Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 2

690D.91/7–1951: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations ¹

secret
priority

Washington, July 19, 1951—8 p. m.

44. Re Kashmir: recent troop movements.

I. Urgently request USUN and London consult with UKDel and FonOff, seeking views on fol contemplated action which Dept believes preferable:

1. While Ind troop movements might be treated as giving rise separate cause of action, we believe preferable consider them part “India–Pakistan Question”, which is GOP approach in ltr SC indicated by numbered para 2 and 3 USUN’s 88, July 16 (rptd, July 17 to London, 348; Delhi 55; Karachi 132)² We propose UK–US and other dels request SC mtg near future re troop movements. General line mtg might be as fol:

a. Members refer recent reports large-scale troop movements both Ind Pak as indicating dangerous situation in area, and ask: explanation from parties re nature, extent, reasons such movements. State reason for request primary responsibility SC for maintenance internatl peace and security, and bearing troop movements appear have on Graham mission.

b. After explanations, we believe shld seek res with limited objective, touching on fol among other points:

(1) recalling parties commitment under 13 Aug 1948 UNCIP res to assist in creating and maintaining atmosphere favorable promotion further negots;

(2) recalling various SC reses had called on parties take all possible measures ensure creation and maintenance such atmosphere and to refrain from any action likely prejudice just and lasting settlement Kashmir dispute;

(3) pointing out troop movements and belligerent atmosphere both countries appeared hinder possibility Graham cld help parties under mission on which sent by SC;

(4) hoping parties wld so act as ensure creation and maintenance atmosphere favorable promotion further negots in India Pakistan Question.

2. Simultaneously with SC mtg or prior thereto, US–UK shld urge parties accept Austral offer good offices made by Menzies. We suggest FonOff CRO and Dept at once see Austral HICOM³ and Ambs, expressing desire aid Menzies offer and inquiring what Australs have in mind. We think advisable ask if Menzies has considered specific approaches, such as suggesting that parties might wish avail selves of such UN devices as observers under Peace Observation Commission, or an expanded Kashmir Mil Observer Group. In both cases, observers cld observe and report on situation, and their presence might serve reduce tension while helping protect each party against actions by the other. Such suggestions to Australs based on our belief that, if Menzies cld get parties accept UN observers, this might materially diminish chance general hostilities. We wld, of course, advise Australs fully on our contemplated SC action.

3. UKDel–USUN shld informally suggest UN SYG ask Chief Kashmir Milob report any recent troop build-up in Kashmir. This wld give necessary info and, since limited to area Milob operations, can be done without formal SC action. In view UK assumption initiative Kashmir dispute, we have not yet instructed USUN take such step and hope UK will at once instruct UKDel join with USUN in making suggestion.

4. Advantages we see in above approaches fol:

a. SC Mtg deals with immed cause of tension—troop movements—but does not bring SC into complicated problems involved in troop withdrawals. These problems left to parties and possibly Menzies. SC only calls on parties live up to present commitments, thus diminishing prestige questions which wld be involved in any request parties withdraw troops.

b. Airing troop movement question and asking explanation in SC may have restraining effect on parties.

c. New cause of action not created, but only further consideration present case.

d. Menzies good offices, directed to troop movements issue, performed outside UN forum, thus giving flexibility in approaching problem and not in any way conflicting with Graham’s mission. Menzies efforts, if necessary keyed to SO action, shld give maximum effect in helping diminish tension in area.

e. Graham mission not made more difficult by giving him other duties re troop movements, and he will be aided if tension subsides.

f. If UN observers desirable in helping prevent outburst, probably wld be more acceptable have Menzies first make this suggestion privately outside SC, where parties’ prestige not so involved. In this connection, using POC for first time or greatly expanding Kashmir Milob Group might require some time. Might need large nr observers (525 used in Palestine). However, assume cld send in some observers on improvised basis fairly quickly.

g. SC Mtg shld be adequate indication to Pak genuine UK–US concern, while not overly antagonizing Inds.

II. 1. New Delhi and Karachi requested at once inform Graham, on most confidential basis, nature action contemplated. Explain Dept wishes keep him informed and urgently desires his comments before taking action.

2. Comments all Embs requested.

III. Dept agrees with FonOff views on taking notice GOI complaints on cease-fire violations [London’s 358, July 18, para 2, rptd Delhi 128, Karachi 54, USUN 35; USUN’s 106, July 18].⁴

Acheson

1. Sent also to London as telegram 458; repeated for information to New Delhi as 169, to Karachi as 66, and to Canberra as 23.
2. Telegram 88 from the U.S. Mission at the United Nations, July 16, not printed, quoted the text of a communication from Ahmed S. Bokhari, Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations, to Secretary-General Trygve Lie. The communication was issued as U.N. document S/2245. Numbered paragraphs 2 and 3 referred to here were quotations from a letter to Nehru from Liaquat Ali Khan of July 15. (690D.91/7–1651)
3. E. J. Harrison, Australian High Commissioner in the United Kingdom.
4. Brackets in the source text. Telegram 106, from New York, July 18, not printed, contained further views of the British Foreign Office, relayed by the U.K. Delegation to the United Nations, concerning an approach to the Indian Government (690D.91/7–1851).