Attached are four copies of an informal staff paper prepared in the
Department of State on the subject of the 38th parallel. We hope to have
a chance to discuss this with the Joint Chiefs of Staff this
afternoon.1 The attached paper does not represent a firm
Department of State position because we do not wish to reach one without
full consultation with you.
[Annex]
The 38th
Parallel
In the absence of an agreed cease-fire, the 38th parallel will
provide acute political and military problems. UN forces entered
Korea to repel the aggression and to restore peace. The restoration
of peace required an effort to destroy the North Korean forces. UN
forces crossed the 38th parallel in October 1950 to pursue and
destroy North Korean forces who had refused to surrender and were
giving every indication of continuing the fight.
With the large-scale intervention by the Chinese, it must be
concluded that we cannot now pursue and destroy enemy forces in
North Korea. Our inability to embark upon this effort may even
impose some limitations upon our ability to punish the enemy as
severely as we should like.
There would be considerable advantage in forcing the enemy north
[Page 173]
of the 38th parallel and
in securing the territory of the ROK, but serious risks or costs should not be undertaken
merely to secure terrain. A second purpose is to bring the fighting
in Korea to a close. If the enemy stops fighting, we are better off
without a continuation of the fight than with it. A cease-fire on a
reasonable and acceptable basis would be in our national interest.
We are fully aware that a cease-fire may not last if the Chinese
wish to break it.
From the political point of view, what military action would be
indicated? It would be for the military to consider whether such
military action is feasible or desirable. The following outlines the
military action which would best support our present political
objectives:
-
a.
- If there is an agreed cease-fire, of course, UN forces
would comply with the terms of the cease-fire. It is assumed
that the cease-fire principles of December 1950 set forth
our views on the conditions of the cease-fire.
-
b.
- If the enemy continues his offensive operations against UN
forces, UN forces should attempt to punish him as severely
as possible.
-
c.
- If the enemy retains considerable forces in any
substantial part of Korea south of the 38th parallel, UN
forces should punish him if an opportunity arises to do so
without incurring severe losses on our own side.
-
d.
- If the enemy pulls back north of the 38th parallel, we
believe that the main body of the UN forces should remain
south of the 38th parallel, with freedom to patrol or thrust
into a zone, say 20 miles north of the 38th parallel. The
purpose of this latter point would be to give the UN
Commander, in the absence of an agreed cease-fire, an
opportunity to keep a degree of control over the situation
to his front and to allow him to take such action as might
be required to keep the enemy off balance.
-
e.
- In the absence of an agreed cease-fire, air and naval
action against enemy forces and military targets in enemy
hands should be maximized.
-
f.
-
ROK forces should, as soon
as possible, be built into the best possible fighting force
with adequate training and replacement features to ensure
ROK effectiveness over a
prolonged period.
-
g.
- If the main body of UN forces reaches the 38th parallel,
the ROK defensive positions
along the 38th parallel should be strengthened and a special
effort should be made to clean up guerrillas south of the
parallel.
-
h.
- In the absence of an agreed cease-fire, the enemy should
not be afforded a sanctuary behind the 38th parallel similar
to that which he enjoys behind the Yalu River.
The primary means by which our Korean commitment can be substantially
reduced is an agreed cease-fire. If the enemy now refuses a
cease-fire, the above suggested action will permit a continuation of
punishment which might bring the enemy to accept a cease-fire. If
there is no agreed cease-fire, an effort should be made to increase
the
[Page 174]
capability of ROK forces in order, if possible, to
permit the relief of at least a portion of the UN forces now in
Korea. To the extent that air and naval forces can take over the
mission of punishing the enemy, that should be done.
What is the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the military
aspects of the above suggestions?
