Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 2

796.11/9–1451

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs (Melby)

confidential

[Washington,] September 14, 1951.

Subject: Call on President Truman by President Quirino

Participants:	President Truman
	Ambassador Cowen1
	President Quirino
	Ambassador Elizalde

President Quirino when he called on President Truman by appointment was kept waiting a half-hour because Governor Dewey² was with the President. Quirino first presented the President with an ivory and gold-headed cane bearing the presidential crest identical with the cane he was carrying himself. There was first the usual exchange of amenities in which Quirino explained he had received a clean bill of health from his doctors but had been told to rest for 45 days. He said he is proceeding to Honolulu where he will spend some time and then fly to Manila.

Ambassador Cowen took this occasion to make some reference to the heavy burden Quirino is carrying now and the grave responsibility which is his in view of the impending critical November elections. The President said “Yes”, he understood this was the case and he expressed to Quirino the wish that he would have in the elections the same kind of splendid success he has had in the past. Quirino thanked the President for his wishes.

Quirino then expressed to the President his hope that something further could be done on war damages. He said he understood the President had expressed approval of the idea to Judge Delgado.³ The President said that as a matter of fact he had told Delgado he favored additional war damages, that he had originally recommended 500 million to the Congress, which had appropriated only 400 million, and that he thought the Philippines was entitled to the extra 100 million. He added, however, that in all frankness he should tell Mr. Quirino he did not think there was the slightest chance that Congress would agree.⁴

President Quirino raised the question of priorities for Maria Cristina.⁵ The President laughed and said that although he was fully sympathetic to the project, he did not know how helpful he could be since he had been trying unsuccessfully to get structural steel for a new post office in Independence, Missouri.

The President then expressed to Quirino his appreciation for the understanding and splendid support the Philippines had given on the Japanese peace treaty. Quirino then referred to a conversation he said Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs Neri had had in Tokyo some weeks ago with Prime Minister Yoshida. According to Quirino, Yoshida had told Neri that Japan had every intention of complying with any reparations required of the peace treaty and, furthermore as evidence of Japanese sincerity, Japan intended in addition to whatever the treaty provided for to pay the Philippines $1 billion in cash after the treaty went into effect. Quirino added that the Romulo–Yoshida conversation in San Francisco confirmed this understanding.⁶ He understood the United States interpretation of the aide-mémoire on reparations⁷ to the Philippines at San Francisco supported the Yoshida statement. Ambassador Cowen at this point injected that there must be some misunderstanding since this was the first he had heard of any such proposal and that it was not as far as he knew the intention of the United States to favor any such proposal. He said the United States interpretation was that the reparations articles would provide for payment in capital goods as well as consumer goods. President Quirino said that that was correct.

President Quirino asked President Truman whether or not he thought it would be advisable for him to call a special session of the Philippine Congress for early ratification of the Japanese treaty. President Truman replied that although he would send the treaty to our Congress for ratification immediately upon its receipt from the State Department,⁸ he thought it highly unlikely the American Congress would act on the treaty before the January session and accordingly it would be unnecessary for the Philippine Congress to hold a special session. Following a few amenities, President Quirino left.

In reply to a question by the Press as he left the White House, President Quirino said that he and the President had discussed the question of a Pacific pact. (Ambassador Cowen states that neither President ever even referred to the question.)

1. Ambassador Cowen had left Manila on August 24 to assist at the Japanese Peace Conference in San Francisco, after which he had gone to Washington for consultations at the Department.
2. Governor Thomas E. Dewey of New York.
3. Francisco A. Delgado, a Commissioner on the U.S.-Philippine War Damage Commission. Mr. Delgado was elected to the Philippine Senate on November 13.
4. The Congress took no action on Philippine war damage claims during 1951.
5. Reference is to a hydroelectric power project then under consideration by the Export–Import Bank.
6. In a memorandum of September 4, of a conversation held that day with Akira Matsui, Private Secretary to Mr. Yoshida, William J. Sebald, U.S. Political Adviser to the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers, summarized what Mr. Matsui had told him regarding a conversation held the morning of the 4th between the Prime Minister and Secretary Romulo. Mr. Sebald’s summary contains no mention of any discussion of monetary reparations. (Lot 54 D 423: John Foster Dulles Peace Treaty File)
7. Not printed.
8. President Truman later reconsidered this decision and delayed submission of the Treaty to the Congress until January.