on
the political level in consultation with other United Nations
members, would inevitably result in disclosure to the enemy of
this decision. Such a disclosure would permit the enemy to
select his course of action based upon the known intentions of
the United Nations ground forces and thus could jeopardize the
military position of the United Nations in Korea.
- 11.
- In view of all of the above considerations, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff strongly recommend that the present military courses of
action in Korea be continued at least until:
-
a.
- The Department of State, after due consideration of
public opinion both national and international, has
formulated and transmitted to the Department of Defense
the political courses of action the Department of State
recommends for furthering the United States political
objectives in Korea and China;
-
b.
- Based upon these political courses of action, the
Department of Defense has formulated, in the light of
the global situation and United States military
commitments, future military courses of action with
respect to Korea; and
-
c.
- These political and military courses of action have
been integrated into a governmental decision as to our
future politico-military policy toward Korea.
- 12.
- Until this governmental decision is reached there should be no
change in that part of the directive to General MacArthur which
now permits him so to dispose his forces either north or south
of the 38th parallel as best to provide for their
security.
- 13.
- In light of all the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
strongly recommend that the Draft Memorandum on the subject of
the 38th parallel, prepared by the Department of State, not be
submitted to the President; but instead that the Department of
State be urged to initiate action in accordance with paragraph
11 above.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Omar N. Bradley
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
