694.001/5–1651: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the United States Political Adviser to SCAP (Sebald)
Topad 1626. For Sebald from Dulles.
London discussion with Morrison will involve handling of China in peace settlement. We shld like before then to clarify our own position on basis of merits not of compromise. As you know, we have been exchanging views fully with National Govt and draft treaty seems generally satis to them. However, question of Treaty signature on behalf China raises difficult problems. Theoretically choices are:
- 1.
- Signature by Commie regime.
- 2.
- Signature by Natl Govt, either
- (a)
- concurrently and at same ceremony with other Allied Powers;
- (b)
- concurrent signature of counterpart at separate ceremony not attended by other signers; or
- (c)
- subsequent signing or adhesion as arranged between Jap and Natl Govt.
- 3.
- Deferment of any signing on behalf of China until governmental situation clarified.
No. 1 is absolutely out so far as the US is concerned for we do not consider Mao Tse-tung as real voice of China.
No. 2(a) and (b) involve apparent treatment of the Natl Govt as authorized to speak for and bind the hundreds of millions of Chi over which it has lost, at least temporarily, de facto auth. No. 2(a) wld be seriously objected to by probably all Commonwealth and Western Eur countries, and India, Burma and Indonesia. Even Canada, Aus, NZ which continue recognize Natl regime consider its present lack of governmental relationship to great bulk of Chi people on mainland renders it unqualified to bind them for all time in matter as important as China-Jap peace treaty. Some of these wld probably absolutely refuse give color of approbation by sharing signing ceremony with Natl China
In this connection you will recall that in 1919 while US and other Allies recognized Kerensky Govt and heard its views on the Versailles Treaty, this recognized Govt was not accepted as qualified to sign the Versailles Treaty on behalf of Russia.
The question of signing wld not, in our opinion, prejudice in any way the questions of recognition Natl Govt and maintenance of dipl and consular relations.
Today opinion in US Congress and public wld probably favor concurrent signing with Natl Govt. However, if there were to be subsequent Natl Govt signing before Treaty came to Senate for ratification the situation might, from polit standpoint, be acceptable.
Before fixing our position we consider Jap itself is entitled express views on this matter which is vitally important to it, because in long run Jap’s relations with China are of paramount importance to Jap. If Gen Ridgway agrees, pls confer immed with Yoshida and get prompt expression views Jap Govt as to what their own preference wld be as to handling this matter as between choices 2(a), 2(b), 2(c) and 3, or any other course they may want to suggest. [Dulles.]