Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 1

694.001/7–651: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Manila ¹

secret

Washington, July 6, 1951—8 p. m.

83. Allison and UK Chargé today delivered to Phil Amb July 3 draft Jap Peace Treaty with covering memo (See Depcirtels 9² and 10,³ July 3). Amb was advised that FonOff cld get this July 3 draft and covering memo from you to save time and expense of cable. Accordingly pls deliver July 3 text (being June 14 text as revised in accordance with Depcirtel 9) and covering memo to FonOff, acting in this matter in conjunction with UK Amb if he desires.

In your presentation⁴ you shld emphasize para (a) of Art 14 proposed especially for Phil benefit; that “it is recognized” has been substituted for “the Allied Powers recognize” at beginning Art 14 (a), also especially to meet Phil views;⁵ and that “interference with econ reconstruction of Jap and” has been deleted from 14 (a) 1 in further effort satisfy Phil. US considers that it has gone to great lengths to meet Phil position on this issue and can go no further.

For use at your discretion Dept finds Romulo’s letter of June 15 to Dulles and accompanying Dept of Fon Affairs memo⁶ to be little more than a restatement of previously expressed arguments with certain added details and refinements. While purporting to rest on objective analysis, major proposals are totally unrealistic and, if accepted, wld wreck the treaty and all it is hoped to accomplish.

As regards security proposals, placing Formosa and Pescadores under UN trusteeship cld only increase danger Phil profess to fear most—their transfer to Chi Commie control by action of pro-Chi Commie General Assembly majority. Proposals UN supervise Jap education for 25 years and intervene to ensure supremacy civil over mil auth are almost naive in their impracticality and inconsistency with actual requirements coming period. Enduring attachment Jap to peaceful and democratic ways cannot be legislated or compelled but must arise from experience advantages these ways through friendly, equal and profitable association with free world nations. Basis for enduring cooperation Jap and other friendly nations lies in constructive recommendations of type advanced by John D. Rockefeller III, who accompanied Dulles to Jap in Jan–Feb this year to study means of strengthening Jap cultural ties with Free World.

Phil assumption all other Allies wld waive their reparations claims and the US its GARIOA claim so Jap will be free meet Phil claims alone is absurd. While proposal that reparations payments be exclusively in kind and vary each year in accordance Japan’s ability to pay avoids some of more obvious Versailles faults, program as a whole overlooks really fundamental lessons to be drawn from Versailles experience and pays no heed to econ problems faced by US in Jap in endeavoring to ensure Jap security from Sov domination, in spite of obvious consequences Japan’s incorporation in Sov bloc wld have for Phil security.

[Here follows detailed comment on the Philippine reparations proposal.]

For your general guidance it is not anticipated that there will be further changes in July 3 text except on style or minor points which obviously wld not be objectionable to anyone. Therefore do not encourage response to invitation to make further observations by July 20.⁷

Acheson

1. Telegram drafted by Mr. Fearey and cleared by, among others, Mr. Allison.
2. Ante, p. 1174.
3. Not printed, but see footnote 7 below.
4. In the course of telegram 202, from Manila, July 13, not printed, Ambassador Cowen stated that he had upon receipt of telegram 83 promptly informed Minister Romulo of its substance. (694.001/7–1351)

5. In telegram 2263, June 29, from Tokyo, marked “For Dulles from Allison,” the latter had stated:

   “In addition to eliminating phrase on interference with econ reconstruction of Japan from reparations clause, believe Phil concurrence wld be made easier if beginning clause is amended to eliminate the words ‘the Allied powers recognize’ and change them to read ‘it is recognized, etc.’ This wld to some extent meet Romulo’s contention that Japan rather than the Allied powers shld recognize the justice of reparations, but it also retains the implication, inasmuch as both Japan and the Allies in effect agree, that Japan lacks capacity to pay and at the same time meet other obligations. In giving draft this Art to Jap I have used above language but told them this was not exact quotations of draft but only paraphrase, so that it wld be possible to go back to original language if desired.” (694.001/6–2951)

6. Neither printed. (Lot 54 D 423)

7. In circular telegram 10, the Department had enclosed a covering memorandum (to the July 3 draft) which had in part stated to those governments which were to receive the draft that, should they wish to make any comments or submit amendments, the United States and the United Kingdom were proposing to circulate formally a revised draft by July 20. (694.001/7–351)

   In telegram 120, from Manila, July 10, Ambassador Cowen reported in part that he had that morning discussed the July 3 treaty draft with Mr. Romulo. “Romulo was concerned only with reparations clause but was bitter in his denunciation of failure of drafters to recognize Phil position. He said he did not see how Phil govt cld associate itself with para a of Art 14 that states Japs lack capacity to pay but at same time permits Phils to attempt seek reparations after agreeing to Jap incapacity.” The Ambassador mentioned also that Mr. Romulo later in the day had told Mr. Harrington he was considering resigning over the issue. (694.001/7–1051)