751G.00/1–2551
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)1
Subject: Possible American Action if Chinese Communists Attack Indochina.
| Participants: | H. R. H. Prince Wan Waithayakon, Thai Ambassador |
| Mr. Dean Rusk, FE | |
| Mr. Kenneth P. Landon, PSA |
In the course of a conversation on another subject the Thai Ambassador pointed out that his government was in entire accord with the United States Government in regard to Communism as evidenced by the presence of Thai troops in Korea, the recognition of the governments of Indochina, and the present act of co-sponsorship of the resolution designating the Chinese Communists as aggressors. He went on to say that he had been instructed by his government to ask what United States policy would be if the Chinese Communists should attack northern Indochina, i.e., would the United States give air support or navy support or ground support or simply provide military equipment as at present. Furthermore, if Thailand were attacked would the United States come to their support while they were fighting the enemy or would Thailand have to do as it did in the last war when overrun by the enemy—establish an underground which would cooperate with the United States and work toward their liberation with us. The Ambassador reaffirmed that his government saw eye to eye with the U.S. Government and wanted to know how to lay its own plans in order to meet the potential threat.
I said that it was exceedingly difficult to give a practical reply to a hypothetical question; that the President of the United States in fact was the only person who could reply to such a question; that if he were requested to make a reply at this time it would become a problem between the Executive and the Legislative branches of government; that it would be a different matter if the President were faced with such a practical problem for immediate action as Commander in Chief; that in regard to Korea we have no intention of giving up the fight and would not act hastily in reaching a decision [Page 15] in regard to withdrawal from Korea;2 that any attack by the Chinese Communists on Indochina or Thailand would be regarded by the United States as a very serious matter and as part of our world-wide fight against Communism; that in fact Thailand’s immediate neighbors such as Burma, India and Malaya, would probably feel equally involved in such an attack by the Chinese Communists and would doubtless be prepared to consider coincident action in such an event; that, however, at this moment the Chinese Communists were apparently limiting themselves to assistance to Ho Chi Minh and his forces in the expectation that they might prove to be adequate in driving out the French. I went on to point out that the Chinese had suffered heavy losses in Korea which might have had a sobering effect upon them and that we had no indication of Chinese intentions to extend the present conflict beyond Korea although we were studying every possibility.
At this point I asked the Thai Ambassador whether he and his government had any information on Chinese intentions in Korea as we were considerably puzzled at the current news coming from Korea, it being unclear whether the Chinese were withdrawing beyond the 38th Parallel in preparation for a cease fire order or whether they were regrouping farther north in preparation for another large drive. The Ambassador said he had no information on the subject.