Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 2

792.00/7–351: Telegram

The Chargé in Thailand (Turner) to the Secretary of State

confidential

Bangkok, July 3, 1951—10 a. m.

21. Fol is elaboration Embtel 2, July 1 to Dept.¹ Dept will realize that accurate evaluation this complicated situation extremely difficult and our conclusions must in some respects be tentative.

Considerable evidence that at least since April plot of sizable proportions gestating but not at stage of final agreement. Wld have included many elements as fleet, marines, certain army, police, air force elements, plus tactic support Democrats.² If above true then one element of this plot, a small group officers in fleet at Thonburi apparently became impatient, where tempted by opportunity offered by presence Phibun, Royal Landing June 29 in navy territory. They Seized opportunity believing other factions involved original but uncompleted plotting wld join. Apparently hoped possession of Phibun wld prevent police, army counteraction until other forces joined rebels. But almost no others joined due condition lack coordination, fear, doubts of success. Fleet units left on limb and govt with police, air force, army proceeded take strong suppressive measures despite danger to Phibun. Thus coup actually attempted only by fleet elements and two battalions marines based Thonburi.

Marine commanders other naval installations did not participate (CAS). Naval signal station at opposite end town entered fight only later when govt forces moved on station. Believe no reinforcements from Sattaheep naval base.

Because of (1) Nonparticipation by important navy-marine elements; (2) Absence of army-police split; (3) Vigorous counter-action by air force; (4) Lack participation by civilian groups, such as Free Thai³ or Democrats, it was obvious coup must fail. However, fact that attempt resulted from jumping the gun by only few elements in a bigger but as yet uncrystalized pattern is significant: It (1) makes clear not all non-revolting forces are solidly behind govt as many who refused join foolhardy action have been plotting against govt; (2) Indicates importance of factors which motivated fleet group make this desperate attempt. Various factors probably involved ranging from sheer impatience thru assumption other groups wld join, to possible goading of Admiral Taharn by pro-Commie elements. Emb unable assess this matter now but investigating. (But choice of ECA dredge handover ceremony as occasion for kidnapping believe not to signify anti-Americanism and purely coincidental.)

Fol is list key names and indication their position based on info available:

1. Admiral Sindhu Songgram Chai, CINC Navy—discredited with navy because allegedly denied it ammunition. Ruined with govt because, as Premier stated, to me, Sindhu had foreknowledge of plot and alerted ships to river. Furthermore delayed until last moment before coup ended to declare self publicly with govt. To be replaced by Vice Admiral Pholasin Thawanat.

2. Admiral Chalit Kunlakamthorn—definitely implicated and reported still at large.

3. Navy Captain Janon Purtrikhapha—definitely implicated and reported still at large.

4. Admiral Taharn Kamhiran—definitely implicated and reported still at large.

5. Admiral Chali Sinthusotmon—position doubtful, but involved as defended naval signal station, reported surrendered.

6. Admiral Pan Nawawichit and Admiral Zharoen Rajanawa and Momrajawong Seni Promote—reported themselves to govt immed after coup started, did not take part.

7. Admiral Thamrong Nawaskwat—not appear to be involved.

8. Gen Kach Songgram—activities June 20 and 30 uncertain. Govt suspects him. Surrendered.

9. Gen Wira Wirayotha—probably not implicated altho named on rebel radio as participant. Denies implication.

10. Air Marshal Thewarit Panluk—possibly implicated, reported in custody.

Fol are Emb first impressions probable consequences attempted coup and its suppression.

1. Navy to be drastically reduced in strength, perhaps sterilized of all political influence. Some sources say army-police will completely take over navy, but this seems over-stated. Others surmise navy will be kept as coastal force but all installations will be moved from Bangkok.

2. Army–police more firmly in saddle. Gen Phao’s⁴ influence will increase. Because of important part in suppression Gen Sarit Thannarat’s⁵ influence probably will increase. A new force added, i.e., Air Marshal Fuen Ronnapakat⁶ whose ruthless stand for govt in bombing naval installations probably will increase his stature.

3. Govt as a whole will become more of a mil dictatorship.

4. Because he cannot claim credit for defeat of rebellion since he a prisoner throughout, Phibun will have more difficulty controlling coup party leaders. Now must deal thru Phin,⁷ Phao, Sarit and Fuen, thus complicating problem of balancing forces. Hence Phibun probably to become more of a figurehead, superimposed on mil junta.

5. Removal of navy means elimination one factor which previously kept 1947 coup party⁸ leaders somewhat restrained. Other hand Emb expects rivalries will develop between four above mil leaders.

6. Difficult evaluate public opinion accurately yet. But people disapprove strong govt suppressive methods, particularly air force bombing.

7. Strong reprisals possible as colonel in premier’s secretariat asked me to be understanding if stern measures used against navy. We fear too drastic measures against navy leaders might force break up navy into small banks susceptible subversive control. Other hand we advised to date no unimplicated civilians have been seized.

8. Chi remain aloof, disapproving violence as bad for business. Regard conflict as quarrel between two mil clients, both bad. Altho local Chi Commies have not yet exploited propaganda advantages, incident offers opportunities for exploitation. Can attribute revolt to popular displeasure with dictatorial govt. Can interpret connection of kidnapping with Manhattan turnover ceremony as showing people disapprove govt cooperation with America. Can attempt woo disgruntled navy men. Coup advantageous to Commies because increases disunity, weakens mil potential and offers opportunity accuse MAAG of providing weapons used in revolt. Commies can now concentrate on civilian, political organizational and propaganda campaign exploiting revulsion against periodic mil amassings. Only clue to possible Commie inspiration is unsubstantiated hypothesis that Commies may have deliberately goaded Admiral Taharn into precipitating plot too soon, knowing navy wld be defeated and resultant bitterness wld make Thai more fertile field for them. Emb investigating this thesis but at present no evidence exists.

Altho as Dept aware there is great dissatisfaction with corruption, high cost of living, inefficiency, yet we do not believe these factors of primary importance in this coup.

Emb detailed interpretation of coup based on further investigations to fol by despatch.

Rptd info Manila 5, Saigon 4, pouched Rangoon, Chíengmaí.

Turner

1. In telegram 2 from Bangkok, July 1, the Embassy characterized the revolt of June 29 as an effort by a small faction of naval officers to seize power for themselves at the expense of the army and police officials who had controlled Thailand since November 1947 (792.00/7–151).
2. The Democrats were civilians who, as royalist-conservatives, had supported the army and police officers in their successful seizure of power in the autumn of 1947 to terminate Thailand’s democratic government and replace it with an authoritarian regime under the leadership of Field Marshal Pibulsonggram.
3. The Free Thai was an organization founded by Thai nationals living in the United States when the Japanese invaded and occupied their homeland in the spring of 1942. Among other things, they branded the existing government in Bangkok under the leadership of Field Marshal Pibulsonggram a puppet of the Japanese because it had, under Japanese pressure, declared war upon Great Britain and had tried to do the same to the United States, and they pledged to restore democracy in Thailand after the country’s liberation. The United States supported this organization and its aspirations during the course of World War II and helped the Free Thai establish an underground resistance movement against the Japanese. Its leader was Pridi Phanomyong, who had participated in a coup d’état on June 24, 1932, which had led to the introduction of a democratic system of government in Thailand and had ended the absolute monarchy. After World War II, democratic and constitutional practices, under the auspices of Pridi and the Free Thai movement, returned to the country until the military takeover late in 1947. For documentation regarding American dealings with the Free Thai, see Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. iii, pp. 1118–1125.
4. Lt. Gen. Phao Sriyanon, Deputy General of the Thai Police.
5. Commander in Chief of the Thai First Army.
6. Commander in Chief of the Thai Air Force.
7. General Phin Chunawan, Commander in Chief of the Thai Army.
8. The 1947 Coup Party was composed of military leaders who wished to over-throw the existing democratic government in Thailand and to reestablish an authoritarian regime. Officers such as Gen. Phin Chunawan, General Phao, and Gen. Sarit Thannarat planned and executed the successful coup d’état of November 8, 1947, which placed Field Marshal Phibun Pibulsonggram back in power. The attempted coup of June 29, 1951, was staged primarily by elements of the Navy who were discontented with the status quo, who wished to overthrow these officers rather than the Field Marshal, and who wanted to assume more power for themselves. Field Marshal Pibulsonggram was retained by the Coup Party leaders in the wake of these events because they believed he had become extremely popular with the United States, which enabled Thailand to obtain military and economic aid.