Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 2

Kabul Embassy Files

The Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Ambassador in Afghanistan (Merrell)

confidential
official
informal

Washington, August 14, 1951.

Dear George: Since your arrival last month in Kabul, I have intended to write you about a number of outstanding problems affecting Afghanistan. Your reports are most helpful and indicate that we are witnessing a new phase in the internal political situation there. We have been particularly interested in your summaries of significant events showing that the people of Afghanistan are acquiring greater political consciousness and are comparing their own depressed living standards with those of their more prosperous neighbors. The so-called liberal elements, though lacking in leadership at present, seem to offer opportunities for the exercise of tactful and beneficial United States influence. Without identifying ourselves too closely with them, we may be able to influence them sufficiently so as to prevent their capture by Communist infiltration.

Pushtoonistan is always with us and is likely to be for some time. I think you will agree that a minimum requirement of our policy is to discourage Afghan agitation of this issue, reduce tension as much as possible, and hope that time and wiser counsels on both sides will prevail. Economic development of the country may help to eliminate some of the emotional bases for “Pushtoonistan.” That is not to say, however, that we should not continually strive to settle the issue bilaterally or through other appropriate means. Incidentally, I doubt that my remarks to the Afghan Prime Minister on June 8 ever filtered down to the Afghan Foreign Office; perhaps it will be useful for you to find an occasion to repeat these points to Ali Mohammed, as we suggested in our telegram No. 36 of July 20.¹

It will be interesting to learn what the Prime Minister’s position is when he returns. I believe it would be very unfortunate from our point of view for him to retire. He has many ideals similar to those of the West and seems to be respected by the Pakistanis as well as the Afghans. His visit here was successful, I think, in making him a better friend to the United States, but it is now clear that we were unable to prevail upon him to make an early return to Afghanistan. This may reflect a desire among certain elements in Afghanistan to keep him away at this particular time or the possibility that he is holding himself in reserve for a real crisis in either internal or external affairs.

The MKA oil situation may be a matter of concern for some time and we intend to lend appropriate assistance while following the general line you recently recommended, i.e. to make the Afghans shoulder some responsibility for negotiating with the GOP, at least on the technical level. I believe the record shows that the GOP has done pretty well by us and MKA and you might find this useful sometimes in countering the perennial Afghan contention that Pakistan is constantly trying to strangle their economy. On the other hand, I quite agree with your recent telegram indicating that, if Indo-Pakistan tensions increase, Afghanistan will be in a very tight spot both politically and economically.

I have noted with great interest your reports of increasing USSR activity in Kabul, and I know you will keep us alert to any hints of a change in their objectives or plains, which might lead to some internal coup.

The application of the Kem Amendment² to Afghanistan is another matter of some concern at this time. We hope that Afghanistan, like India, may be granted exemption and that US aid, though small, may stimulate the Afghan development program and indirectly ease the Pushtoonistan issue. Meanwhile, it is gratifying to know that the two dams being financed by the Export-Import loan may cost only $16 million, so that the $5 million balance might possibly be used for land utilization.

In the administrative field, we are fully aware of the need for expanding the Embassy staff and arranging for additional housing. Fritz Larkin³ has promised to visit Kabul some time this year. We are doing everything possible to get you more personnel, though I am sure you realize that a good deal of time is needed to select suitable people. I think it is particularly necessary to continue utilizing the USIE program so as to reach more Afghans, especially those who are just now beginning to become more sophisticated politically. We are also trying to persuade the Air Force to let you make the maximum use of the Air Attaché’s plane.

I still recall with great pleasure my visit with you in Addis and hope that some time I may have occasion to see you also in Kabul. With warm personal regards and best wishes to the members of your staff, I am

Sincerely yours,

George C. McGhee

1. Telegram 36 to Kabul, July 20, not printed, in part requested Ambassador Merrell, should the Afghan reply to the Pakistani counterproposal be a flat refusal, to remind the Acting Prime Minister of the substance of McGhee’s March 12 conversations in Kabul and of his June 8 talk with the Prime Minister. He was to emphasize the following points: (1) Pushtunistan is not an economically or politically viable state; (2) the insistence of the Government of Afghanistan in pressing the Pushtun issue under present world conditions is not believed to be in the best interests of Afghanistan or of world peace, a view with which the Prime Minister indicated agreement; and (3) the principles of self-determination have proved difficult in practice during the last 20 years. (689.90D/7–1151)

   Telegram 72 to Kabul, August 17, not printed, instructed the Embassy to transmit the formal Afghan reply, when received, to the Department for forwarding to the Government of Pakistan. If the Afghan reply was a flat refusal, the Embassy was to make the representations indicated in telegram 36 to Kabul of July 20. (689.90D/8–951)

2. The Kem Amendment, Section 1302 of P.L. 45, Third Supplemental Appropriation Act of 1951, approved June 2, 1951 (65 Stat. 52), so-named after Senator James P. Kem of Missouri, provided for a ban on economic assistance to countries exporting strategic materials to Communist-bloc countries.
3. Frederick Larkin, Chief, Division of Foreign Buildings Operations.