694.001/4–2351
Memorandum by the Deputy to the Consultant (Allison) to the Consultant to the Secretary (Dulles)
Subject: Comments on views of Joint Chiefs of Staff dated April 17, 19511 on Japanese Peace Treaty
[Here follows the portion of Mr. Allison’s memorandum devoted primarily to his analysis of the views of the JCS on the proposed Japanese peace treaty and the proposed bilateral United States-Japan security arrangement. Part of the omitted section is summarized in footnote 1, page 990.]
In the same document the Joint Chiefs comment on the draft treaty with Australia and New Zealand and raise specific objections to Article 7 of the draft treaty, which sets up a defense council, and to [Page 213] Article 8 of the draft treaty, which provides for consultation and coordinated planning with other regional organizations. In this connection the Joint Chiefs state that there should be “no reference of any nature in any new security arrangements with nations of the Pacific islands other than Japan (if such arrangements must eventuate) to military plans, planning, or organizations therefore.” If the Joint Chiefs maintain their position in this respect it will, in my opinion, be impossible to include any joint security arrangements acceptable to the Australians and New Zealanders with the consequent result that those commonwealth nations would not acquiesce in the type of Japanese peace treaty which all elements of the United States Government, including the Joint Chiefs, have agreed is desirable. It has been made very clear to the United States by the Australian government that no form of security arrangement will be satisfactory unless some form of organization for mutual planning and consultation is included. In Foreign Minister Spender’s message to Mr. Dulles of April 13, 19512 in which he outlines the type of statement he might wish to make in case the United States was not able to make an authoritative statement he stated specifically “that while no elaborate organization is envisioned, the arrangements under discussion provide for consultative machinery through which the parties could concert their policies and planning.” In the Foreign Minister’s statement of April 18th3 issued at the time of the President’s announcement in this country he said, inter alia, “close association of Australia and New Zealand with the United States under an arrangement based on the principles of self-help and mutual aid and containing adequate provisions for consultation would constitute a solid guarantee to peace in the Pacific and to the security of Australia.” (underlining added)
The position of the Joint Chiefs is difficult to understand in view of the statements made to Mr. Dulles in January to the effect that they would recommend some security arrangement with Australia and New Zealand which would encourage those nations to carry out willingly their Middle East commitments. The statement quoted above is also difficult to understand in view of the statement in Paragraph 7 of the Joint Chiefs’ comments of April 17th4 on the memorandum of the British Chiefs of staff.5 Paragraph 7 of that statement6 reads as follows:
“It now appears that the security of the Pacific against communist aggression, together with security against possible Japanese aggression, [Page 214] can best be attained, in the future, by Japan’s membership in the United Nations and in a mutual security arrangement with the United States together with a continuation of current United States security arrangements with the Philippine Islands and with concurrent mutual security arrangements whose membership would include certain of the Pacific Island nations in addition to the United States. An essential feature of continued orientation of Japan to the West lies in the economic development of that country and in close commercial ties with the West.”
In reading the Joint Chiefs’ comments and studying their implications it is difficult not to conclude that their basic desire is to force delay in the coming into effect of any Japanese Peace Treaty and that one of the methods by which they hoped to secure this delay is by the creation of difficulties in the conclusion of mutual security arrangements with Australia and New Zealand which it is recognized is a condition precedent to obtaining the consent of those countries to the United States draft of a peace treaty with Japan.
In my opinion the difficulties between the State and Defense Departments are of a fundamental character and an effort should be made to resolve them at once. I am afraid that in the past apparent difficulties have been resolved by the use of language which glossed over differences but did not in fact settle them and that we should now meet the issue head on and come to a definite complete understanding.
- That portion of the JCS memorandum on which Mr. Allison comments here is printed on p. 207.↩
- For full text, see Spender, Exercises in Diplomacy, p. 168.↩
- A copy of the full text of this statement was made available to Mr. Dulles by the Australian Mission in Tokyo on April 20. (Lot 54D423)↩
- Not printed.↩
- Text forms the annex to the undated aide-mémoire of the United Kingdom, printed under date of March 12, p. 909.↩
- That is, of the Joint Chiefs’ memorandum.↩