Dulles Papers
Memorandum by the Consultant to the Secretary (Dulles)
Memorandum of Telephone Conversations Regarding the Invitation to General MacArthur To Attend the San Francisco Conference—Colonel Bunker,1 General Whitney 2
On Saturday, August 11, 1951, at 11:20 a. m. I telephoned to Colonel Bunker, General MacArthur’s Aide, that there was now agreement from the White House and State Department to the idea of the General’s coming out and making a speech at San Francisco, the idea being that he would be the first speaker at the first business session, so that President Truman would have spoken the day before, Mac-Arthur next, and I would speak after him. The thought was that he and I between us would cover the background of the Treaty, he dealing with the occupation and I picking up with the Treaty negotiations.
I then read him the text of a suggested statement3 prepared by the State Department and cleared with the White House, a copy of which is annexed hereto. I asked Colonel Bunker to submit this text to the General and let me know whether it was acceptable, or what modifications seemed to him desirable.
On Saturday afternoon, August 11, at 1:15 p. m. General Whitney called me at my home and told me that the suggested statement was totally unacceptable, that it seemed to put General MacArthur in a position of an attendant to the U.S. Delegation, a role which was unacceptable and incompatible to that which he had played in Japan, where he had been the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and not a United States official.
[Page 1276]General Whitney said that it was General MacArthur’s feeling that he could not attend the Conference except at the invitation of the Allied Powers as a whole.
I told General Whitney that I was disappointed in learning of this reaction because, while it was understandable it raised very serious practical problems. The United States could not speak on behalf of all the Allies, or on behalf of the Conference, that only after the Conference had convened could the matter be considered and I doubted whether it was wise or practical to interject his appearance as a controversial issue.
I suggested that I would be glad to come up to New York and talk the matter over further personally with General MacArthur. I suggested Tuesday or Wednesday.4 General Whitney said he thought that Tuesday was already full of engagements but that Wednesday might be all right and he would look into the matter.
That evening, or the following evening, Colonel Bunker called me at home and told me that General MacArthur would be glad to see me either Tuesday or Wednesday but that he thought it was hardly worthwhile discussing the matter unless I felt it possible to find an international basis for the invitation.
The following Sunday, August 12, 1951, we received word of the prospective Russian attendance and I called Colonel Bunker on Tuesday at 10:10 a.m. to tell him the new problem injected by the Russians attendance would probably tie me up in Washington so that I would not be able to discuss the matter further with the General until Saturday,5 when we were planning to lunch together. I said that the presence of the Russians was raising additional difficulties in the way of an Allied invitation as, of course, the Soviet Delegates would make this a major issue and might filibuster against it so long that the invitation would become an academic matter. However, I still hoped something could be worked out and would want to go over the whole situation with the General on Saturday.
On Thursday, August 16, after the story in the New York Herald Tribune had aroused so much interest, I telephoned Colonel Bunker at 8:50 a. m. and we agreed that we would not make any comment. I telephoned him again at 10:55 with reference to the comments made by the President at his press conference.6 I told him that I might have to make a statement but that I would first get the President’s actual [Page 1277] remarks. Mr. Short dictated the verbatim text to Mr. Rusk and I telephoned it to Colonel Bunker at 11:16 and read to him my proposed statement7 on which we agreed.
- Col. Laurence E. Bunker, aide-de-camp to General MacArthur.↩
- Maj. Gen. Courtney Whitney, A.U.S. (ret.), former Chief of the Government Section, GHQ, SCAP.↩
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This proposed statement, dated August 9, reads as follows:
“The White House announced today that General MacArthur has accepted an invitation to assist the U.S. Delegation in presenting the background of the Japanese Peace Treaty to the Japanese Peace Conference scheduled to convene in San Francisco.
“The Conference will be opened on Tuesday, September 4, with an address by President Truman. The first working session, at which views of delegations will be presented, will be held on Wednesday, September 5. It is expected that the United States and United Kingdom delegations, as co-sponsors of the draft Treaty, will present at an early stage the background of the Treaty and an analysis of its terms. General MacArthur has accepted an invitation by the U.S. Delegation to present on its behalf a review of the postwar period in Japan based upon his five and one-half years’ experience as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.”
↩ - August 14 and 15.↩
- August 18.↩
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The following exchange occurred at Mr. Truman’s press conference held August 16:
“Q. Mr. President, there is a published report this morning that General MacArthur will address the Japanese Peace Conference in San Francisco next month. Has he been invited to speak—
“The President. I don’t know. It will be all right, if he wants to address the Conference. I would have no objection to it whatever. And if the State Department invites him, he undoubtedly will. I think Mr. Dulles covered the situation pretty well.” (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1951 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 465.)
The last sentence refers to Mr. Dulles’ radio address of August 15. Excerpts are printed in the Department of State Bulletin, August 27, 1951, p. 346.
↩ - An attached statement dated August 16 reads: “Mr. Dulles has consulted frequently with General MacArthur about the Japanese Peace Treaty and related problems. It is expected that such consultations will continue. Obviously, in view of General Mac Arthur’s 5½ years’ service as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan, the possibility of his participation in a suitable way in the San Francisco Conference has been a matter for consideration. No arrangements in the matter have been reached.”↩