SEAC Files: Lot 53D255
Report by the Defense Department Representative to the Southeast Asia Aid Policy Committee (Malony)
SEAC D–41
Report of General Malony on Far Eastern Trip1
philippines
Since his visit, General Malony had found that the adverse opinion concerning possible dispatch of U.S. personnel to the combat-team level, as in Greece, had been undergoing a change. The experience in Greece had shown how useful this effort could be; and the important thing was to revive quickly a feeling of strength in the military.
The problem of intelligence remained acute, and it was probably true that (again, as had been the case in Greece) the guerrilla intelligence was quicker than the Government’s.
The Erskine–Melby report on the Huk situation had been excellent.2 Unfortunately, there had been little or no improvement since that report was made. Experienced U.S. soldiers for Philippines service were almost entirely limited to over-age ex-scouts or former troops. The demands for experienced personnel and materials for suppression simply could not be met immediately.
Responsible U.S. officials in Manila received the Bell Report3 with the feeling that it was a “last hope operation” and had to be followed-up on successfully.
malaya
It was his opinion that the operation for suppressing dissidents in Malaya was 90% political rather than military. This situation was quiet when he was there, although the incident over the Dutch-Malay child took place shortly after he left. Mr. MacDonald,4 for whom he [Page 11] had the greatest respect, had outlined for him the long-term job which the British saw in cutting down the inter-racial barriers and in creating a Malayan nationality. It was probable that the British authorities would ask the U.S. for limited help, as for example Chinese-speaking teachers.
He had formed the opinion that the British, in view of the strategic location and highly important dollar-earning raw materials of Malaya, would make great efforts to hold onto the Peninsula.
indo-china
He had asked General De LaTour5 why the northeastern strip on the coast on Indo-China was being held, despite its military vulnerability. He had been advised that French mining installations, and the possible necessity for use as an embarkation point for a possible amphibious operation were the reasons.
His limited observations of the National Armies had led him to believe that they were physically fit, and if given adequate training and equipment might well make a good show.
While the U.S. Government talked of 12 battalions of Vietnamese, Bao Dai had spoken of 4 divisions. Bao Dai also inferred that since no French money would probably be forthcoming for the increase of his forces to that size, the U.S. would probably be asked to provide the money for equipping them. The lists prepared by Bao Dai and General Carpentier6 of military needs for Vietnam had not differed greatly and have been reconciled by Brink.7
thailand
The Thai economic situation was relatively good and likely to continue so if Indo-China did not fall.
Questions and Answers
philippines
Q. Was there any evidence that trouble was expected from the Moros?
A. He had attempted several times to get an answer to this question, but it had been avoided by the officials approached.
Q. How did he evaluate, in general, the anti-Huk program?
A. Much, of course, remained to be done. But he had been particularly impressed with Defense Minister Magsaysay’s determination and pro-American attitude. If able to act without interference, [Page 12] he might make a very good effort. It went without saying that the Defense Minister was a prime target for assassination by the Huks.
malaya
Q. What was his impression of the recent riots in Malaya?
A. They did not appear to be manifestations of a general anti-British feeling, but rather an instigated flare-up, which had not seemed to bear any considerable effect on the general situation.
Q. If Indo-China and Thailand fell, would it, in his opinion, be wise to attempt to hold Malaya, whatever the determination of the British to hold on?
A. In his opinion, it would be wise to attempt to hold Malaya; and he felt it could be done, since the peninsula provided a site for favorable air and sea activities.
Q. Had anything been said during his stay in Malaya concerning additional MDA supplies?
A. Nothing had been said concerning this matter. In his opinion, the needs of Malaya lay in other fields; but because of their will to fight he had recommended that such military assistance as they required be provided to Malaya.
Q. Had he observed any significant independence movement in Malaya?
A. His opportunity of obtaining an answer to this question had been limited. But his feeling was that any “nationalist” sentiment was oriented toward greater national unity within the Commonwealth, rather than complete independence.
indo-china
Q. In his opinion, was a further subsidy from the U.S. for France necessary for the continuation of the National Armies. More specifically, what was his opinion on the ability and willingness of the Associated States to raise the money necessary for their contribution to the Armies?
A. The question applied to more than the National Armies plans, and a real problem existed with regard to the ability of the Associated States to raise necessary monies. The tax collection power, had, of course, been turned over to Vietnam, but the French-Vietnamese problems of transition related to this function, as well as to all other functions assumed by the governments of the Associated States, made the situation very nebulous.
thailand
Q. What was the state of the Laotian infiltration into Thailand, which so disturbed the Thai Government and people?
A. The recent French announcement that it would send about four thousand men to the border regions to oppose guerrilla activity had [Page 13] cut Thai concern with the problem somewhat, but the problem of infiltration still existed.
Q. What was his opinion of the MDA program in Burma?
A. The existence of an approved program for river craft appeared to have been quite helpful for U.S. interests.
smuggling
In answer to questions on smuggling, General Malony reported that:
There was a feeling in Malaya, particularly among the British, that the Indonesian policy of U.S. had opened a “back door” through Malaya for smuggling, particularly from, the Philippines. The British were certain there was relatively little smuggling going on in Malaya since many Chinese had been resettled from the edges of plantations, and a constant surveillance barred them from producing support in food and money to the guerrillas. Pushing the dissident forces back further into the hills had also cut down smuggling. Considerable smuggling continued in Indo-China; but the Thai and British officials were cooperating in making pursuit across borders possible. Some smuggling continued from Hainan by air drops, but sending PBY’s should cut down this traffic somewhat. If a regional pact were developed for the area, smuggling certainly should be one of the questions of common concern to be dealt with as soon as possible.
regional problems
General:
Q. Had there been any noticeable feeling of indigenous belief that regional cooperation was necessary?
A. The only concrete evidence of such feeling which he had encountered was in Thailand, where the Navy Commander-in-Chief had indicated they would favor a regional grouping if Australia or the U.S. headed it. He considered this as a poor source.
U.S. Organizational Arrangements in the Area
In answer to a question as to the wisdom of setting up a U.S. Government regional office to deal with MDA problems, General Malony felt that a more centralized regional organization would be generally useful, but that it should not be limited to MDAP matters. Rather, MDAP problems were less in need of such a center of decisions short of Washington than were the economic and other programs in the area. But all of the programs could use such a device.
Continuance of Aid in Region
Q. Did he feel that the situation warranted continued and increased aid in the region?
A. Yes. U.S. officials were now able to sort out the facts and analyze the regional situation better than ever before. The U.S. should not [Page 14] act on its apprehensions but on what lines of action would profit it most; and continuance of aid was definitely indicated.
- Major General Malony visited the Philippines, Malaya, Viet-Nam, Thailand, and Burma in December 1950 to familiarize himself with conditions affecting policy in Southeast Asia. He discussed the existing situation arid the effectiveness of U.S. programs, particularly military assistance programs, with ranking U.S. officials and indigenous leaders in each country. General Malony’s final written report on his trip was circulated as document SEAC D–38, January 10, not printed. The above report (SEAC D–41) represented a supplement to SEAC D–38, based on statements made at an interdepartmental meeting held under the auspices of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State, on January 4. (SEAC Files: Lot 53D255)↩
- A joint Mutual Defense Assistance Program survey mission headed by John F. Melby, Special Assistant to Dean Busk, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, and Maj. Gen. Graves B. Erskine, Commanding General of the First Marine Division, visited Southeast Asia in July and August 1950. For documentation on the mission, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. vi, pp. 1 ff. For information on the mission’s stop in the Philippines, see ibid., pp. 1493 ff.↩
- For extracts from the Bell report October 9, 1950, see ibid., p. 1497.↩
- British Commissioner General for Southeast Asia.↩
- Gen. Boyer de Latour, Commander of French Union forces in northern Indochina in December 1950.↩
- Gen. Marcel Carpentier, Commander of French Union forces in Indochina, 1949–1950.↩
- Brig. Gen. Francis G. Brink, Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group at Saigon.↩