Editorial Note
At a meeting held at 11 a. m. January 29, 1951 with Ambassador Dulles and Mr. Allison, Sir Alvary Gascoigne, Political Representative (with the personal rank of Ambassador) of the British Liaison Mission to SCAP, outlined on what he described as a “purely personal” basis the tentative views of his government concerning a Japanese peace treaty and Japanese rearmament. An unsigned “Text of Remarks” made at this meeting (apparently a verbatim transcript) is not printed in its entirety, but a section devoted to discussion of cultural relations between Japan and the “West” is given below. (For Mr. Dulles’ summary of Sir Alvary’s remarks on a treaty, see Mr. Fearey’s minutes of the Dulles Mission staff meeting of January 30, page 830.)
“Sir Alvary: …You also, Ambassador, mentioned in the summary of (I haven’t read your memorandum yet), but you have mentioned that owing to the possibility that Japan might get into serious economic trouble by reason of the culmination of one of her chief sources of raw materials and one of her chief markets, something might be arranged on the lines of “an elite Anglo-Saxon Club”, which seemed in the context in which I read it, in my telegram, to have mainly an economic significance. Would you possibly tell me exactly what was intended, what is intended, by you in this … [Ellipsis in the source text.]
“Mr. Dulles: That phrase is I think quite possibly one I used. It was intended to refer more to cultural and social relations rather than relations of an economic character. I have a feeling that the Japanese people have felt a certain superiority as against the Asiatic mainland masses. Perhaps not a superiority as against the ancient cultures of China, from which they have drawn very heavily. But they have felt that the Western civilization represented by Britain, more latterly the United States, is perhaps sharing in that, represents a certain triumph of mind over mass which gives us a social standing in the world better than what is being achieved in terms of the mainland human masses of Asia, and that they think that they have also achieved somewhat the similar superiority of mind over mass and would like to feel that they belong to, or are accepted by, the Western nations. And I think that anything we can do to encourage that feeling will set up an attraction which is calculated to hold the Japanese in friendly association with us despite the fact that the mainland is in possession of the economic [Page 826] means of setting up an attraction which we, perhaps, in those particular terms of economy cannot match. I think that at the time of the United Kingdom-Japanese Treaty of Alliance, there was a certain equivalent you might say, a certain social prestige attached to that relationship, which was full of meaning from the standpoint of Japan. And without contemplating the precise duplication of that and its military significance, I would think there is value in attempting to recapture that particular quality of relationship.
“Sir Alvary: You are not contemplating when you talk about this association … [ellipsis in the source text] you are not … [ellipsis in the source text]. In your mind you haven’t got anything in the shape of an agreement, signed agreement, or anything of that kind? It is merely getting together closer with Japan on cultural and social lines.
“Mr. Dulles: That is correct. It might possibly be desirable to have what you might call ‘an off-shore defense pact’ if we establish a defense line on the island chain which would be encompassed with the Aleutians, Japan, U.S. and the Ryukyus, Philippines, Australia and New Zealand. That is something apart from what I referred to.
“Sir Alvary: I am sure it is. May I break in to say that we can’t discuss with you today the question of what we call the Pacific Ocean Pact. But I shall have some comments and I hope to have them tomorrow or the next day and I hope you will give me another interview later on.
“Mr. Dulles: At the moment I am not giving any thought to that. Although if, as now seems likely, I pass on at the conclusion of my stay here, I go on to Manila, Canberra and Wellington, doubtless that would come up because the subject has been discussed with us by those government[s] in the past. I am not giving any thought to that at the present time. … [Ellipsis in the source text.]
“The reason why I asked Mr. Rockefeller to come on as part of this mission was because I wanted to have someone who would symbolize that cultural aspect, the possibility of exchange of scientific knowledge, students, and I would hope that your Government and other Western Governments, France, the Scandinavian countries, could all take an active part in making the Japanese feel that they had something to contribute that we welcomed and that our scientific knowledge, medical knowledge, political experimentation, etc. is available to their students because I believe that the good will that we can develop in that way is going to be indispensable to keep Japan over a long period in association with us as against the purely material economic attractions that can be set up by the mainland, as long as that remains Communist and they are in a position to open attractive markets and attractive sources of raw materials. Offsetting this is going to be a tough proposition for us, and I believe that this association of students and scholars, scientists, political students, can be very valuable in that respect. But I only contemplated that as a quite informal type of association.
“Sir Alvary: I agree. That’s exactly what I wanted to know. You had nothing concrete in mind?
“Mr. Dulles: No.
“Sir Alvary: … [ellipsis in the source text] and the association that you mention and so clearly described, and I entirely understand, [Page 827] would be concreted a little bit by our making cultural bi-lateral treaties.
“Mr. Dulles: And it is quite possible that Japan might become members [sic] of subsidiary agencies of the United Nations, such as UNESCO, which she would be eligible to join without actually being a member of the United Nations.” (Tokyo Post Files: 320.1 Peace Treaty)
The editors have been unable to identify the memorandum and telegram mentioned in the first quoted paragraph.