694.001/3–3051: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Indonesia 1


1057. It is Dept’s present intention proceed expeditiously as possible with negot of Jap peace treaty. In this connection we consider mutual declarations in Monroe Doctrine terms covering US, Phil, Austral and NZ and perhaps Indo[nesia]. You shld understand that idea of this security arrangement has its origin in unwillingness of Australia, NZ and perhaps Phil to agree to a Jap peace treaty which wld permit Jap rearmament and economic recovery unless possible threat of renaissance of Jap as potential aggressor in Pacific be counterbalanced by some security declarations making integrity of Jap’s island neighbors formally of concern to US. For your most secret info it is Dept’s hope that at some future time Jap itself might be brought into the security arrangement, in which event all parties wld share in determination of steps which Jap might take to contribute to collective security.

During Amb Dulles visit to Jap, Phil, Austral and NZ the ideas of such a security arrangement were put forward, particularly by Austral and NZ and at Canberra embodied in a draft,2 copy of which now in your hands.

As many documents testify, including the Pres’s instrs to Mr. Dulles of last Jan,3 it has always been our thought that Indo[nesia] shld [Page 181] be included in any such security arrangement. It is our belief, however, based on your reporting, that Indo [nesia] will not in all likelihood be prepared participate this time. We understand, however, that for obvious reasons Indo [nesia] hopes to receive an indication she wld be welcome, which, however, she can regret.

Dept believes that failure to invite Indo[nesia] participation wld be unfortunate in what many in south and southeast Asian countries wld believe themselves excluded from ambit of Amer protection and faced with yet another evidence of white Anglo-Saxon unity in Pacific, to which they attach their little friend the Phil and that such an arrangement in Pacific might encourage South Asian nations to gravitate toward “independent neutrality” policy of Nehru with attendant relaxation of efforts against communism—Chi and indigenous, also differences NG might well be exacerbated.

For foregoing reasons Dept believes US shld officially indicate to Indonesia its desire that Indo[nesia] shld be invited participate in the Pact even though we are fully aware Indo[nesia] wld in all probability reject invitation. To achieve desired effect fact of US desire to include Indo[nesia] shld be made public knowledge. This in turn means of course greatest care must be exercised in determining timing and character approach Indo[nesia] and agreeing with Indo[nesian] Govt what it shall say in reply.

You of course will bear in mind ameliorative effect which Pact if properly presented to Indo[nesian]s and Austral may have on the NG situation in so much as Pact wld indicate mutual concern with the territory of the signatories as against armed attack. If both Austral and Indo[nesia] were parties, each wld be concerned with the integrity of the other. If only Australia, but not Indo[nesia] is signatory, territorial integrity of Eastern NG wld be matter of concern to other signatories. We do not want to provide any ground for assumption that what is contemplated indirectly to advantage of Austral as against Indo[nesia] in NG.

Bear in mind that the initiative in ascertaining Indo[nesian] attitude toward participation wld probably have to be taken by US alone. We (wld not want to make, nor wld it be practical to make Australia or others parties to the invitation particularly since such procedure wld imply they had a preferential position as against Indo[nesia]. We wld probably have to let Australia and NZ and perhaps UK know that we were ascertaining the attitude of Indonesia prior to making any final decision on the whole matter.

Dept appreciate your earliest comments on foregoing.

  1. Telegram drafted by Mr. Dulles and William S. B. Lacy, Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs.
  2. Reference is to the draft of February 17, p. 172.
  3. For text of the President’s letter to Mr. Dulles of January 10, see enclosure 2 (as annotated) to Mr. Acheson’s letter to Secretary Marshall of January 9, p. 788.