Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 1

794.00/5–1651

The Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Johnson) to the United States Political Adviser to SCAP (Sebald)

personal
top secret

[Washington,] May 16, 1951.

Dear Bill: While this letter was written originally in reply to yours of April 30¹ on the depurge, it should now assist in amplifying the Topad from Mr. Rusk to you² on the same subject which it appeared advisable to despatch immediately in view of articles appearing in the Japanese press. While we recognize the factors leading to the proposal that all army and navy officers commissioned subsequent to 1937 be depurged, we believe that certain constructive steps can be taken short of this proposal which would still assist us in meeting the problem, but which would not expose us to the charge that we are flagrantly violating FEC policy decisions. So far as key individuals in political and economic fields are concerned, there is little or no problem, except possibly the desirability of leaving some persons in each category so that the principle enunciated not only in FEC policies but also in the basic US policies will not be completely repudiated.

In more specific terms, we believe that paragraph 13(a) of the FEC policy decision on the “Prohibition of Military Activity in Japan and Disposition of Japanese Military Equipment”³ makes a flat depurging of all army and navy officers commissioned subsequent to the outbreak of the China Incident in 1937 impossible. This subparagraph provides that “Generals, Admirals, and all other senior officers, and all career officers of the Army, Navy and gendarmerie” shall be excluded from public office. SCAP authority to modify the application of this subparagraph, as set forth in the last part of paragraph 13, appears to be limited to a few individuals if those individuals can demonstrate that they were opponents of Japanese expansionism. This latter restriction also seems to apply to SCAP authority to modify the provisions of subparagraph c of the FEC decision which relates to officials of various para-military organizations. On the other hand, reserve officers, except senior reserve officers who appear to fall under the provisions of subparagraph a are another matter. Subparagraph b provides that reserve officers shall be excluded if their employment would harm the cause of peace and security, and therefore in our opinion SCAP could exempt the majority if not all of the reserve officers, except the senior reserve officers, from the purge.

Moreover, we believe that it would be reasonable to consider as reserve officers those officers who might at one time have been commissioned as career officers, but who subsequently left the service and engaged in private pursuits for a substantial period of time before being called back into service in the reserves.

TS WAR 80453, November 30, 1948, (attached) outlined as of that date, the thinking of State and Army as to the implementation of paragraph 13 of NSC 13/2.⁴ These ideas for the modification of the purge were agreed upon by the two Departments and sent to SCAP in the form of suggestions in the belief that if these suggestions were carried out the provisions of NSC 13/2 would have been fulfilled. As you know, this was never done. However, it may prove a convenient guide to action at the present time. You will note that provisions in this cable refer to the automatic depurge of all reserve officers below the rank of Colonel which was originally drafted with the existing FEC policy decisions in mind.

If only these suggestions are carried out, the purge still would be substantially modified, the Japanese Government would be permitted to depurge the majority of those it is seeking to return to active public life, and we would avoid any charges that we are violating either the letter or the spirit of FEC decisions. Although we do not have available here the statistics that would enable us to determine the number of purgees that would be depurged under this plan, recent Japanese figures indicate for example that there remain some 31,000 persons purged because of their affiliation with the IRAA and subsidiary organizations who would be freed from the purge under this plan. Moreover, there is every reason to believe that a substantial number of the purgees in the military category are reserve rather than regular officers and could be depurged under this plan, and that the majority if not all of those purged for their previous economic activities could likewise be freed. The majority of the economic personnel will fall under the provisions of paragraph B of Part 3 of the enclosed cable. This provides for a mandatory review of their cases on an individual basis under more liberal standards than heretofore (Part 5 of reference cable). It may be possible to consolidate the categories listed under para B with those under para A thus making the depurge of the economic personnel automatic. On the other hand, the FEC in its “Basic Initial Post-Surrender Policy” directs SCAP to institute an economic purge, and a complete elimination of this entire category might be interpreted as a violation of the spirit if not the letter of the FEC decision. It was partly for this reason that we provided for individual review of these cases.

It is our belief that in view of the foregoing it might be appropriate to proceed at least initially by implementing the suggestions contained in the cable and in addition the few modifications we have recommended.

Since we do not know how much of the thinking in Headquarters may have been relayed to the Japanese Government, should questions arise on the part of Japanese, you may wish to point out the desirability of proceeding with the depurge within the limits set by the FEC in order to avoid criticism from other FEC member governments which might prejudice their position toward a peace settlement. So little time now remains before the conclusion of such a settlement that it would be unfortunate to take steps that might complicate the real solution to this type of problem.

As pointed out in the Topad in view of the rapid strides being made toward the conclusion of the Japanese peace settlement and the need for the United States Government to give full international support to SCAP’s action in relation to FEC policy decisions, we believe that depurge plans extending significantly beyond WAR 80453 should be referred to Washington for approval.

May I add that we are gratified to see that steps are now being taken toward the relaxation of control over the Japanese Government and do not believe that our reservations on the depurge will have serious effect on this long awaited development.

Sincerely yours,

U. Alexis Johnson

[Attachment]

Telegram From the Department of the Army to the Commander in Chief, Far East (MacArthur)

top secret

[Washington, November 30, 1948.]

WAR 80453. From CSGPO reference Paragraph 13 of NSC 13/2. This radio in five parts.

Part 1. Pursuant decision stated in reference paragraph, desire you informally advise Japanese Government that no further extension of the purge is contemplated and that the purge should be modified along the following lines:

(1) Categories of persons who have been purged or who are subject to the purge by virtue of their having held relatively harmless positions should be made reeligible for governmental business and public media positions;

(2) Certain others who have been barred or who are subject to being barred from public life on the basis of positions occupied should be allowed to have their cases reexamined solely on the basis of personal actions; and

(3) A minimum age limit should be fixed, under which no screening for public office would be required.

Part 2. Parts 3, 4 and 5 list modifications in purge believed desirable by State and Army in implemention of Part 1. Request comments.

Part 3.

A. Following categories of persons purged or barred by virtue of offices held should be freed of disabilities imposed by reason of Cabinet and Home Affairs Ministry Ordinance Number 1 of 1947, promulgated January 4, 1947, (listed categories correspond with those in Appendix to this ordinance):

Category 2 Subparas 3 and 5 Reserve Army and Navy officers below the rank of colonel.

Category 4 officials of IRAA, IRAPS, DAI Nippon Seijikai, and affiliated organizations.

Category 5 Subpara 1 directors, advisors and auditors of designated concerns.

Category 7 Subpara 8 of remarks, recommended candidates for 1952 election.

B. Following categories of persons purged or barred by virtue of offices held should be permitted in every instance to have their cases examined or reexamined on basis of individual activities on application of person concerned:

Category 5 chairman of directors, president and vice president of financial and development organizations involved in Japanese expansion.

Category 7 Subpara 6 of remarks (officials in business corporations.)

Part 4. In addition to above, no screening for public office should be required for persons under 30 years of age at time of Pearl Harbor.

All other categories of persons purged or barred remain unaffected by above modifications.

Modifications should not preclude further measures for relaxation of purge to be instituted as rapidly as you consider feasible.

Part 5. Japanese Government should be advised standards of examination under Para B part 3 above should be more liberal than under Category 7 heretofore, and that only those whose records clearly indicate they were “active exponents of militant nationalism and aggression” in positions of important responsibility should be excluded. You should ensure that appeals are acted on by Japanese Government with maximum expedition solely on basis individuals culpability under above criteria.

View here is that US should favor at peace conference elimination of purge except possibly in few highly restricted categories.⁵

1. Ante, p. 1022.
2. Telegram 1616 to Tokyo, May 14, not printed. (794.00/5–1451)
3. FEC 017/21, February 12, 1948. For text, see Far Eastern Commission, Second Report, pp. 19–22.
4. For NSC 13/2, see Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. vi, p. 858.
5. For further information on this topic, see Mr. Rusk’s letter of June 22 to Assistant Secretary of the Army Johnson, p. 1138.