Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 2

689.90D/5–1951: Telegram

The Ambassador in Pakistan (Warren) to the Secretary of State

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Karachi, May 19, 1951—1 p. m.

1094. FonMin called me last evening and on arrival said he had also asked UK HICOM to be present for estimate of Afghan-Pak border sitn in vicinity Chaman and Kandahar that is rapidly becoming inflammatory ref my 1086 May 18¹ and Kabul’s 357 May 16 to Dept.²

A week of relative quiet followed the Afghan raids May 5. Now Pak MilAtt at Kabul reported on May 14 the Afghan–Kandahar garrison reinforced by three brigades including artillery and some aircraft and at same time reserves were alerted from Kabul to extent of three brigades. Machine guns, automatic rifles and other weapons from Kabul ordnance depot have been released to equip them. Pak vice consul Kandahar yesterday was made object of public anti-Pak demonstration. With prospect that Daud³ may proceed from Kabul to Kandahar this weekend Paks feel sitn may get out of hand.

FonMin said Paks as measure of defense have moved from Quetta towards Chaman a reinforced brigade which is the total of regular armed forces stationed in Baluchistan. Yesterday they flew a squadron (12) Furies to Quetta. Troops are instructed not to cross border nor fire into Afghan territory.

In opinion FonMin these concentrations along immed border between the two countries, not in so-called Pooshtoonistan area where there is a buffer of tribal territory, has no obvious explanation. He said it may be a bid for power by Daud, or it may be that Kabul, having been informed that Pak accepts the provisions of US démarche of Nov 6 in its first three phases, realizes the Pooshtoonistan issue is dead unless border incidents between the two countries become sufficiently significant to invite UN cognizance of sitn ref Kabul’s 353 to Dept, in which case the Pooshtoonistan issue could be introduced as an element of irritation between the two countries. This thinking was not advanced by Zafrullah but was subj of triangular discussion between three of us.

Zafrullah said his purpose in seeing us was (1) to acquaint us with facts as they appear from Pak side and with Pak defense measures; (2) to invite US and UK to send their senior MilAtt to Chaman outpost on border where they could readily determine what defensive measures Pak has taken as well as attitudes of villages that have been subj to raids in the last month.

After I had remarked that adjacent concentrations on the Kandahar plain were dangerous and shld be dissipated soonest, Grafftey-Smith offered the proposal, to which I subscribe, that Zafrullah ask PM in his capacity as Defense Min (1) to tell us Pak prepared inform Afghan that it considers sitn has element of danger to peace between two countries and (2) Pak is prepared withdraw immed ground troops it has moved into area as measure of defense if Afghans take similar measures with ref their concentration in Kandahar.

Zafrullah concurred with suggestion. Said he wld take up with PM and ask for cab mtg and if approved wld let us know immed.

In event PM accepts our suggestions I recommend to Dept a further step; Paks wld welcome presence of US and UK senior MilAtts to verify facts of withdrawal of its forces at threatened point on border and wld be glad if Kabul could make similar arrangements with US and UK MilAtts in Afghan who wld determine facts of withdrawal of Afghan forces on their side.

Dept pass London. Sent Dept 1094, rptd info London 73, Kabul 56. Dept pls pass Army.

Warren

1. Telegram 1086, from Karachi, May 18, not printed, contained in part a report from the Pakistan Ministry of Defense that, with reference to Afghan allegations that 5,000 regular Pakistan troops were now based on the Baluchistan, border with tanks, guns, and ammunition, the actual fact was that the Ministry had ordered one troop of seven armored cars to Chaman to safeguard villages against further raids. (689.90D/5–1851)
2. Telegram 357, from Kabul, May 16, not printed, reported in part that Afghan allegations of substantial troop reinforcements on the Baluchistan border were unconfirmed and that such reports were motivated by the desire of Afghanistan to win support abroad for its case regarding Pushtunistan (689.90D/5–1651).
3. Mohammad Baud Khan, Commander in Chief of the Afghan Central Forces and Military Schools.