790.5/4–951
The Ambassador in Thailand (Stanton) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)
My Dear Mr. Rusk; I probably have no business expressing my views regarding the proposed Pacific Pact, inasmuch as my views have not been requested. However, on the basis of a Washington AP despatch dated April 3, which outlines what are alleged to be Mr. Dulles’ views on this matter as expressed in a speech at Whittier College in Los Angeles,1 I feel I must at least write you of my own personal reaction to this proposal. My concern stems primarily from the intimation contained in the news report, and also from what Brad Connors2 told me, indicating that the Pact will be exclusive and that the South Asian countries are not to be included.
I realize of course that many of the South Asian countries, for instance, India, Burma and Indonesia are not at present in a mood to join in any kind of a pact which definitely aligns them against the Commies, and that in consequence it is not possible, as much as we might desire it, to see all South Asian nations joined together in a [Page 191] mutual defense pact. Nevertheless, I do feel, and very strongly, that it is a mistake for the United States to enter into a multilateral but exclusive pact, for the reason that those countries not included will feel that the United States is no longer seriously interested in their security and their future.
I feel that the conclusion of an exclusive pact will most seriously if not disastrously, affect our basic policies and objectives vis-à-vis the South Asian nations. For the past four years we have, by friendly diplomatic support and the extension of aid where aid was wanted, endeavored to convince the South Asian nations that the United States is indeed their friend and a friend to whom they could look for support in case of serious trouble. In other words our policies have engendered definite hope amongst the smaller nations of South Asia, and I am sure the respective leaders of such countries as Burma and Indonesia, carry on in the expectation that if worst happens we would somehow help them. I am absolutely certain that the conclusion of a Pacific Pact limited to say Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines, would be taken by the Thai Government and informed Thai to mean that we are writing off Thailand and all of Southeast Asia. I think such a development would very definitely cause all Southeast Asian countries, including Thailand, to yield to Commie pressure.
I have been told that it was necessary to agree to the idea of a Pacific Pact in order to win the support of Australia and New Zealand to the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan. This may be the case, but it is hard for me to understand why, if a quid pro quo was absolutely necessary we could not enter into a bilateral understanding with each of these countries. An undertaking on a bilateral basis would not particularly harm our relations with the South Asian nations. But may I say again that the conclusion of any multilateral but exclusive pact will not only be impossible to explain to friendly South Asian nations, but will most seriously undermine our policies and diplomatic efforts in this part of the world. Frankly I would feel that United States diplomacy in South Asia had suffered a most serious set back and that our various aid programs had been rendered virtually meaningless and ineffectual. If an exclusive Pacific Pact were to materialize and to that be added the drastic reduction apparently contemplated in our economic aid programs to Thailand and possibly other Asian countries, the total impact of these events can only engender disillusionment and despair amongst those countries and the rapid burgeoning of a spirit of accommodation and submission to communist dictates.
Yours very sincerely,