Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 2

357.AB/2051: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

secret

New Delhi, July 20, 1951—6 p. m.

283. Ref Deptel 141, July 18 to Delhi, sent London 384, USUN 37, rptd info Karachi 58.¹ Emb convinced GOI has taken firm decision stand its ground on Kashmir. Inds appear believe Kashmir will be theirs without further action their part and they can successfully defy any effort by Pak or even UN to take from Ind parts Kashmir which they now occupy. Recrudescence inflammatory recriminations both countries (but particularly Pak) appear to have developed rapidly among Inds including armed forces, officials and public state of mind no longer shrinks from all-out war accompanied by horrors of communal strife—if, as Inds say, it is forced upon them by Pak. This attitude is more one of calm determination or resignation than anger but seems none-the-less dangerous if dangerous incidents of violence should occur.

Emb believes nevertheless that something might be achieved bringing Inds leaders to greater awareness of the sense of responsibility for dangerous situation to which country has now been brought. We doubt that UNSC or Graham mission in present frame of mind Ind can bring about such change. We believe that only US and Brit Govts have sufficient prestige and influence. We accordingly suggest that it wld be useful to check dangerous drift toward war if US in consultation with UK were immed to express to GOI and GOP its concern about most recent developments incident to Kashmir dispute.

Emb ventures further make certain suggestions re an approach to GOI which it believes might be effective.

(1) We might begin by expression our grave apprehension: Over sudden development extremely dangerous relations between two countries which has resulted in movement substantial portion their armed forces to respective common borders; over development mutual recriminations by countries leaders and press which we believe if continued cannot but inflame population toward readiness for war; over signs of Communal uneasiness which by single incident might suddenly spread and envelop the country in a wave of bloodshed.

(2) We have no doubt sincere desire both countries maintain peace and avoid war but wld respectfully remind them that all history shows situations such as that now existing are prelude to war. Ind is by far larger of two countries and with forty million Moslems residing within its boundaries bears a grave responsibility for avoidance of communal strife. Its very existence as newly independent country might be jeopardized and economic life of country perhaps shattered if war shld break out.

(3) Furthermore if Ind now fails take action, world wld not understand why it was that Ind which so strongly supports peaceful solutions in international councils was apparently unable achieve peaceful] solutions with its own neighbors. Kashmir problem has defied solution for almost four years. Ind and Pak leaders must now make utmost effort avoid drift toward war and communal holocaust and find solution basic problem.

(4) In addition to above suggestion Emb also believes: UNSYG might consider requesting UN mil observers in Kashmir for interim report with respect recent mil developments there. Circulation interim report to SC members shld be effective means impressing Pak and Ind with seriousness situation and possibly deterring them from further mil moves which wld certainly result in SC consideration.

(5) US and UK dels UN meanwhile might informally discuss with certain other SC members possibility SC meeting on basis Pak letter re constituent assembly and Ind letters re cease-fire violations as basis for immed SC consideration during which Liaquat charge re Ind mil movement and Nehru reply wld certainly arise for discussion, At such meeting pres SC might be authorized address further letter to Ind and Pak calling upon them (1) to check drift toward war and perhaps suggesting (2) formal negots between Ind and Pak PriMins to, settle Kashmir matter with Graham functioning in good offices: capacity.

(6) Emb fully concurs in Amb Warren’s conclusions re effect communal disturbances in Ind and Pak and believes this aspect shld be stressed strongly (Embtel 50 July 17 from Karachi). Contel 59 July 18 from Calcutta² graphically describes press agitation and growing influx refugees from East Pak. During recent discussion re Kashmir, high MEA official indicated to Steere that GOI was not worried re possibility communal disturbances which suggests urgent reason for approach to GOI outlined above.

Rptd info London 14, Karachi 17.

Henderson;

1. Telegram 141, July 18, to New Delhi, repeated to London as telegram 384 and to New York as 37, not printed, stated that although the Department believed the United Kingdom should take the lead in approaches to the Governments of India and Pakistan, it would welcome the views of the Embassies in New Delhi and London and the Mission at the U.N. as soon as possible on the usefulness of an immediate expression to the two governments of the U.S. Government’s concern (357.AB/7–1851).
2. Not printed.