Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 1

S/P Files: Lot 64D563

Memorandum on the Substance of Discussions at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting¹

top secret

[Washington,] April 11, 1951—11 a.m.

Present²

General Bradley	Admiral Robbins
General Collins	General Rogers
Admiral Sherman	Colonel Cress
General Vandenberg	Colonel Carns
General Bolte	Mr. Dulles
Admiral Davis	Mr. Matthews
Admiral Duncan	Mr. Ferguson
Admiral Lalor	Mr. Marshall
General White	Mr. Lay
General Maddocks	Mr. Gleason
Admiral Wooldridge

In a brief preliminary session involving the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Lalor, Colonel Carns, Mr. Matthews and Mr. Marshall, General Bradley raised a question about the status of minutes. He said subordinated individuals in the State Department had discussed certain topics with subordinates in the JCS establishment, citing minutes kept by the State Department participants as to what particular members of the JCS had said on particular issues at particular times in the State–JCS sessions. General Bradley said that such minutes were to be kept for the convenience of the individuals taking them and not for guidance of others and not to be considered authoritative. He said that agreed minutes were only to indicate topics discussed. Mr. Matthews and Mr. Marshall said this was their understanding and agreed to inform their colleagues of General Bradley’s view.

Mr. Matthews referred to a communication from the Yugoslav trade minister conveying agreement to the holding of U.S.-Yugoslav staff talks in the U.S.

General Bradley indicated assent.

Admiral Sherman said that from the standpoint of public attention and speculation this would be preferable to having the talks in Yugoslavia.

The others listed above as present then entered.

General Bradley specified the interest of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in: (a) the status of negotiations for a Japanese peace treaty; (b) proposals for a Pacific pact.

Mr. Dulles emphasized the urgency of the latter.

In response to General Bradley’s inquiry on prospects of his returning soon to Japan to complete treaty negotiations, Mr. Dulles said the decision must await clarification of the domestic political situation in the sequel to the relief of General MacArthur.³ He said that on Mr. Acheson’s advice he would defer, pending this clarification, discussing this mission with the President. He cited a suggestion in Republican congressional circles for a resolution by the party caucus, in session that morning, which might call on him and former Senator Cooper⁴ to resign. He said he did not mean to indicate that he would feel bound by such a resolution.

General Bradley focused the discussion on the topic of a Far East mutual defense arrangement. He indicated prior general disapproval of a pact involving continental Far East nations and general approval of an off-shore mutual defense arrangement. He said he understood there were now under consideration three pacts: (a) among the U.S., Australia, and New Zealand; (b) between the U.S. and the Philippines, already party to a military pact; and (c) between the U.S. and Japan.

General Bradley warned against expectations of a final and unified view from the JCS at this session in view of lack of time the JCS had had to study and to discuss the problems raised by Secretary Acheson’s letter to Secretary Marshall. He cited some advantages and disadvantages of the arrangement—specifying again that the JCS have not made up their mind as to the balance between them:

a. Advantages—

(1) Preservation of our special arrangements with the Philippines.

(2) Withholding from Philippines an inappropriate status as an equal with others in a general defense arrangement.

b. Disadvantages—

(1) Lack of obligation on each to fight wherever attack might occur—thus missing the deterrent value of such collective security as in NATO.

(2) Possibility of pressure from Indochina, Burma, etc., for bilateral arrangement with us similar to ones entered into with off-shore nations.

(3) The necessity of furnishing staff under each pact.

Admiral Sherman warned against a multiplicity of pacts as possibly involving the U.S. in compromises among competing claims for assistance rather than the achievement of combined planning. He urged (a) preserving the present arrangement with the Philippines which, from a Naval point of view, was adequate; (b) a Presidential pronouncement pledging our assistance to Australia and New Zealand in event of attack, without a commitment regarding combined or joint planning. He referred to the use of such a Presidential declaration in the case of Formosa.

In answer to a query from General Bradley, Admiral Sherman said this course would obviate the necessity of treaties. General Bradley commented on the difficulty of getting Senate concurrence to a treaty.

General Vandenberg stated that he had not made up his mind on this matter.

Agreeing with Admiral Sherman on avoiding a complex pattern of consultation, General Collins cited, as an obstacle to the suggested unilateral declaration, constitutional inhibitions against the use of executive prerogative as the basis of an obligation to defend a foreign country. In answer to General Bradley’s inquiry as to the possibility of making such a pledge but keeping it unannounced, General Collins said this would be impossible.

Mr. Matthews counseled the need of acting publicly in view of the possibility of an upsurge of Mr. Evatt’s Labor Party⁵ on a plank opposing the Japanese rearmament in approaching Australian elections.

Admiral Sherman argued for a unilateral declaration on the premise of difficulty of Senate concurrence in further mutual assistance treaties in the next year or two.

General Collins stressed the role of the U.S. as the only source of “real” naval, air, and land power in the proposed mutual assistance arrangements in the Pacific area. He stressed the relationship between a commitment of our power and the freeing of Australia and New Zealand to furnish men for the defense of the Middle East. He saw the essentiality of our role and the interrelation of the various elements as arguments for the advantages of a general treaty. In response to a question from General Bradley, he stressed general arrangements rather than a general pact.

General Bradley elicited Mr. Dulles’ views.

Mr. Dulles said his mandate from the President linked a treaty with Japan removing military restrictions and, if necessary to win their consent to such a treaty, assurances of U.S. assistance in event of attack to off-shore nations having reasons in their experience to fear attack from Japan. He had found this to be necessary as to Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines. On the basis of the following he had found it conclusively not practical to bring all of the nations concerned into one treaty: (a) The United Kingdom’s view, which Australia and New Zealand were disposed to accept, “violently” opposing such a pact; (b) opposition in public opinion in the three countries to any arrangement which appeared to be alliance with Japan.

Mr. Dulles described Indonesia as now negative to a mutual defense arrangement and its later attitude as problematic. He said the country was now in a governmental crisis, and the succeeding government might be disposed to a neutralist position even more than the erstwhile government.

As an alternative designed to obtain effects equivalent to the apparently impracticable general pact, Mr. Dulles outlined arrangements along the following lines: (a) A bilateral pact with Japan permitting the continuation of U.S. forces there to the extent and for the period found necessary; and (b) either (1) a quadripartite pact with the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand or (2) a bilateral pact with the Philippines and a tripartite pact with Australia and New Zealand. He indicated that the total effect of these pacts would be the same in substance as the single pact which had been contemplated originally. If any of the five were attacked, the others would be under an obligation to react.

Mr. Dulles said he had touched on this matter only lightly in Manila. The situation there was not urgent since the presence of U.S. forces gave the country the same de facto protection as Japan. He added, however, that if we seem to give other countries more by signing a pact, we may also want to give something more formal to the Philippines, as a political matter.

He detailed the following developments in discussions at Canberra with New Zealand and Australian foreign ministers which lasted four or five days: (a) their immediate opposition to inclusion of Japan in a pact; (b) their preference for a tripartite pact; (c) reference to the United Kingdom for its views of the question, raised by Mr. Dulles, of a quadripartite pact to include the Philippines, and an unfavorable response by the United Kingdom.

He said the discussions had resulted in a draft,⁶ included in a February 8 letter to the two foreign ministers.⁷ Its essence was a mutual assistance pledge embodying the concept of the Monroe Doctrine rather than the NAT—i.e., an attack on any one to be considered a danger to the peace and safety of all rather than an attack against all. Mr. Dulles said he had recounted to the two ministers (a) the constitutional objections raised, notably by Senator Taft,⁸ to the NAT language on the basis that considering an attack against another country as an attack against the U.S. made implicit the President’s power to resist such attack on his own authority; (b) his own views, then as Senator, that the NAT language implied such power by the President; (c) Senator Vandenberg’s⁹ contemporaneous statement that acceptance of this interpretation would compel him to oppose NAT; (d) Senator Taft’s then expressed willingness to accept a Monroe Doctrine pattern for North Atlantic defense. Mr. Dulles said he had told the two ministers that it would be a mistake to revive the question of the NAT language particularly in view of the augmentation of Senator Taft’s strength since the NAT debate. He also mentioned that he had ascertained from Senators Milliken¹⁰ and Taft that they would not object to the Monroe Doctrine phrasing in a Pacific pact.

Mr. Dulles then took up two specific points raised by the JCS: (a) As to the question of lack of obligation of each to fight in the event of attack on any part of the area concerned—he explained that the mutual assistance pledge extended to attacks not only on territories but also on armed forces, public ships, and aircraft in the Pacific and that during term of our maintenance of forces in the Philippines, the Ryukyus, and Japan, an attack on those areas would make the treaty just as operative as a general pact including those areas specifically; (b) as to alleged multiplicity of planning arrangements—he stated that coordination of planning with other Pacific regional groupings with which one or more of the parties might be associated was specifically included.

Mr. Dulles covered the following in sequence: (a) the close of the Canberra talks February 18, when he left with the two ministers a letter containing views explicitly stated as tentative in view of the necessity of final determination of the pact pattern after consultation in Washington; (b) the forwarding of the relevant draft to the Department of Defense “some six weeks ago” in a letter from the Secretary of State soliciting the military views; (c) the submission last week by the British Ambassador of the U.K. views to the effect that (1) they opposed a quadripartite pact, tying together the U.S., Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines and (2) saw no objection to a tripartite pact tying together the U.S., Australia, and New Zealand, with a bilateral pact between the U.S. and the Philippines.

He described New Zealand as strongly under U.K. influence and Australia as impatient of U.K. influence but vicariously affected by it because of the desire to work in unity with New Zealand.

He described the U.K. views as “not wholly lacking in reason” and said that the U.K. might be willing to reconsider in event of U.S., insistence on direct Philippine participation. He emphasized the additional delay and the uncertainty involved if the U.S. should so insist.

Mr. Dulles said the U.K. view was based on a preference to have, as the basis of the arrangements, U.S. political relations with the other parties rather than an area defense concept delimiting special areas for protection and thus implicitly increasing the jeopardy of areas outside such limits—in this case especially Hong Kong. Mr. Dulles recalled the impression left by the marked maps displayed in connection with NAT which implicitly gave the impression that the scope of our concern was defined by the limits of NAT and the Rio Pact.¹¹ In indicating on a wall map the areas of the proposed Pacific pact system, he noted specifically that under present circumstances, Formosa came within the scope of our protection.

Mr. Dulles said the situation had become more acute since we now have the British views and any delay will be interpreted as indicating we are not prepared to move along the lines he had advocated.

On the following bases he urged against additional delay: (a) the tendency of delay to indicate an unreadiness to go ahead; (b) possible advantages of this indication to the Australian Labor Party which opposes Japanese rearmament, in the coming elections; (c) considerations of courtesy to the other parties.

Mr. Dulles described pressure from Indochina, Burma, and Indonesia for inclusion in mutual defense arrangements with the U.S. on a basis of special political relations as less likely than if the basis were that of a defined “island of safety” under a single pact. He said, the U.S. would be receptive if Indonesia should show such interest.

General Collins commented that the British premise was good as a basis for withholding a U.S. guarantee of Hong Kong.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Admiral Sherman stressed the value of informality in establishing joint planning and a preference for leaving such arrangements out of the treaty. He said it was desirable to hold onto our rights in the Philippines and Japan without making those countries privy to our own plans; that as to Australia and New Zealand, any provisions for joint planning arrangements in the treaty would have to be disclosed when the treaty is filed with the TIN. Admiral Sherman thought it was important to avoid any reference to a planning agency or to the way planning is to be done or coordinated. He said that the way to handle this matter is in three areas, but the more informally the better.

In response to a query from General Bradley, Mr. Dulles said treaties requiring Senate concurrence were contemplated.

General Bradley described combined planning as theoretically all right but practicably objectionable, involving impairment of secrecy through too wide disclosure.

Mr. Dulles said that it seemed to him that this difficulty was inherent in the directive of January 10 from the President,¹² which called for a five-power pact. He said General Bradley’s point might be valid but should have been raised at that time.

General Collins commented that the disclosure of our plans for the defense of Japan would not be relevant since the other nations were not competent to go to the defense of Japan.

General Bradley said that under a five-power pact the countries would be planning together, so that if any one was attacked they would all act together.

Mr. Dulles said that under the separate pacts all the nations concerned equally would be pledged to help defend Japan if it were attacked unless we failed to go to the assistance of Japan ourselves. He mentioned that there would be no problem so long as the attack came while U.S. forces remained there. He observed that since Australia and New Zealand would be involved in Near East defense they would be entitled to know our plans for defense of their own areas so as to be satisfied on domestic security arrangements before undertaking commitments afar.

Admiral Sherman said he would like to comment on the apparent shift of position of the JCS on the question of security arrangements. He said the JCS originally understood that New Zealand and Australia would agree to a five-power pact. Now there is a fresh situation. Admiral Sherman said he wanted an answer in the quickest and simplest fashion.

As to JCS misgivings about the attitude of the Senate, Mr. Dulles said that on the day before he had discussed the undertakings with the subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and with Senators Taft and Milliken and that he anticipated no trouble with the Senate if the bilateral and trilateral pacts were submitted as treaties.

General Bradley referred to the advantages of separate arrangements rather than generalized staff planning, about which he had misgivings.

Mr. Dulles said he had anticipated General Bradley would prefer generalized staff planning in view of his opening statements critical of a multiplicity of separate arrangements.

General Bradley said the provision for joint planning in the original five-power pact proposal was expected to be an inducement to bring New Zealand and Australia in. General Bradley asked as to the certainty that the other nations would go to the defense of Japan in event of an attack on Japan. He asked why they should not be willing to go into a treaty with Japan if this was sure.

Mr. Dulles emphasized that public opinion in the countries concerned would rebel against the idea of Japan as an ally. He said this might be possible in two or three years but not now.

General Bradley also inquired as to the necessity of a new bilateral pact with the Philippines.

Mr. Dulles said he believed off-hand something less formal would be adequate but he would have to check this with the appropriate officers in the State Department. He described the question of a pact as not as important in the case of the Philippines as in the case of Australia and New Zealand, the Philippines being more preoccupied with reparations. He said he had misgivings about a special “white man’s” pact in the Far East without some reaffirmation, clarification or broadening of our commitment’s to the Philippines. Perhaps a declaration would be enough. He ventured the opinion that the Philippine insistence on reparations might be dealt with through provisions similar to those used in the Italian treaty.¹³

General Collins asked again about the feasibility of a unilateral declaration in the Monroe Doctrine pattern as the basis of our commitments in the area.

General Vandenberg raised a caveat against overcommitment.

Mr. Dulles said that, as a unilateral declaration, the Monroe Doctrine had sufficed for a long time as the basis of inter-American security, but eventually had had to be succeeded by multilateral commitments in the Act of Chapultepec and the Rio Pact. The Vandenberg Resolution is explicit on the point that protection by the U.S. must be on the basis of self-help and mutual aid.

Generals Bradley and Collins indicated agreement a unilateral basis for the commitment would not be feasible today.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Admiral Sherman referred to Article 9 of the NAT. He said it was desirable to go only as far as the first sentence and to stop short of the details about organization of a defense council.

Mr. Dulles said the contemplated Pacific pacts would be consistent with his idea. He said a Colonel Babcock had drafted the relevant part of the draft with that in mind.

Admiral Sherman and General Bradley expressed preference for flexible, informal arrangements rather than any that would be explicitly written out. Admiral Sherman added that he thought the arrangements for planning could be worked out better in the back room.

Mr. Dulles referred to the Australians as anxious to get in on any sort of combined planning. He said he wouldn’t say it would be easy to remove this language now as long as the Australians have an obligation to fight in the event of an attack.

General Bradley noted their particular interest in guided missiles.

General Collins emphasized the desirability that the Philippines not be in on such combined planning.

Admiral Sherman said the general arrangements might be coordinated with them—but that they might get a copy of tripartite arrangements and demand participation.

General Bradley referred to difficulties growing out of jealousies incident to multilateral arrangements. He cited French anxieties over the Malta talks.¹⁴

Mr. Dulles said the Australians and New Zealanders had fought in many places and had a much greater potential than the Philippines and it should be possible to make a distinction in combined planning: between their participation and that of the Philippines.

Mr. Dulles again emphasized the time urgency.

General Vandenberg said the JCS must get its position clear before answering the State Department letter.

General Bradley agreed on the need of an early Defense answer to State’s March 6 letter. He recapitulated JCSinterest in the Ryukus and the timing of the treaty.

Mr. Dulles emphasized the need of action to reassure the peoples looking to us in the Pacific, particularly since the MacArthur relief.

Admiral Sherman said he was getting out of his field, but it seemed to him a Monroe Doctrine type statement would have a good effect.

Mr. Dulles urged against stopping with that. He emphasized (a) Congress’ jealousy in relation to commitments undertaken by the Executive; (b) self-help and mutuality as principles laid down in the Vandenberg Resolution; (c) the idea of “no more free rides” under American protection.

Admiral Sherman said he meant not a pronouncement in lieu of a treaty but a statement of policy to clear the air regarding our aims and to dispel the rumor of Pentagon blocking of the Japanese peace treaty.

Mr. Dulles said his return to Japan, if he should “stay in the picture”, might provide the occasion for such a gesture.

General Collins remarked—and Mr. Matthews agreed—on the need to make clear that the President, Secretary Acheson, and General Ridgway did not differ from MacArthur in their attitude regarding Japan.

Mr. Dulles reemphasized his warnings on a deterioration in the Japanese situation following the MacArthur relief. He pondered the possibility that MacArthur’s words might spread the impression of U.S. abandonment of the Pacific and perhaps set us back gravely—maybe irrevocably.¹⁵

1. In the source text, the following sentence is near the top of the title page: “(State Draft. Not cleared with any of the participants.)” For other portions of this memorandum, see pp. 909–971.
2. General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Gen. J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; Adm. Forrest P. Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations; Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; Lt. Gen. Charles L. Bolté, Deputy Chief of Army Staff for Plans; Vice Adm. Arthur C. Davis, Director of the Joint Staff; Vice Adm. Donald B. Duncan, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations: Rear Adm. William G. Lalor, (ret.), Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Maj. Gen. Thomas D. White, Director of Air Plans; Col. Edwin H. J. Carns, Deputy Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; John H. Ferguson, Deputy Director of the Policy Planning Staff; Charles B. Marshall of the Policy Planning Staff; James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary of the National Security Council; S. Everett Gleason, Deputy Executive Secretary of the National Security Council.
3. Earlier on April 11 the President had relieved General MacArthur from his posts as SCAP, CINCFE, and CINCUNC. Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway succeeded to all three posts. Documentation on the relief of General MacArthur is scheduled for publication in volume vii.
4. John Sherman Cooper, also a Consultant to the Secretary of State.
5. Dr. Herbert Evatt, former Foreign Minister of Australia and leader of the Opposition.
6. Of February 17, p. 172.
7. Reference is to the letter dated February 18, p. 175.
8. Robert Alfonso Taft of Ohio.
9. Arthur H. Vandenberg of Michigan, ranking Minority member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee while the North Atlantic Treaty was under consideration by the Senate.
10. Eugene D. Millikin of Colorado.
11. For text of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, opened for signature at Rio de Janeiro September 2, 1947, see TIAS No. 1838, or 62 Stat, (pt. 2) 1681.
12. For text, see enclosure 2 (as annotated) to the letter of January 9 from Secretary Acheson to Secretary Marshall, p. 788.
13. For text of the Treaty of Peace with Italy signed at Paris February 10, 1947, see TIAS No. 1648, or 61 Stat. (pt. 2) 1245.
14. Documentation regarding the talks held at Malta, January 23–24 and March 13, 1951, between armed forces representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States, is scheduled for publication in volume iv.
15. In an undated memorandum attached to a covering memorandum of April 12, neither printed, Mr. Dulles put into summary form the substance of his presentation of views at this meeting. (Lot 54D423)