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  4. Document 130

795.00/2–1251

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

secret
[Washington,] February 12, 1951.

Subject: Korean Situation

Participants: Mr. Hubert Graves–British Embassy
Dean Rusk–Assistant Secretary of State

Mr. Graves brought in a copy of the attached message from Mr. Bevin to Sir Oliver Franks1 and said that there was a Cabinet meeting today in London for which he would like to pass along any points which might be of interest on the 38th parallel problem.

I made the following preliminary comments to Mr. Graves:

1.
The present penetration of the 38th parallel consists of the reconnaissance copy [company] of the ROK Capital Division, which has advanced to a point four to five miles north of the 38th parallel along the east coast road, where there has been little or no opposition for several days.
2.
We do not contemplate a “major crossing of the parallel by our land forces”; in fact, it is not possible militarily in view of enemy dispositions and heavy enemy pressure in the central sector. The Unified Command has informed us that they have no such operations in mind.
3.
The present operation in Korea is an active defense; the aggressive reconnaissance and thrusts recently made by General Ridgway have been designed to punish the enemy, to keep him off balance, and to prevent his build-up for a renewal of his own offensive in strength.
4.
The Secretary will be meeting with his advisers in the Department at noon today on this subject and we expected to consult with the British Embassy within 48 hours on the broad range of problems concerned with the 38th parallel.2
5.
As a preliminary view, we would see great difficulty in establishing a sanctuary north of the 38th parallel similar to the one which the enemy enjoys north of the Yalu River. This is not a current operational problem because of the large enemy forces south of the parallel, but it would bear upon the attitude of the UN forces in the absence of an agreed cease-fire.
6.
We believe it most important not to give the enemy a firm indication of our intentions, since by doing so we might seriously jeopardize the position of our forces and the ability of the ground commander to punish the enemy.
7.
The Good Offices Committee is proceeding with its work; Mr. Entezam is calling at the Department today and will see Mr. Matthews, Mr. Jessup and Mr. Rusk.
8.
Although the United States does not accept their view, ROK authorities and people are violently opposed to any freezing of the 38th parallel in such a way as to give up the prospect of the unification of the country.

I stated that these were, of course, preliminary comments, pending our consultation with the Secretary today.

  1. Not printed. It conveyed Bevin’s preliminary views on the political aspects of the question of recrossing the 38th parallel. Essentially, he felt that the political decision lay not solely with the United States but with the United Nations, particularly those countries contributing forces in Korea. He also believed that any benefit attaching to a major crossing of the parallel might be outweighed by the political and military disadvantages resulting therefrom.↩
  2. No record has been found of a meeting between Department of State and British Embassy officials on February 13 or 14, but see the memorandum of conversation by Rusk, dated February 15, p. 177.↩