Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 2

796.11/8–2851

Memorandum Prepared by the Embassy in the Philippines¹

secret

Manila, August [?], 1951.

Appraisal of the Philippine Situation by the American Embassy

The past two and one-half years have seen the renegotiation of the agreement on naval bases, the conclusion of a military assistance program and an important part of its implementation, the acceptance of an economic survey mission, the conclusion of the bilateral agreement setting forth the terms of the Economic Cooperation Administration development program, and the sending of an Export–Import Bank survey team. Now safely assured is Philippine participation in the Japanese Peace Treaty. Negotiations for a mutual defense treaty have been completed.

It now seems likely that we will see the disintegration of the Huks as early as November if present pressures are continued. Huk leaders are now promising a big victory in November, but the feeling of the rank and file is that, unless eventual victory is then assured, they will cease their struggle, either drifting back home or surrendering for resettlement on Mindanao. This would be a victory over the Huk militia but not over the Huk political forces, who will continue as long as there is economic and social discontent. There is reason to believe that the Chinese Communists are assaying the coming failure of the Huks as the vehicle for the Communists in the Philippines and are quietly setting about organizing a stronger, more disciplined, and more clandestine force to supplant the Huks eventually.²

The application of the Department’s policy during the past two and one-half years has registered satisfactory progress in influencing the nation’s development as a unit of the democratic bloc. Whereas economic and political collapse appeared probable in 1949, the nation today finds itself with a budget in balance, the possibility of a budgetary surplus, rising production indices, stable and gradually receding price levels, internal reserves well above the margin of safety, and a marked improvement in civic morale.

We feel we have just cause for satisfaction in the results achieved but must recognize that, without exception, they remain possible only by continuously applied pressure. This suggests several matters for future concern. The first is whether or not this reinforced structure will hold together when pressure is removed. It is too easy for our own public opinion to dismiss such concern as the Filipino’s own responsibility, to justify withdrawal of active interest on the ground that our moral obligation has been met and that the future, good or bad, is up to the Filipinos. However, even though this task has been a moral obligation, we cannot overlook the fact that for our purposes it was also a matter of practical self-interest. If the eyes of Asia are on this area as a show window of democracy, they are focused upon it even more keenly as a testing ground for American leadership. In casting about for adaptable social patterns, the new nations of Asia will accept or reject ours on the basis of its success or failure in the Philippines. By the same token, in seeking new relations with the West to replace those they have dislodged, they will be influenced by the firmness, understanding, and fair play which we demonstrate in our relations with the Philippines. Strong leadership is respected in this part of the world, but it must be tolerant and understanding, without condescension, to be accepted.

An understanding of the Philippine people is essential, and their shortcomings must be appraised against their historic background. A useful analogy is to regard them as precocious children without minimizing their potential as future world citizens. This merely recognizes their relatively recent introduction to the modern world and the fact that four centuries of their experience in that world have seen the obliteration of their own culture and the imposition of three alien, diverse, and conflicting cultures. That they have assimilated the superficial aspects of ours in so short a time is proof of their precocity. Where they failed to grasp its more fundamental implications they are displaying no more than the uncertainty and the bewilderment of national mind in which several strong but incompatible traditions vie for supremacy. As they are today, however, they present no problem that cannot be met by firm patience and sympathetic understanding. It is against this background that we must view the problems of retaining the gains we have made and of expanding the ideological bridgehead we already have here.

In connection with the problem of retaining gains we have made, it will be necessary, among other things, to be prepared for a worsening of economic conditions in the Philippines if the prices of their principal export commodities do not recover from their present relatively low levels in comparison with those prevailing a few months ago. Any appraisal of future economic conditions in the Philippines should also take into account the resurgence of Japan as an industrial power in Asia and its possible adverse effect upon Philippine plans for intensive industrial development.

Another problem is more directly related to the local political scene. It was inevitable that, in shoring up the shaky economic structure and in providing for a program of economic aid and development, we should at the same time have restored the administration’s power and prestige. The danger now is that in so doing we have developed a threat to the very institutions we seek to strengthen. It is already becoming apparent that the continuation of what we have started will be used by the incumbents to undermine and destroy opposition, with the elimination of the two-party system as the ultimate goal. This obviously must be avoided and can be avoided if we take as the task ahead the strengthening and encouragement of the opposition party devoted to constructive criticism of domestic issues. The existing opposition has leaned toward criticism of foreign policy not only because its leadership includes such embittered ex-collaborators as Laurel³ and Recto⁴ but also because it felt we were wholly committed to support the Liberal Party. The Ambassador has been unable to dispel this misconception to date, because of the prior importance of building and maintaining a working relationship with the Administration and because of the Administration’s extreme sensitivity to even the mildest show of tolerance for and association with the opposition.

With our various aid agencies now established and functioning, however, it should be possible to begin developing a broadened bipartisan base for Philippine-American relations. This can be done only if all such aid programs, including the military, are used as factors in influencing political policy along democratic lines and are coordinated and focused toward the new objective.

1. This memorandum was an enclosure to a memorandum of August 28 from Mr. Rusk to the Secretary, not printed. (796.11/8–2851) It was prepared for President Truman in connection with the visit of President Quirino to Washington to be present with President Truman at signature on August 30 of the Mutual Defense Treaty between their two countries. The second paragraph is based on the Embassy’s telegram 737, August 21, and the remainder is based on telegram 729 of the same date. (Neither printed. 796.00/8–2151)

2. In telegram 789, August 24, Ambassador Cowen commented on this paragraph as follows:

   “To avoid possible misinterpretation I wish to make clear that Embtel 737, August 21 was not intended to imply there will be no further Huk raids or incidents. I believe Huk fighting organization will soon have sufficiently disintegrated if present Phil military pressure sustained to render it incapable of mass attack on govt forces. Scattered groups with poor communications will continue to harass, plunder and raid but danger of overthrow of govt by large-scale Huk military operation now passing thanks to effective efforts of Phil Armed Forces as developed under JUSMAG direction.” (796.001/8–2451)

3. José P. Laurel, President of the Republic of the Philippines, 1943–1945.
4. Senator Claro M. Recto had been a member of the Laurel government.