792.5–MAP/7–1251: Telegram

The Chargé in Thailand (Turner) to the Secretary of State

secret

119. Since recent coup attempt officers of Embassy and MilAtts and MAAG have been giving much thought to matter of future MDAP Thailand. We feel that situation has now clarified sufficiently to attempt reply to Deptel 9, July 2.1

Our understanding is that MDAP Thailand was originally conceived as calculated risk with primary objectives (1) alignment Thailand with US and UN against Communism, (2) resistance external aggression, (3) stabilization govt.

We believe that in first objective MDAP has been remarkably successful; in second reasonably so. As regards third objective recent events have unmistakably demonstrated that basis of govt is unstable and that further disturbances are probably ahead. Thus increased likelihood of internal upheaval in turn increases possibility of reorientation by govt in respect of its foreign policies. In other words, our calculated risk has become riskier as result of recent incident.

While recognizing increased element of risk in MDAP Thailand we must also recognize that attitudes and policies of present govt leaders, especially in international affairs remain unchanged, not withstanding [Page 1621] certain changes in leadership and alignment of forces within govt as result of incident. PriMin and FonMin2 have given repeated assurances their policies of govt remain unchanged, and we have observed nothing which would indicate the contrary. Govt leaders have uniformly indicated desire for continued MDAP aid.

We must also recognize that abandonment or even material modification MDAP Thailand at this time might very likely def eat all our efforts thus far. It might very conceivably cause govt to reconsider the very extended position it has taken on our side and convince govt of wisdom of making some accommodation to Communism. We should also recognize that cost of program to us relative to our position in SEA and Asia generally is minute.

In light of foregoing we recommend that program for FY–51 to which we are committed be continued unchanged, except as regards material for navy.

For latter we recommend shipments not already on water be suspended, subject to our later recommendations which will follow as situation develops and govt plans for navy crystallize. I am addressing a formal note to PriMin asking for information re scope of navy reorganization with view to determining amount and character of future MDAP matériel and training for navy. Our recommendations will take Thai Govt’s reply into account. These recommendations will also cover matter of frigates mentioned in reftel.

As regards plans for future (FY–52 program and thereafter) might well proceed on basis that program will continue unchanged, but should avoid any commitment whatsoever at this time.

Turner
  1. In telegram 9 to Bangkok, July 2, the Department informed the Embassy that MDAP aid for the Thai Navy had been deferred pending further decisions, which would be based on the recommendations of the Embassy and the Military Assistance Advisory Group (792.00/7–151).
  2. The Foreign Minister of Thailand was Nai Worakan Bancha.