Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

795.00/2–1351

Memorandum for the Record of a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting¹

top secret

Washington, February 13, 1951—3 p. m.

[Here follows a list of persons present (23). In addition to the Joint Chiefs, 9 military officials attended; Messrs. Jessup, Matthews, and Rusk were accompanied by 5 other State Department representatives; and also present were Executive Secretary of the NSC Lay and his Deputy Gleason.]

General

1. Before proceeding to the major topics scheduled for consideration, two items were discussed as follows:

a. The Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed their position relative to a withdrawal from Korea in order that there be no misunderstanding on this matter. Their position is that while they would prefer to have U.S. forces out of Korea before next winter because of other United States military commitments, the military situation in Korea does not make such a withdrawal mandatory.

b. It was noted that the purpose of these conferences between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and representatives of the Department of State is to exchange views rather than to reach agreements on current politico-military problems. It was decided to keep a record of the subjects discussed and the gist of the views presented, and to prepare such records of the first three meetings.²

Korea

2. Views were presented on a draft NSC paper relative to the Korean situation submitted informally to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by State representatives.³ General Bradley expressed the opinion that the situation in Korea requires a determination of our political objectives. Then the military requirements to achieve these objectives can be determined. The military is capable of any action which might be required as a result of a political decision, except that a major offensive north of the 38th parallel in the face of resistance by major Chinese Communist forces would require U.N. forces in addition to those now deployed. A U.S. commitment of such proportions should be considered with caution. The 38th parallel is considered of no military significance. A decision to cross it in force should be based on political considerations. Mr. Matthews indicated that State did not want to consider a political decision except in light of our military capabilities. Mr. Rusk thought that—if we exclude the two extremes of driving the Chinese Communists from Korea and a unilateral U.N. withdrawal—the problem is to achieve a stabilization by which we could make progress toward our political objectives. The draft paper was intended to indicate what military action would, if it were feasible, best serve our political objectives. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that a cease-fire should not be regarded as an objective in itself but as one factor in an over-all agreement.

3. Mr. Rusk thought that the political and military problems are closely related. For example, it is a political objective to withdraw our forces from Korea in order to make them available for our build-up at home, for the defense of Japan and Western Europe, and so forth. However, this presupposes some modification of the enemy’s plan to take all of Korea. The Communists show no interest in reaching an agreement. For the time being, our objective is to punish the enemy severely with the idea of getting, first, a cease-fire and, second, an arrangement which would, in effect, re-establish the status quo ante June 25. We must accept the continuing risk of a renewed attack in view of dangers elsewhere that must be met. Our public position would still be support for the unification of an independent Korea but we would recognize that the Iron Curtain would come down on the 38th parallel.

4. Ambassador Jessup inquired whether the ROK could develop the strength to hold at the 38th parallel except against a major Chinese Communist assault. General Collins thought that ROK forces cannot be expected to have this capability for at least two or three years and agreed with General Vandenberg that if the Iron Curtain was dropped at the 38th parallel, thus permitting a Communist build-up to the north, the ROK probably never would attain the capability of holding. Ambassador Jessup and Mr. Nitze⁴ concluded that there are four possibilities: (1) to withdraw unilaterally; (2) to hold on indefinitely; (3) to liquidate the situation in the event of general war; and (4) to make a political arrangement by which we could withdraw.

a. It was generally recognized that the first would mean a serious blow to U.S. and U.N. prestige and would leave the Communists free to take South Korea and to use their forces for other adventures in Asia.

b. To hold on indefinitely would require more ground troops, not only to continue combat action in Korea but to insure protection for Japan, raising our total in CINCFE [Far East Command] perhaps to ten or twelve divisions with an additional requirement of 30,000 troops in the pipeline to provide for rotation. Raising Chinese Nationalist forces or additional Korean forces to replace U.S. troops is a doubtful possibility.

c. The fourth possibility depends in part on whether we can step up the punishment being inflicted on the enemy. General Vandenberg indicated that we have reached the point where there are not enough targets left in North Korea to keep the air force busy. He also pointed out that while we are punishing the Chinese on the ground, we are trading irreplaceable Americans for expendable Chinese. The question is not only how long will the Chinese be willing to take punishment but also how long will the U.S. public be willing to take American losses, even at the ratio of 20 Chinese to one American. Admiral Sherman thought that we must also consider the reaction of the United Kingdom and other nations which have contributed troops to the Korean operation. General Bradley agreed since it is important to keep our allies. He felt that a “cease-fire” in itself would not be advantageous at this time and that we would probably have to defeat the present attack and probably one more attack before the Chinese Communists would be ready to consider an acceptable agreement.

5. General Collins asked where, from the political point of view, we should attempt to stabilize. Mr. Matthews replied that no agreement short of the 38th parallel would be politically acceptable. Although the more territory we hold at the time of a “cease-fire” the better, it is not politically necessary to regain Seoul or to mount an offensive to seize ground along the 38th parallel. If it is militarily advantageous to hold about where we are now, as General Collins indicated, that is politically satisfactory. There was some discussion of military action north of the 38th parallel. In general, there are no military advantages in ground action in force north of the 38th parallel and there are psychological and political advantages in restricting our ground action to the area south of the parallel. It is important to use air strikes and naval action to make North Korea an example of what happens to an aggressor. Mr. Matthews thought that U.N. forces should not move north of the parallel in force except after consultation with Washington, but it was generally recognized that we should not commit ourselves not to cross the 38th parallel.

6. It was observed that a possible additional alternative is retaliatory action against China as an effort to reach a political settlement. This would involve the risk that the Soviet Union would enter the conflict, but the Soviet Union would have difficulty in supporting an operation in the Far East. General Collins and General Bradley thought that this course would involve excessive risks at this time. Mr. Nitze indicated that our capability for taking retaliatory action might be helpful in achieving a political settlement and then in enforcing it. With this sanction we might be able to get the Chinese Communists to guarantee that the North Koreans would not move against South Korea. It was suggested that CIA, State, and Defense should evaluate what action we can take without serious risk of Soviet intervention.

7. In the course of the preceding discussion General Collins summarized the present military situation in Korea as follows. Generally speaking, military operations in Korea are now stabilized, although there will be a certain amount of give and take. Considering terrain, there would be little military advantage to be gained by crossing the parallel. Any limited advance north of the Han would put the Eighth Army in a position with an unfordable river at its back. We might even do better to fall back a bit from our present position and could do so without relinquishing our hold on the rice-growing areas. We are now close to the limit of our capabilities with present forces as long as there is no appreciable change in enemy strength, and positions are likely to remain approximately as they are now.

[Here follows discussion of Yugoslavia and the proposed Council of Foreign Ministers meetings.]

1. The source text represents an agreed State–JCS memorandum of this meeting, which was the fourth in what became a regular series. A complete set of these meetings is in the files of the Policy Planning Staff: Lot File 64D563.
2. The previous meetings were held on January 24 and 30, and February 6.
3. Supra.
4. Paul H. Nitze, Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State.