493.46E9/9–1751: Telegram

The Ambassador in Ceylon ( Satterthwaite ) to the Secretary of State

secret
priority

171. I delivered representations contained Deptel 104, Sept 13 to PriMin Senanayake at 8:30 this morning. Vaithianathan, Permanent Secretary MEA, and Gufler also present. Result was negative and unsatis. Atmosphere was somewhat tense altho entirely polite and PriMin did not become emotional.

I made representations from written statement based on ref tel which I then handed PriMin.1 I had made some minor changes in Dept’s text and added one or two sentences. Will forward my text by pouch unless Dept wishes it telegraphed. No ref to UKHC reps was made in course conversation.

When I concluded reading statement PriMin expressed regret that Ceylon rubber was being shipped on Mickiewicz. He wld be happy if it were [possible?] to do anything about it, however, he asserted wld drive country to communism.

It was, however, impossible obtain from him any clear explanation why action on part GOC prevent shipment few thous tons rubber to an enemy which would use it in combating US and UN troops [Page 2052] wld drive Ceylon to communism. PriMin made no real effort explain reason but rather adopted attitude he knew best.

He did mention country’s independence and indicated any action on his part restrict free trade wld be very unpopular in country and hurt him politically. He mentioned slaughter tapping during last war and said there had been definite breach faith on part UK and US fol war. When pressed for details he said there had been clear understanding with UK that its stockpile wld not be put on market at conclusion hostilities but UK nevertheless sold it to US. He also mentioned expanded use synthetic rubber in US. To this I said that to my personal knowledge US had actually restricted output synthetic rubber and he knew that rubber prices had risen considerably before outbreak hostilities in Korea. Since then enormous profits had been made in Ceylon as result rubber prices offered by US.

To his arguments that Ceylon shld have complete freedom of trade, I said I cld not understand this feeling in view fact US and UN were engaged in actual warfare and that rubber in question was being shipped to very enemies fighting our troops. Furthermore, if matter were considered merely on trade basis, I cld not understand why Ceylon attached so little importance to retaining good will one of its best customers and was willing lose this good will for only few thous tons rubber.

Vaithianathan made point that while rubber prices had indeed risen, prices rice on which Ceylon was completely dependent had risen eight times. I expressed sympathy but said such arguments wld not convince US public during existence state warfare.

In discussing our decision not assist them obtain sulphur if Ceylon rubber were shipped China PriMin said perhaps it was just as well we cld not do so as he did not believe in bargaining. He added: “If you do not let us have sulphur we cannot grow rubber. On other hand, you must face possibility that this may drive us into the other camp and that we may eventually have sell all our rubber to Chi and obtain sulphur from Chi”.

To this I said I hoped it was clear we were not bargaining. Rather statement I had read him simply made it clear why if Ceylon rubber went to our enemies, it wld be impossible for us to help Ceylon obtain sulphur or give Ceylon exception under Kem Amendment. As to necessity their selling rubber Commie Chi, I pointed out there was not single ton on board Mickiewicz which cld not have been sold elsewhere. Moreover, as GOC had sought our active assistance in combating Communism, this attitude was inexplicable to me.

At no point did Senanayake present any argument that seemed answer ours. In reply my question he said I had indeed in our previous [Page 2053] discussions made him fully aware serious view US wld take any shipment Ceylon rubber to Commie Chi. I expressed regret he had not succeeded in convincing me reasonableness Ceylon’s position and said I cld not therefore be expected convince my govt. I also expressed deep regret that high prestige which Ceylon now enjoyed in US as result MinFin Jayewardene’s excellent work at Jap Treaty Conf wld I feared be lost as result this attitude on Ceylon’s part.

In seeing us off Vaithianathan expressed regret that this difference which he described as due entirely to polit considerations shld have arisen between our two govts. He undoubtedly meant internal polit considerations as he said several times it wld be pol suicide for Ceylon observe UN embargo.

Upon our arrival at PriMin’s residence we saw Home Min Goonetilleke lurking in background. He was not, however, present at interview. I fear his influence on PriMin over present issue has been an evil one.

Am keeping Gov Gen fully informed at his request. He seems assume, however, there is nothing more he can do prevent shipment in view limitations on his power in constitution which he drafted.

Pls give me as much advance notice as possible re timing Dept’s action on Kem Amendment.

Dept pass London; sent Dept 171, rptd info London 65.

Satterthwaite
  1. The text of Ambassador Satterthwaite’s statement of September 17 is printed infra.