493.46E9/9–2051
Statement by the Ambassador in Ceylon (Satterthwaite)1
My Government has instructed me to say in a spirit of friendship that it is greatly concerned over the consequences of the failure of Ceylon to cooperate with the strategic embargo of the United Nations against the Chinese Communists. As the Government of Ceylon knows the embargo is being applied in accordance with the Resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations, dated May 18, 1951, by a sizable majority of the members of the United Nations, and by several non-members, including the German Federal Republic, Italy, Japan and Spain. The General Assembly in this Resolution called on all states and not only member-states to take such action. While the United States is indeed gratified at the cooperation of the Government of Ceylon at the Japanese Treaty Conference in San Francisco, it wonders whether it is not incumbent upon the Government [Page 2054] of Ceylon, which is seeking admission to the United Nations, to accept a share of the responsibility and the burden of the present struggle of the United Nations against aggression.
The important assistance to the enemies of the United Nations and of the United States represented by the shipment on the M. S. “Mickiewicz”, and by any other shipments which might follow, could not fail, it should be emphasized, to arouse the deep resentment of the United States Congress and public. My Government feels that the Government of Ceylon has a real and obvious stake in the joint efforts to deter or suppress aggression before the stage is reached at which Ceylon might find itself an immediately prospective victim. It is therefore reluctant to believe that the Government of Ceylon cannot see its own self-interest in combating aggression before it gains even greater scope and momentum.
My Government has therefore instructed me to say that if Ceylon rubber moves to communist China, it will be impossible, as previously indicated to the Government of Ceylon, for the United States to render assistance in licensing sulphur for Ceylon. This sulphur would contribute to the production of rubber which goes to enemies actively engaged in aggression as defined by the United Nations. The people of the United States could not understand this action on the part of Ceylon nor the action of the United States in rendering assistance with respect to sulphur.
The Government of the United States has gone to great lengths to make sulphur available to Ceylon. It has done this because of its friendly relations with the Government of Ceylon and the friendly reception given by that Government in the past to the points previously made by the American Embassy which lead to the hope that the Government of Ceylon would come to concrete and full support of the position of the United Nations and the free world, as it did so ably at the Japanese Treaty Conference. Other countries supporting the United Nations Resolution also have great need for sulphur. Furthermore, other countries which are natural rubber suppliers also desire the higher price available outside of the free world but refuse to accept such prices in favor of the ultimate benefit of united action.
For manifest reasons of friendship, the United States is making no public announcement of the present delay in licensing the shipment of sulphur and hopes most sincerely that appropriate action on the part of the Government of Ceylon with reference to the M. S. “Mickiewicz” will allow the sulphur to proceed as soon as possible.
In conclusion, it is necessary again point out to the Government of Ceylon that the movement of Ceylon rubber to a communist area will make it impossible for the Government of the United States to grant to Ceylon an exception under the Kem Amendment or the Battle Bill.
- Sent to the Department of State as enclosure 1 to despatch 268 from Colombo, September 20, 1951, not printed.↩