690D.91/9–2551: Telegram
The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State
1503. 1. Extended conversation at FonOff yesterday revealed fact UK thinking closely in accord with that described para four Deptel 1624, Sept 22 to London rptd Delhi, Karachi, USUN.
2. Main UK objective is play for time but, in order avoid exacerbation Pakistan, aim shld be initiate some action in SC before it moves to Paris next month. Clearly, firm decision cannot be reached until [Page 1865] Graham report received and studied and reactions India and Pakistan obtained.
3. UK prefers delay in reference to GA in order (a) meet Pakistan’s present objection ref to GA and (b) enable UK–US choose most favorable moment in light India’s reaction to discussions.
4. There appears to be chance Graham’s report may leave opening for further useful action in SC. If so, such course wld be advantageous for fol reasons: (a) it wld avoid appearance of deliberately ignoring Pakistan’s views; (b) it wld leave ref to GA as a reserve tactical maneuver; (c) it wld avoid or postpone damaging effect on prestige of SC in case of admitted failure solve disputes; and (d) it might serve as means of keeping negotiations alive until after Indian elections in December.
5. In any further SC action it is essential there be no risk such action wld lead to deadlock. This wld not only further exacerbate Pakistan but also wld make such a ref to GA transparent avoidance of problem by SC.
6. Foll are comments on suggested courses of action in SC as brought up in recent Washington discussions:
- a.
- Resolution under Article 37, recommending parties take certain specific action, open to foll serious objections: (i) it wld likely lead to deadlock in SC; (ii) it wld tend to put India “in dock” and wld thus undermine remaining chance agreed settlements; and (iii) rather than reference to GA providing opportunity for new ideas to emerge, this hoped for development wld be made more difficult if issues had already been narrowed down by terms of an Article 37 resolution.
- b.
- Extension of SC activities to include potentially valuable industrial basic proposal undesirable, as to link it with political settlement of Kashmir question wld be best method of killing it.
- c.
- Reappointment of Graham with further negotiating powers has attractive features, particularly opportunity it affords of keeping discussion open. Further SC action might well be based on this idea but under foll essential conditions: (i) it wld be folly reappoint Graham in face hostile reception by either party to Graham report; (ii) Graham’s terms of reference shld continue to be based on provisions agreed UNCIP resolutions; (iii) Graham’s functions shld be limited to political aspects Kashmir dispute and shld not be broadened to include such other problems as canal waters or evacuee property; and (iv) altho, in order preserve momentum Graham’s activities he cld be given wider terms of reference than under present resolution, they shld be phrased so as not to weaken Pakistan’s position. Even though Graham cannot be reappointed he might continue in other ways to be associated with further action.
7. Proposal for immediate partition Kashmir, with vale question shelved for period of four years, under consideration.
[Page 1866]8. Spontaneous pressure from Asian states shld prove valuable but in order avoid suspicion US or UK had inspired such activity we shld make no move this direction.
Understood above views being communicated by FonOff and CRO to British Missions Washington, Karachi and Delhi for their comments and for further discussion with their US colleagues.
Dept please inform USUN.
Sent Dept 1503, rptd info Karachi 41, New Delhi 38.