Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 1

Lot 64D423

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Satterthwaite)

secret

[Washington,] March 30, 1951.

Subject: Pacific Security Arrangement.

Participants:	Sir Oliver Franks, British Ambassador
	Mr. F. S. Tomlinson, British Embassy
	Ambassador Dulles, S
	Mr. John Allison, FE
	Mr. L. Satterthwaite, BNA

[Here follows that portion of the conversation which dealt with regional security arrangements in the Far East.]

Sir Oliver then said that he was leaving a note on two aspects of the Japanese Peace Treaty (copy attached).¹ He said that paragraph 1 of the note outlining the British desire to have the People’s Government of China included in the Peace Treaty with Japan was not only for the record which, however, was a part of the reason, but also because the British were convinced that if the purpose of the Japanese Treaty were to be fulfilled, that is the reestablishment of Japan on a self-sustaining basis, Japan would have to have good relations with China, which meant for the foreseeable future the Peiping Government. It was clear that the new Japanese state could not have good relations with Russia. Its trade with China was most important. Sir Oliver doubted the Peiping Government, if asked, would accept an invitation to participate in the Japanese peace talks. In fact, the British were strongly of the opinion that it would not. Nevertheless, a refused invitation would be better for us than a complaint that they were not asked. Ambassador Dulles said that the inclusion of the Peiping Government would present a great many difficulties for us and he wondered whether the British Government had given any consideration as to how they should be asked and who should do it. Sir Oliver said he did not think they had, but he would ask for their thinking on this and pass it on to the Department.

With respect to the second point, that is the renunciation by Japan of claims to Formosa in favor of China without specifying what China, Sir Oliver said that he thought our language, which provided for the renunciation of Formosa by Japan, but without specifying who should have it was a little bit vague. Ambassador Dulles said that this, too, presented us with many problems but that we would consider the British views carefully. Ambassador Dulles pointed out the importance of not taking any action by the Treaty which would suddenly and definitely foreclose all international concern with Formosa as it might be desirable at some stage to invoke that concern.

1. The entire text of this aide-mémoire is as follows:

   “It is the view of His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom that the Central People’s Government of China should be invited to participate in any negotiations for the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan.

   “2. As regards the disposal of Formosa in the treaty of peace with Japan, His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom consider that Japan should be required to renounce her sovereignty over Formosa and cede it to China.”