Lot 54D423
Memorandum by the Deputy to the Consultant (Allison) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)
Subject: Proposed Pacific Security Arrangements
There is attached hereto an advance copy of a comment by the Joint Chiefs on Mr. Dulles’ memorandum to Secretary Acheson dated April 13,1 copy also attached, regarding the proposed security arrangements in the Pacific. The Joint Chiefs refer particularly to the second paragraph of Mr. Dulles’ memorandum in which he states that it can be made clear that any organization under the trilateral arrangement with Australia and New Zealand will not have the right to demand [Page 210] knowledge of and to participate in planning by “the North Atlantic Treaty organization, the Organization of American States or any other security organizations not directly related to the Pacific area.” The Joint Chiefs refer to the above language and then repeat the language in their memorandum of April 11, 1951,2 to the effect that the Joint Chiefs “oppose the inclusion in the pact of any reference to military plans, planning, or organizations therefor.”
Captain Murdaugh of the Navy3 who gave me the advance copy of the JCS views made it clear to me that the Joint Chiefs will in fact be opposed to any sort of organization under the tripartite pact which will have anything to do with planning in the Pacific or elsewhere. Captain Murdaugh expressed surprise that the Joint Chiefs had approved the language in the proposed Presidential statement which referred to establishing “consultation to strengthen security”. He said that the Joint Chiefs were apparently going back on the whole idea of consultation. I believe we are going to have a head-on collision with the Joint Chiefs on this point when the time comes for actual negotiation of a security arrangement and I suggest that we should begin to think how to meet this. I am convinced that the Australians will refuse to go along with any pact which does not provide an organization for some form of consultation and while Mr. Spender’s message to Mr. Dulles of April 164 indicates that there would be no difficulty concerning the limitation of such consultation to matters directly concerning the Pacific, it is also clear that if there cannot even be consultation on Pacific matters we might as well give up any idea of concluding a security arrangement. And if we have to give that up we might as well give up any idea of getting Australian and New Zealand acquiescence to a Japanese Peace Treaty along the lines so far developed by the United States.
In my opinion it is difficult to believe that the Joint Chiefs in fact would rule out any sort of consultation, everything else being equal, and I am therefore coming to the opinion that failing to hold up the early conclusion of the Japanese Peace Treaty by direct opposition, they have taken this round-about method of putting obstacles in the path of progress so that there will of necessity be delay in getting a Japanese Treaty until the problem of the security arrangement with Australia and New Zealand can be threshed out.
I think the most serious consideration should be given to taking this matter up on a high level with the Department of Defense with a view to obtaining as speedily as possible the exact intentions of the Joint Chiefs in this respect.
[Page 211]- Ante, p. 202.↩
- See Secretary Marshall’s letter to Mr. Acheson of April 13, p. 201.↩
- Albert C. Murdaugh, Acting Director of the Office of Foreign Military Affairs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.↩
- Not found in Department of State files.↩
- See footnotes 3 and 4, pp. 203 and 204, respectively.↩