689.90D/7–2851: Telegram
The Ambassador in Afghanistan (Merrell) to the Secretary of State
68. It is not necessary to admit validity of GOP charge that GOI is financially and morally behind pro-Pashtunistan propaganda to see close inter-connection between Kashmir and Pashtun issues. Without any doubt outbreak actual hostilities over Kashmir wld present GOA with challenge. Expressed differently, there wld exist strong temptation to join GOI in hope (or possibly as result prior agreement) of obtaining NWFP and Baluchistan. This potential opportunity to secure for Afghan exit to sea and considerable accretion territory wld be held in check by fear of internal troubles, for it is seriously open to doubt whether regime cld carry with it Pashtun tribesmen in war at side infidel Hindus and Sikhs.
As Dept aware, present govt is made up of such diverse elements, and wields such tenuous auth, that it is impossible to predict how it will react in face given situation. However Acting PM in discussion yesterday admitted that outbreak Indian-Pak hostilities wld impose severe strain on GOA to extent that he personally wld be unable to gauge consequences internally. Other observers believe without question that tribesmen wld be irresistibly drawn to side of Pak, and that if GOA attempted take pro-Indian stand it wld be overthrown in quick order. In consequence an attempt at neutrality, at least in early stages, wld seem obvious policy govt. As against this clear course of wisdom (which, however, might fail shld tribesmen move on Kashmir as they did in 1947), voices are heard inland advocating prompt move thru Khyber and Chaman. Whereas we consider Af mil capacities to be extremely limited, it is sad commentary that many Afghans tend to be guided by their emotions rather than minds.
Dept pass Karachi, New Delhi 4, London, sent Dept 68, rptd info Karachi 14, London 10.