320/2–1251
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (Bancroft)
| Participants: | Ambassador Nasrollah Entezam (Iran)–President of Fifth General Assembly |
| S/A–Ambassador Jessup | |
| UNA–Mr. Sandifer | |
| FE–Mr. Rusk | |
| UNP–Mr. Bancroft |
Mr. Entezam opened the conversation by saying that Padilla Nervo of Mexico had accepted membership on the Cease-Fire Group under the Assembly resolution but would not be able to start work until after February 17 because of eye trouble. He commented that he didn’t think there was any rush about putting the Good Offices Committee to work.
Entezam outlined at some length his thinking on alternative methods which the Good Offices Committee might follow. These were in general the same as those he mentioned in his conversation with Ross reported in telegram #1136 from New York.1
Entezam then talked about the relationship between the Ad Hoc Measures Committee and the Good Offices Committee and suggested the possibility that after the organizational meeting this week, the Ad Hoc Committee might decide to request the preparation of studies to be completed by a definite date in the future. He said that this would be helpful to the Good Offices Committee for the Chinese would know that after that date the Ad Hoc Collective Measures Committee would be considering the actual additional measures which might be applied. Thus the date might be in the nature of an indirect ultimatum.
[Page 171]We pointed out to Mr. Entezam that it was our plan to have the bureau of the Ad Hoc Committee first work out a plan of work for consideration by the whole Committee and thereafter to have the Secretariat or some appropriate subcommittee prepare the studies for later consideration. As far as the United States was concerned, we were not going to press the Ad Hoc Committee for quick action or in any way to proceed with undue haste. We wanted to give full scope to the possibilities of the Good Offices Committee. If the Good Offices Committee thought that providing for a terminal date when the studies had to be ready would be helpful, we would certainly acquiesce, although there was a possibility that the fixing of a date might later be troublesome in so far as the Chinese were concerned.
In respect to the various alternative methods of approach by the Good Offices Committee, Messrs. Rusk and Jessup suggested that the more indirect the approach was to Peiping, the more chance of success there would be. Mr. Entezam suggested that now that Sweden was on the Good Offices Committee and India off, it might be well to use the Indian Ambassador in Peiping to arrange contact with the Communist authorities. Mr. Jessup suggested that the Indian Ambassador might be used to arrange for contact between the Swedish Ambassador and the Peiping Government or perhaps contact between a Swedish ambassador elsewhere than Peiping and some Chinese Communist representative.
In so far as the question of developing contact between the United States and the Peiping Government was concerned, which Mr. Entezam mentioned in the same way as reported in New York telegram #1136, Mr. Rusk pointed out that we had made efforts for contact which had not been successful or fruitful in the past.
Mr. Sandifer made the point that it was important not to create the impression in the work of the Good Offices Committee that the United States and the Chinese Communists were the two principal parties in interest, but rather it was the Chinese Communists vs. the United Nations. Mr. Entezam agreed but suggested that although this was so in respect to Korea, the United States was a principal party in interest on the question of Formosa and, to a lesser extent, on the question of Chinese representation. Mr. Entezam went on to say that he did not want to get from us an affirmative reply that we would be willing to develop contact with Peiping but merely wanted to find out if the United States was violently opposed to it and that as far as he was concerned our silence on this point was sufficient. Mr. Rusk said that our position had been made clear in the past that we were willing to discuss Far Eastern problems in a forum at which the [Page 172] Chinese Communists would be represented, but that as he said earlier our prior contacts with the Peiping Government had not been fruitful.
Mr. Entezam made the point early in the conversation that the success of his Group depended a good deal on the military situation. Mr. Rusk said that that was probably true, that the situation was very fluid and that the new offensive by the Chinese Communists would probably mean that they would not make any decision until after there had been an opportunity to find out whether or not it was successful. Mr. Rusk said that in general he did not think that the military situation would move as fast in the future as it had in the last several weeks.